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JESSICA A. CLARKE†
ABSTRACT
In the course of debates over same-sex marriage, many scholars
have proposed new legal definitions of sexual orientation to better
account for the role of relationships in constituting identities. But
these discussions have overlooked a large body of case law in which
courts are already applying this model of sexual orientation, with
inequitable results.
This Article examines a set of fifteen years of sexual harassment
decisions in which courts have endeavored to determine the sexual
orientations of alleged harassers. Under federal law, sexual
harassment is actionable because it is a subspecies of sex
discrimination. A man who makes unwanted sexual advances toward
a woman discriminates on the basis of sex, courts presume, because
he would not have made sexual advances toward another man. In
1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the same presumption is available
in a case of same-sex harassment, i.e., a man harassing a man, if there
is “credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.” Since then,
federal courts have decided 154 cases on whether a harasser was
homosexual or experienced same-sex desire, often conflating the two
questions.
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Empirical assessment of these cases raises questions about legal
determinations of sexual orientation and sexual desire. First, it finds
that courts rely on overly simplistic assumptions about sexual
orientation that are contradicted by social science research.
Surprisingly, in searching for evidence of same-sex desire, courts
compare the harasser’s behavior to an idealized vision of romantic
courtship that resonates with the picture of same-sex intimacy drawn
by advocates of gay marriage. Second, these judicial inquiries into
desire reinforce biases in favor of heterosexuality. Courts interpret
sexually charged interactions to be devoid of desire when the harasser
is involved in a heterosexual marriage, while reading desire into far
less suggestive scenarios when the harasser self-identifies as
nonheterosexual. And third, the judicial preoccupation with desire
distracts from the purpose of sexual harassment law: eliminating
invidious sex discrimination.
This study has implications for other legal doctrines that may
require definitions of sexual orientation or inferences of desire. It
suggests that a relationship model of sexual orientation may not be
appropriate in all legal contexts, and it calls into question the project
of devising any all-purpose legal definition of sexual orientation. It
also argues that reformers should be wary of how inquiries into
sexual desire may operate as distractions and reinforce conventional
notions of sexuality.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent gay-rights victories have renewed legal interest in the
1
question of how sexual orientation ought to be defined. Influenced
by the same-sex marriage debate, many scholars have argued for new
definitions of sexual orientation that would emphasize the role of
2
relationships in defining identities. But these discussions have been
largely theoretical, overlooking the one context in which courts
3
routinely make determinations about individuals’ sexual orientations.
1. Until extremely recently, the classification “homosexual” was used primarily for
purposes of exclusion. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (banning military service by openly gay
men and lesbians), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321,
124 Stat. 3515, 3516; Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S.
Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 780–82
(1993) (discussing how the Immigration Act of 1990 repealed an exclusion based on “sexual
deviation” that had been used to bar gay men and lesbians from immigrating to the United
States). Although some states restrict adoptions by same-sex couples, only Florida still has a law
on the books that bans adoption by a “homosexual” individual. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3)
(West 2012). But see Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that § 63.042(3) violates the equal protection provision of the
Florida Constitution).
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 1002 (2012)
(arguing that “sexual orientation” should be defined to include both “General Orientation,”
meaning the sex of the partner the individual is attracted to most of the time, and “Specific
Orientation,” meaning the sex of the individual’s current partner); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage
Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1196–99 (2012) (arguing for a “public” and
“relational” concept of sexual orientation).
3. Professor Elizabeth Glazer discusses two main examples, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F. Supp. 2d 921, 996–97 (N.D. Cal. 2010), the case challenging the California initiative that
barred gay marriage, and Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, 792 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2011), in which bisexual individuals sued over being labeled “non-gay”
by an athletic organization. See Glazer, supra note 2, at 1000–01. Although the parties litigated
the plaintiffs’ sexual orientations in both cases, neither court reached a finding on any specific
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This Article is the first to analyze all sexual harassment cases in
which courts have endeavored to infer the sexual orientations of
alleged harassers since the Supreme Court held that sexual
orientation might be relevant to a sexual harassment claim fifteen
4
years ago. It engages in a close reading and empirical analysis of this
5
set of 154 cases, informed by social science research on sexuality.
Surprisingly, it reveals that courts are employing a model of sexual
orientation that emphasizes relationships, measuring same-sex desire
6
against a set of romantic ideals. But rather than advancing equality,
the effect of the doctrine is to privilege heterosexuality and distract
7
from sexism. This study demonstrates that despite recent gay-rights
plaintiff’s sexual orientation. But see Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual
Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2011) (discussing how the Los
Angeles County Men’s Jail selects inmates for protective housing units based on whether the
inmate is gay or transgender).
4. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).
5. These cases are noted with asterisks in Appendix A. The 154 figure represents a subset
of the 236 same-sex harassment cases reviewed for this Article. See infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
6. An analysis of older case law led one scholar to conclude that judges were employing
the prejudice that same-sex relationships are “predatory, lustful, or purely sexual [in] nature,”
and “do not reflect loving, long-term relationships.” Todd Brower, Social Cognition “at Work”:
Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay Identity in Title VII, 18 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 14 (2009).
Although these old prejudices are still at work, see infra Part II.B, new schemas about gay
identity as based in loving and long-term relationships have also surfaced, see infra Parts I.C,
II.A.
7. In the aftermath of Oncale, many law review articles criticized the opinion’s reasoning
and made contradicting predictions about its likely effects with respect to sexual orientation.
Compare Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale: Was It a Victory?,
6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 113, 150 (1999) (fearing Oncale would give rise to claims based
on “[p]uritanism” and “homophobia”), and Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182, 195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004)
(theorizing that Oncale would result in homophobic claims), with Marc Spindelman,
Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra, at 201, 204
(arguing Professor Halley lacked empirical support for her concerns of homophobia), and
Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the Boundaries
of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 680 (1998) (“[T]hese claims will not be used as a
new tool in the oppression of gay men and lesbians under the law . . . .”), and with Kenji
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 454 (2000)
(concluding that Oncale had brought sexual harassment jurisprudence to a “crossroads” and
hypothesizing that the increased visibility of bisexuality might “goad” courts into abandoning
their focus on sexual desire). Yet little empirical analysis has focused on how courts have
actually determined harassers’ sexualities since Oncale. But see YVONNE ZYLAN, STATES OF
PASSION 157–60, 185–90 (2011) (exploring the role of legal discourse in the construction of
sexuality through analysis of same-sex sexual harassment cases); Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the “Because of Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 56–58 (2007) (offering doctrinal analysis of a set of 105 cases on the
“because of sex” requirement decided between 1998 and 2006); cf. Ann C. McGinley, Creating
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victories, laws that turn on sexual orientation may still operate to
8
reinforce conventional notions of sexuality.
Understanding why liability for sexual harassment can turn on
sexual orientation requires some background on the development of
sexual harassment doctrine. No federal statute specifically forbids
sexual harassment in the workplace. In fact, the term “sexual”
9
harassment is a misnomer. Sexual harassment law derives from Title
VII’s prohibition on discrimination against any individual “because of
10
such individual’s . . . sex.” Title VII uses the term “sex” in the sense
11
of male or female, not in the sense of erotic activity. Thus, to prevail
on a sexual harassment claim, a woman must show she was harassed
12
because she is female. It is not enough to show that the harasser’s
13
conduct was sexual in nature. The Supreme Court has reasoned that
in the typical case of an unwanted sexual advance by a man toward a
woman, the harasser discriminated “because of sex” because he
would not have made sexual advances toward the plaintiff had she
14
been a man. Courts presume such male harassers are heterosexual.
15
In the 1998 decision, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that a male plaintiff alleging another man
harassed him could make out a claim of sexual harassment under the
same theory if he had “credible evidence that the harasser was
16
homosexual.” Again, the inference is that the harasser would not
have made sexual advances toward the plaintiff had he been a
Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151,
1151, 1167–91 (2008) (applying research on masculinities and bullying to argue that forms of
harassment that are “not overtly sexual or gendered” are “because of sex”).
8. For purposes of this Article, I use the term “sexuality” to refer both to sexual
orientation, as commonly understood to mean heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, and the
presence or absence of sexual desire. As discussed in Part I, these two questions are frequently
conflated in sexual harassment jurisprudence.
9. Throughout this Article, I use the term “sexual” in the sense of the common
understanding of the term “erotic.” I use the term “sex” to refer to notions of maleness or
femaleness understood to be biological, and the term “gender” to refer to notions of masculinity
or femininity understood to be cultural.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
11. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
16. Id. The Court left the door open for plaintiffs to advance other theories about how
same-sex harassment might be “‘because of . . . sex,’” holding that the “sexual desire” theory
was just one possibility. Id. at 80–81 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). However, most
prevailing plaintiffs have relied on a sexual desire theory. See infra Figure 1.
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woman. Many lower courts have interpreted Oncale to require that
they look into the hearts and minds of harassers for evidence of
17
sexual desire.
This Article argues that the resulting decisions are problematic
on three main grounds. First, they essentialize sexuality, making
unfounded assumptions about sexual orientation and same-sex desire.
Although social science researchers have not agreed on any allpurpose definition of sexual orientation, most courts have implicitly
defined gay identity as public announcement and acceptance—in
other words, being out of the closet at work. Courts assume that
sexual orientations are binary, static, and transparent. They infer
sexual orientation from desire, and vice versa. Unless a purported
harasser identifies as nonheterosexual, courts are loath to
characterize same-sex interactions as motivated by desire. Courts
measure sexual orientation against a particular conception of samesex relationships—comparing a harasser’s actions to an idealized
vision of romantic courtship that resonates with the picture of samesex intimacy drawn by advocates of gay marriage. Under these
doctrines, the possibility of same-sex desire is negated if a court
concludes that a harasser intended to humiliate, threaten, or engage
in mere horseplay with a plaintiff. In contrast, the same conduct
would likely be actionable harassment had a plaintiff and harasser not
been of the same sex.
This Article’s second main ground of criticism is that the samesex harassment cases reinforce heterosexism, in other words,
discrimination in favor of cross-sex orientations and relationships.
18
Confirming some of the fears of early critics, this empirical
assessment reveals that the doctrine resulting from Oncale privileges
heterosexuality. It does so in more complicated ways than scholars
initially predicted, however. When holding that no inference of samesex desire is possible, courts often emphasize that harassers are
involved in heterosexual marriages with children. The reasoning is
not simply the (demonstrably false) assumption that a person who is
involved in a cross-sex marriage could never harbor same-sex desire.
Rather, the courts in these cases seem to be concerned about the high
stakes of a legal finding of same-sex desire, which not only imposes a
stigmatized nonheterosexual identity on the harasser, but also poses a

17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 7, at 114; Halley, supra note 7, at 195.
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threat to the harasser’s spouse and children. In effect, these
decisions give purported heterosexuals license to experiment with
same-sex sexuality in the workplace without undermining their
heterosexual status. These cases stand in stark contrast those in which
a harasser is “openly gay.” When a harasser is openly gay, courts infer
desire with ease, reinforcing stereotypes about gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals as overly sexual. In almost every case in which a court found
credible evidence of homosexuality, it held that a jury could infer the
20
harasser desired the same-sex plaintiff. This doctrine, in which
liability turns on an employee’s openness about his or her sexual
orientation, creates incentives for employers to discourage employees
21
from coming out at work. It also invites invasive discovery practices
aimed at determining the sexualities of alleged harassers.
Third, the judicial preoccupation with sexuality undermines the
goals of sex-equality law. Legal scholars have engaged in extensive
debate about why sexual harassment is discrimination “because of
22
sex.” Their theories can be grouped into three main ideas: (1) that
sexual harassment is sexual domination, (2) that sexual harassment is
the perpetuation of gendered expectations for certain workers, and
(3) that sexual harassment is deviation from the norm of sex
23
blindness. This Article does not take a side in the debates among
these theories. Nor does it advance a new theory about why
harassment is “because of sex.” Rather, it argues that under any of
the three main normative theories, judicial inquiries into the
sexualities of harassers are distractions from the harm of sex
discrimination.
This is not to say Oncale’s ultimate holding, that Title VII bars
same-sex harassment, is incorrect. Rather, this Article takes issue
with Oncale’s suggestion that homosexual desire is what transforms

19. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 449 (“[C]ourts may believe that where any ambiguity
exists, it is better to let the guilty homosexual go free than to convict the innocent
heterosexual.”).
20. See infra notes 371–73 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.D.
22. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1169, 1217 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REV. 691, 762 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1755 (1998).
23. Others have argued that sexual harassment is harmful for reasons apart from sex
discrimination. See infra note 445. Although they still operate as background norms, these
justifications rarely surface in federal cases, because sexual harassment law is grounded in Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.
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workplace interactions into sexual harassment. It argues that courts
and advocates should not equate desire or sexual orientation with
discriminatory intent. Superficially, sexuality may seem to be an
appealing proxy for discriminatory motive at a time when courts are
24
raising the bar for proof that sex discrimination still exists. But
examination of the cases reveals that determining sexuality is not so
simple. In inferring desire, courts uncritically rely on reductive
notions of sexual orientation as a heuristic for determining
discriminatory intent, rather than considering alternative
25
presumptions that might better target sex-based harassment. Instead
of endorsing any single alternative to the desire-based rule, this
Article provides a set of potential rules that make sense from each
26
normative standpoint.
The sexual harassment cases have lessons for other legal contexts
involving classifications based on sexual orientation or the regulation
of desire generally. By challenging the assumption that determining
an individual’s sexual orientation is an easy doctrinal shortcut, these
cases suggest caution with respect to legal efforts to classify
individuals by sexual orientation. They shed light on questions such as
whether proposed laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation should require a plaintiff to prove her sexual
27
orientation to show she is part of the “protected class.” The
harassment cases also suggest caution with respect to the regulation
of desire more generally, in contexts such as family and criminal law.
Despite the growing consensus in favor of gay rights, regulatory
regimes that turn on sexuality are likely to be carried out in ways that
privilege heterosexual identities and conventional relationships.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I argues that the samesex harassment cases rest on dramatically undertheorized notions of

24. See Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101,
103–04 (2004) (defending the presumption that sexual desire is discriminatory on practical
grounds).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Figure 2.
27. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in employment. See Statewide Employment Laws and Policies, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (June 19, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/employment_
laws_062013.pdf. Legislation to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis sexual
orientation is proposed almost every year. Jennifer C. Pizer, Brad Sears, Christy Mallory & Nan
D. Hunter, Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT
People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal
Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012).
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sexual orientation and desire. Part II shows how determinations of
sexual orientation and sexual desire raise troubling normative
concerns by reinforcing heterosexism. Part III demonstrates that
sexuality determinations are a distraction from the goals of sexual
harassment law, under any plausible account of the doctrine. It also
discusses a set of doctrinal alternatives for courts and advocates.
Finally, Part IV draws out the implications of this study for other
judicial or governmental efforts to determine sexual identity or to
make desire the focal point of regulation.
I. ESSENTIALIZING SEXUALITY
In this Part, I will explain how courts have come to focus on
desire in same-sex harassment cases and argue that these courts are
applying essentialist notions of both sexual orientation and same-sex
desire. But before proceeding, a word on what I mean by
“essentializing.” I do not argue that sexual desires or sexual
orientations, insofar as orientation is defined as desires for one sex or
both, have no biological basis. By essentialism, I mean a certain set of
28
assumptions about sexuality. First is the assumption that the
categories homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual are a natural and
29
necessary way of dividing up biological phenomena like desires.
Second is the idea that every individual has a stable essence that can
be neatly classified as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, and

28. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 22–27 (1990)
(explaining how sexual orientation is an “inconceivably coarse ax[is] of categorization” such
that “even people who share . . . our own positioning[] along [this] crude ax[is] may still be
different enough from us, and from each other, to seem like all but different species”); Jessica
A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J.
1219, 1242–43 (2011) (discussing types of antiessentialist arguments); Gayle Rubin, Thinking
Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 275–77 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984) (discussing “sexual
essentialism”).
29. See, e.g., LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE
AND DESIRE 21–24, 246–53 (2008); RITCH C. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, THE NEW GAY TEENAGER 27–
28 (2005). I do not intend to make the ontological claim that such experiences are entirely
socially constructed without any physiological or psychological basis; rather, I make the
epistemological claim that our understanding of such experiences is mediated through law,
society, culture, and discourse. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 866–68 (2002)
(reading Professor Judith Butler not as claiming “there is no biological substrate to sex,” but
rather as claiming “there may be a biological component to sex, but that we will never be sure
what that biological component is, as we can only apprehend it through culture (that is,
gender)”).
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discerned through common sense. And last is the assumption that
members of each of these three groups share a common set of
31
distinguishing characteristics and typical experiences. This Part will
argue that sexual desires and orientations are complex, variable, and
32
susceptible to many definitions. It will also argue that in the samesex harassment context, courts operate under essentialist assumptions
about sexuality that are descriptively inaccurate.
A. Conflating Sexual Orientation, Desire, and Discrimination
By way of background, this Section will briefly explain how
courts have found themselves determining the sexual orientations of
alleged harassers in adjudicating sexual harassment cases, and
conflating that question with the issue of whether the harasser desired
the plaintiff.
To prove a claim of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must generally
establish four elements: (1) that the harassment was because of sex,
(2) that it was severe or pervasive, (3) that it was unwelcome, and (4)
33
that there is a basis for employer liability. A harasser’s sexuality is
relevant to the first element—whether the harassment was “because
of sex.” It is important to recall that the term “sex” here is used in the
sense of identity as a man or woman, not in the sense of erotic in
content. Oncale clarified:
We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of
sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations. “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
34
not exposed.”

30. See PAUL BLOOM, HOW PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE
WHAT WE LIKE 9 (2010) (defining essentialism as “the notion that things have an underlying
reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly and it is this hidden nature that really
matters”).
31. Cf. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 585 (1990) (discussing this sort of essentialism with respect to the category of “women”).
32. To say that sexual orientations are complex is not to say they can be freely chosen. See
DIAMOND, supra note 29, at 249–53.
33. E.g., Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 2011).
34. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

INFERRING DESIRE

535

In Oncale, the Supreme Court gave three illustrations of how a
plaintiff might prove sexual harassment was “because of sex” in a
same-sex harassment case. First, when a plaintiff alleges “explicit or
implicit proposals of sexual activity,” an inference of sex
discrimination would be supported if “there were credible evidence
35
that the harasser was homosexual.” Second, such an inference would
be supported “if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in
36
the workplace.” And third, an inference of sex discrimination would
be supported by “direct comparative evidence about how the alleged
37
harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”
Lower courts have interpreted these three illustrations as evidentiary
routes plaintiffs might pursue.
Oncale did not hold that its three examples were exhaustive, and
some circuits have recognized same-sex harassment to be “because of
38
sex” based on other theories. For example, many courts consider
whether harassment was a result of sex stereotyping—that is, whether
39
it was intended to enforce gender conformity. This theory is based
40
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
that discrimination may include adverse treatment of an individual
for failing to meet stereotypes associated with her group—in that
case, a female accountant who was not promoted due to her failure to
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
41
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” A handful of

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 80–81.
38. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999).
39. E.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290–92 (3d Cir. 2009); Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762–66 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413
F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th
Cir. 2001); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000).
These courts have not gone so far as to hold that all animus based on sexual orientation
is reducible to sex stereotyping. See, e.g., Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763. Rather, they require evidence
that the discrimination was based on a plaintiff’s gender presentation. See, e.g., id. So, for
example, a plaintiff might survive summary judgment if he were harassed with both antigay slurs
and insults suggesting he failed to “look, speak, and act” in a masculine manner. Prowel, 579
F.3d at 292. In other cases, however, courts have viewed sexual-orientation discrimination as
swamping other motives and precluding a sex-discrimination claim. See Zachary A. Kramer,
Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 207 & n.17 (2009).
40. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
41. Id. at 235.
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courts have allowed cases to proceed on yet other theories. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has held that unwelcome sexual touching
43
is per se “because of sex.”
Although the Supreme Court held that “harassing conduct need
not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
44
discrimination on the basis of sex,” in practice, it has been difficult
45
for plaintiffs to establish causation based on any other theory. For
purposes of this Article, I reviewed 236 published and unpublished
federal-court decisions in which courts reached a conclusion on the
“because of sex” element of a same-sex harassment case from the
46
time of the Oncale decision in March 1998 until March 2013.

42. See Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032, at
*9 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2012) (holding that harassment is based on sex if it is “explicitly sexual and
patently degrading to women,” meaning “that a reasonable person, regardless of gender, would
consider the sexually offensive conduct and comments more offensive to women than men”);
Vargas-Cabán v. Caribbean Transp. Servs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D.P.R. 2003) (denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss when the female plaintiff alleged a female supervisor harassed
her out of jealousy over a relationship the plaintiff had with the defendant’s male president).
43. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see
also Bligh-Glover v. Rizzo, No. 1:08CV2788, 2012 WL 4506029, at *13–14 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30,
2012) (concluding a jury could find harassment was because of sex based on “sexually
inappropriate comments” and “physical contact”); Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48
F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999) (“[A] reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the
sexually explicit quality of the verbal and physical assaults, especially the frequent references to
homosexual sex acts, that Plaintiff’s gender was one motivating factor of the offensive
behavior.”); Bacon v. Art Inst. of Chi., 6 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766–67 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that
evidence that an aggressor “continually touched or grabbed [the plaintiff’s] buttocks and other
of [his] body parts,” “[ran] his fingers through [the plaintiff’s] hair,” and “rubbed his penis
against [the plaintiff]” was sufficient to create a jury question as to whether harassment was
because of sex). For discussion of cases in which male-on-male touching of genitalia was not
considered “because of sex,” however, see infra notes 228–33 and accompanying text.
44. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
45. Confusion on this point is so persistent that the First Circuit recently found it necessary
to “repeat previous reminders to the bar and bench that the harassing action need not be
inspired ‘by sexual desire’ to be redressable under Title VII—the only requirement is that the
action must be because of the victim’s sex.” Medina-Rivera v. MVM Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 138 n.4
(1st Cir. 2013) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
46. These cases are cited in Appendix A. The Appendix includes only cases decided by
federal courts under Title VII or parallel federal or state employment-discrimination statutes
from March 4, 1998 through March 31, 2013. It does not include cases in which the “because of
sex” element appears not to have been contested, or in which the court did not reach any
conclusion on that issue. It includes only dispositive motions, mostly summary judgment rulings,
although I also reviewed a small number of decisions on discovery disputes, discussed in Part
II.D. I attempted to collect all cases meeting these criteria, but I do not purport to have
assembled a comprehensive list. I identified these cases through a number of traditional legal
research methods, including broad searches in the “All Federal Cases” Westlaw database using
a variety of search terms. I also independently reviewed all cases referenced in the secondary
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Figure 1 sets forth the number of cases in which plaintiffs prevailed
on each theory of why same-sex harassment is “because of sex.”
Plaintiffs have relied on the theory that the harasser acted out of
discriminatory sexual desire in the majority of these decisions. My
research has uncovered just two opinions in which a plaintiff alleging
same-sex harassment survived summary judgment exclusively based
on the second evidentiary route—general hostility toward men or
47
women in the workplace. With respect to the third route—evidence
of more favorable treatment of one sex—the Seventh Circuit
explained, “That evidence may be difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain when the plaintiff and his harasser work in the kind of singlesex work environment that the Supreme Court confronted in Oncale;
and it is in that kind of environment where same-sex harassment
48
frequently occurs.” And although the sex-stereotyping theory is on
the ascendance, it is not uniformly recognized or consistently
49
considered by courts.

literature on this topic, including many of those cases collected by Clare Diefenbach. See supra
note 7.
47. McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 923, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2011);
Bailey v. Henderson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2000); cf. Amezaga v. Potter, No. 04-1944
(RLA), 2007 WL 1387287, at *7 (D.P.R. May 8, 2007) (denying summary judgment in a case in
which a female harasser insulted a female plaintiff’s “body and physique” and “denigrated her
intellectual capacity and professional qualifications” based on both the second and third Oncale
theories). See generally Ramit Mizrahi, Note, “Hostility to the Presence of Women”: Why
Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE
L.J. 157 (2004).
48. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., McCown v.
St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543–44 (8th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin,
Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 520 (6th Cir. 2001); cf. EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 422 F.3d 840, 846–47 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the “accident of a mostly female workplace” could not insulate an
employer from liability for male-on-female harassment).
49. See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2012) (declining to
decide whether to recognize a sex-stereotyping theory, observing “there is at least some
resistance to allowing, in same-sex harassment suits, evidence that does not fall within any
Oncale category”); Borski v. Staten Island Rapid Transit, No. 04 CV 3614(SLT)(CLP), 2006 WL
3681142, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2006) (failing to consider a sex-stereotyping theory in a case
in which the harassment included an implication that the male plaintiff wore women’s clothes).
Routinely, courts simply proceed mechanically through each of the three Oncale theories, even
in jurisdictions that recognize sex-stereotyping claims. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Norfolk S. Ry.,
No. 10-cv-1556, 2011 WL 3568843, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2011).
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Figure 1. Plaintiffs Prevailing on Theories of why Same-Sex
50
Harassment was Because of Sex
Sexual Desire /
Theory

Homosexuality
(Oncale #1)

Number of
Cases

41

Hostility

Different

Sex-

Toward

Treatment

Stereotyping

One Sex

of Sexes

(Price

(Oncale #2)

(Oncale #3)

Waterhouse)

5

16

8

Other

9

Thus, plaintiffs are most successful arguing they were harassed
due to discriminatory sexual desire—Oncale’s first theory. In
analyzing this theory, courts have conflated the question of a
harasser’s sexual orientation with the question of a harasser’s sexual
desire for a particular plaintiff. Although no court has explicitly
formulated the rule in these terms, my review of the cases shows a
plaintiff can prevail on Oncale’s first theory by showing either that (1)
the same-sex harasser sexually desired her or (2) the harasser was
homosexual. Some courts state that they require plaintiffs to
51
demonstrate both of these elements. But in practice, courts treat
52
these two inquiries as overlapping, to the point of being circular. I
have found only one case in which a court expressly held that conduct
was not “because of sex” when the plaintiff could demonstrate the
same-sex harasser’s sexual desire for him but failed to make an

50. These cases are cited in Appendix B. I note that these plaintiffs did not necessarily
prevail on every issue. They merely prevailed on the question of whether the harassment was
“because of sex” by having sufficient evidence or allegations, depending on the applicable
procedural standard. These decisions do not include those in which courts did not specify any
theory. See, e.g., Wright v. Porters Restoration, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-163-PRC, 2010 WL 2559877,
at *3 (N.D. Ind. June 23, 2010) (denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss a same-sex harassment
claim without noting any Oncale theory because the plaintiff had met the pleading standard by
“rais[ing] the possibility of a right to relief above a speculative level”).
51. See, e.g., Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1010–11.
52. See id. (concluding that “[a]lthough none of these incidents [of harassment] necessarily
proves that [the male harasser] Jemison is gay, the connotations of sexual interest in [the male
plaintiff] Shepherd certainly suggest that Jemison might be sexually oriented toward members
of the same sex” while “readily acknowledg[ing] that the factfinder could infer from [evidence
that Jemison also harassed a woman] that Jemison’s harassment was bisexual and therefore
beyond the reach of Title VII” (citations omitted)); see also Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart
Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010) (concluding,
from the “sufficiently intimate nature” of the harassment, that a factfinder could infer “an
underlying sexual attraction” that was “motivated by some degree of homosexual desire
towards [the plaintiff]” (alteration in original) (quoting Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d
1063, 1069 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005)) (quotation mark omitted)).
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independent showing of the harasser’s homosexual orientation. The
general trend is toward a rule that requires only a showing that the
harasser sexually desired the plaintiff, without any independent
54
showing of the harasser’s homosexuality. Alternatively, many courts
hold that credible evidence of homosexuality is sufficient, interpreting
Oncale to allow an inference of desire to be drawn from the fact that
55
the harasser was homosexual.
Courts have also conflated the question of orientation/desire
with the question of discrimination. Decisions that require only a
showing of desire without any showing of homosexuality raise a
logical dilemma: What if the harasser was bisexual and did not
56
discriminate on the basis of sex in her desires? Such a “defense” has

53. See Myers v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 06-CV-11252, 2007 WL 2413087, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 21, 2007) (dismissing a case at summary judgment when the plaintiff did “not offer any
evidence that [the alleged harasser] is a homosexual and thus allegedly attempted to kiss the
plaintiff because of sex”).
54. See Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “if a
plaintiff presents evidence that he was harassed by a member of the same sex, and that the
harassment was sexual rather than merely humiliating in nature, that evidence is sufficient to
support a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor”); Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1265
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that one “evidentiary route turns on whether the harasser acted out of
sexual desire,” and that “[a] plaintiff who makes this showing establishes that the harassment
took place because of her sex, regardless whether she has also demonstrated that her harasser is
homosexual”). Courts have found evidence of same-sex sexual desire or erotic conduct
sufficient without independent evidence of the harasser’s general sexual orientation in several
other recent cases. E.g., Robinson v. Carefocus, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-208, 2011 WL 2672037, at *7
(E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2011); Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (N.D.
Ill. 2010); Cragle v. Werner Enters., Inc., Nos. 3:07cv2132, 3:07cv2133, 2010 WL 936774, at *6
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2010).
55. See EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 522 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) (“When the
harasser is a homosexual, however, the conclusion that the harassment was gender based is
defensible.”); Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc. 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)
(holding that “because there is no dispute that all of the alleged harassers in the present case
were homosexual, there is an inference that their conduct was based on sexual desire, and thus,
sex”); cf. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
that one way a plaintiff can allege sexual harassment is to demonstrate that “the harasser was
motivated by sexual desire,” and that the inference of desire is “reasonable” when the
harassment is “sexually charged” and the harasser is “gay or lesbian”); Hunter v. Allvac, No. 10CV-941S, 2012 WL 3746270, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2012) (“Nor is there any evidence from
which to infer that any of the coworkers who allegedly harassed Plaintiff were homosexual,
which would give rise to an inference of discrimination based on sexual desire.” (citing Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998))).
56. This dilemma preoccupied the Supreme Court for some time during the oral argument
over Oncale. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–12, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL
751912.
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succeeded only once. More often, this problem arises without
58
resolution. Courts and commentators have been bothered by the
“two wrongs don’t make a right” aspect of this theoretical bisexuality
59
loophole since the inception of sexual harassment jurisprudence.
Their concern begs the question of what the harm is that sexual
harassment law aims to address—sexist or sexual conduct in the
60
workplace? In any event, the loophole for the “bisexual harasser” is
quite narrow—those courts that recognize it will still find
discrimination so long as the harasser subjected members of one sex
61
to qualitatively or quantitatively different treatment.
Although few defendants raise bisexual-harasser defenses, a
constant problem in these cases is the “equal-opportunity harasser”—
a harasser who behaves in a sexually charged manner with both men
and women in the workplace, but does not claim to be bisexual, and

57. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause Title VII is
premised on eliminating discrimination, inappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or
is inflicted regardless of sex, is outside the statute’s ambit.”). In Holman, bisexuality was not
technically raised as a “defense,” rather, the plaintiffs had pleaded themselves out of court by
alleging that both plaintiffs (a married couple) suffered the exact same course of harassment. Id.
at 405.
58. See, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We
need not delve into what inferences—if any—might be drawn from a harasser’s bisexuality.”);
La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting, without resolving,
the “difficult question of the status of bisexual harassers”).
59. See Yoshino, supra note 7, at 442–43 (noting that the lack of defendants employing the
bisexuality defense may be a result of their fear that courts are not comfortable with the
“double for nothing” reasoning). Compare EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 522
(6th Cir. 2001) (commenting that the bisexual-harasser defense “should make for some
interesting workplace notices posted by employers: ‘We do not tolerate sexual harassment; but
if you must, make sure you are equally gross with both sexes’”), with Holman, 211 F.3d at 404
(“Surely attorneys will not advise their employer-clients to instruct their employees to harass
still more people—to commit, in most cases, state law torts—which could subject their clients to
lawsuits and themselves to claims of malpractice and charges of professional misconduct.”).
60. See infra note 445.
61. Katz, supra note 24, at 130; Yoshino, supra note 7, at 445–46. Quantitatively different
harassment could vary in frequency based on the victim’s sex. For example, a harasser might
flash both a man and a woman, but the woman might only get flashed once, while the man gets
flashed “four or five times weekly.” See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th
Cir. 1999) (requiring evidence of harassment of both sexes “in the same way and to the same
degree” to support the bisexual-harasser defense). Qualitatively different harassment might
vary in kind or severity. For example, women might be harassed by men “draping their arms
around” them “and making suggestive comments,” whereas men might be harassed by “painful
physical assault on their genitalia.” Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1176 (D. Minn. 1999).
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does not admit she was motivated by any sort of desire. Courts
distinguish bisexual harassers, who harass out of sexual desire, from
equal-opportunity harassers, who harass out of generalized vulgarity
or misanthropy. Because Oncale instructed that not all sexually
charged conduct is harassment because of sex, courts must determine
whether the harassment arose from sexual desire or some other
motive. As the following sections will demonstrate, this determination
often turns on whether a harasser identifies as gay, lesbian, or
bisexual, as do the results in other scenarios in which a harasser’s
63
intent is ambiguous. The next two sections will argue that courts
apply essentialist notions both in assigning sexual orientations and in
determining whether a jury could infer a harasser acted out of sexual
desire.
B. Reductive Definitions of Sexual Orientation
How do courts determine who is gay? Oncale did not explain
what sort of evidence might suffice to demonstrate homosexuality, or
what definition of “homosexual” courts might use. Contrary to
popular wisdom, there is no unitary definition. The practice of
organizing all persons into the categories of heterosexual,
homosexual, and bisexual based on their sexual desires is by no
64
65
means universal; it is both culturally and historically contingent. It

62. See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[The
harasser] was just an indiscriminately vulgar and offensive superior, obnoxious to men and
women alike.”).
63. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 906–08 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(holding that a harasser who did not self-identify as gay or bisexual was not engaged in sexual
harassment when she harassed both men and women), with Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472
F.3d 930, 934, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a harasser who self-identified as “queer”
sexually harassed female employees, even though she also had also “grabbed two male
employees’ buttocks”). Hy-Vee and Kampmier are discussed in greater detail in Parts II.A and
II.B, respectively.
64. See generally JOSEPH A. MASSAD, DESIRING ARABS (2007); AFSANEH NAJMABADI,
WOMEN WITH MUSTACHES AND MEN WITHOUT BEARDS: GENDER AND SEXUAL ANXIETIES
OF
IRANIAN MODERNITY (2005); JASBIR PUAR, TERRORIST ASSEMBLAGES:
HOMONATIONALISM IN QUEER TIMES (2007); Gilbert H. Herdt, Ritualized Homosexual
Behavior in the Male Cults of Melanesia, 1862–1983: An Introduction, in RITUALIZED
HOMOSEXUALITY IN MELANESIA 1 (Gilbert H. Herdt ed., 1984); Sonia Katyal, Exporting
Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (2002). I am indebted to Professor Katherine Franke’s
work for pointing me to these sources.
65. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (“[A]ccording to some scholars
the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th
century.”). See generally JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY
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may even be outdated. As psychologist Ritch Savin-Williams has
observed, “[T]eenagers are increasingly redefining, reinterpreting,
and renegotiating their sexuality such that possessing a gay, lesbian,
66
or bisexual identity is practically meaningless.” Some individuals
resist categorization based on the sex of their preferred sexual
67
partner, opting instead for a sort of “it’s complicated” response to
68
questions about sexual-orientation status. Others identify as asexual
69
or gray-sexual.
Researchers have defined sexual orientation along at least three
70
axes: self-identification, sexual behavior, and desires. They have also
recognized that an individual’s sexual orientation, as defined along

(1995); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon Books
ed. 1978) (1976); SEDGWICK, supra note 28.
66. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 1.
67. Cf. Clare Suddath, Your Facebook Relationship Status: It’s Complicated, TIME (May 8,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1895694,00.html (discussing Facebook’s
options for designating “relationship status,” including “single, in a relationship, engaged,
married, it’s complicated, and in an open relationship”).
68. See SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 30 (“Members of the younger generation doubt
that their sexual orientation can be reduced to either homosexual or bisexual or heterosexual.”);
Ruth Colker, Response, Hybrid Revisited, 100 GEO. L.J. 1069, 1072–73 (2012) (describing
“sexual orientation resisters” who oppose the notion that “the biological sex of one’s partner is
of key importance in matters of self-identity”); Michael Schulman, Generation LGBTQIA, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2013, at E1 (“[T]his generation is seeking something more radical: an unbending
of gender roles beyond the binary of male/female. The core question isn’t whom they love, but
who they are—that is, identity as distinct from sexual orientation.”). The problem of individuals
who respond with “other” or “something else” to questions regarding sexual orientation is
endemic to social science research in this area. See, e.g., SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 31
(discussing the “staggering” number of young survey respondents who answer questions
regarding sexual orientation with “don’t know,” “not sure,” “none,” “queer,” or “all of the
above”); Anjani Chandra, William D. Mosher, Casey Copen & Catlainn Sionean, Sexual
Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in the United States: Data from the 2006–2008
National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., Mar. 3, 2011, at 1, 33–35 (2011),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr036.pdf (noting the difficulty in compiling
national estimates of sexual identity and behavior due to the relative frequency of the
“something else” response).
69. See SIMON LEVAY & JANICE BALDWIN, HUMAN SEXUALITY 230–31 (4th ed. 2012)
(providing an overview of research regarding asexuality). See generally Elizabeth Emens,
Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5–11) (discussing
the emerging understanding of asexuality as an identity category), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2218783.
70. See, e.g., Donna Brogan, Erika Frank, Lisa Elon & Katherine A. O’Hanlan,
Methodologic Concerns in Defining Lesbian for Health Research, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 109, 109
(2001) (“Consensus is building that sexual orientation can be defined along three dimensions:
self-identification, sexual behavior, and sexual attraction or desire.” (footnotes omitted)); Ritch
C. Savin-Williams, Who’s Gay? Does It Matter?, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 40,
40 (2006) (detailing the same).
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any of these three dimensions, may vary over time. To further
complicate matters, survey evidence demonstrates that these three
72
definitions do not always yield the same result. These definitional
difficulties have led some to suggest that researchers should “forsake
the general notion of sexual orientation altogether and assess only
73
those components relevant for the research question.”
With rare exception, courts have not endeavored to theorize
which definition of sexual orientation is best suited to determining
74
whether workplace harassment is discrimination because of sex.
Rather, they rely on assumptions that social science researchers have
concluded “are patently false: that homosexuality is a uniform
attribute across individuals, that it is stable over time, and that it can
75
be easily measured.”
This Section will critically analyze how courts examine facts
related to sexual orientation along each of these three axes—selfidentification, conduct, and desire—as well as a fourth category
considered legally relevant, which I will refer to as “reputation.” The
cases reveal that courts are generally wary of concluding that an
individual is homosexual unless that individual identifies as such in
the workplace. They privilege a model of sexual orientation based on
public announcement and acceptance, in other words, being out of
the closet at work.

71. Brogan et al., supra note 70, at 109.
72. See Luis F. Morales Knight & Debra A. Hope, Correlates of Same-Sex Attractions and
Behaviors Among Self-Identified Heterosexual University Students, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 1199, 1199 (2012) (collecting surveys which provide “clear evidence of the disconnect
between these variables” through the marked difference in the percentage of respondents who
identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, and of those who reported same-sex attraction or behavior);
Zhana Vrangalova & Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Mostly Heterosexual and Mostly Gay/Lesbian:
Evidence for New Sexual Orientation Identities, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 85, 86 (2012)
(collecting studies demonstrating discrepancies among sexual-orientation components).
73. Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Geoffrey L. Ream, Prevalence and Stability of Sexual
Orientation Components During Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 385, 393 (2007). Rather than one universal definition of sexual orientation, researchers
could define the term in accord with the purpose of the research, “[f]or example, to assess HIV
transmission, measure sexual behavior; to assess interpersonal attachments, measure
sexual/romantic attraction; and to assess political ideology, measure sexual identity.” Id.
74. One such exception, discussed below, is Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998, 1011
(7th Cir. 1999). See infra notes 569–72 and accompanying text.
75. EDWARD O. LAUMANN, JOHN H. GAGNON, ROBERT T. MICHAEL & STUART
MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 283 (2000).
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1. Self-Identification. Many decisions regard self-identification as
76
the litmus test of sexual orientation. Often, the harasser’s
77
homosexuality was simply not contested by the employer-defendant.
In other cases, courts look to statements made by alleged harassers
78
indicating same-sex preferences or relationships.
But as a general matter, courts apply rules of strict construction
to admissions of gay identity, going to great lengths to avoid allowing
juries to read hints, subtleties, or innuendos as expressions of the love
that dare not speak its name. As literary critic Eve Sedgwick has
written, “The speech acts that coming out . . . can comprise
79
are . . . strangely specific.”
Courts are wary of assigning a
homosexual orientation to anyone who has not expressly chosen that
identity and “come out” of the closet by following a very particular
cultural script.
80
For example, in Love v. Motiva Enterprises LLC, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to consider evidence that a
coworker had heard the alleged harasser, a woman, “state loudly
several times that the reason the men did not like her was because she
81
was gay or female.” The court did not consider this “clear and
credible proof that [the alleged harasser] is homosexual sufficient to
defeat summary judgment,” because the statement could be
construed as reflecting the coworker’s uncertainty about which of the
two conditions was stated as the reason men did not like the alleged
harasser—perhaps the coworker could not recall if the harasser said
76. See, e.g., Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *4
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010) (“[N]either the Plaintiff nor anyone else he has discussed selfidentifies as homosexual . . . .”); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846
(E.D. Va. 2002) (“[Plaintiff] also concedes that [the alleged harasser] never told [Plaintiff] that
he was a homosexual.”). A plaintiff may lose her case if she fails to secure an admission of
homosexuality from the alleged harasser. See EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008) (granting summary judgment for
an employer when the plaintiff could not depose the alleged harasser to establish his sexuality).
77. E.g., Russell v. Univ. of Tex. of Permian Basin, 234 F. App’x 195, 201 (5th Cir. 2007);
Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09 Cv. 7821(RPP), 2012 WL 3631276, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472
F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1788), 2006 WL 2024101, at *6; Reply Brief in Support of
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 6, Smith v. Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308
(N.D. Ga. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-1042).
78. See, e.g., Adeshile v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. H-06-3480, 2008 WL 112103, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 9, 2008) (“Green’s discussion of her sexual preferences and exploits with women
provides some evidence supporting a homosexual orientation.”).
79. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 3–4.
80. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 904.

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

INFERRING DESIRE

545

the men did not like her because she was gay, or if she said the men
82
did not like her because she was female. It was also possible that the
harasser’s statement only reflected that the men thought she was gay,
83
not that she self-identified as such. In another case, Warner v. USF
84
Holland, an alleged harasser turned to the plaintiff in the restroom
while the two men were standing side by side at urinals and, with his
genitals exposed, said, “If I was gay, I would like to be with somebody
85
like you.” The district court gave this statement a close grammatical
analysis, concluding that “read literally, the subjunctive ‘if I was gay’
86
would mean that [the alleged harasser] was not gay.”
Some courts defer to an alleged harasser’s self-identification as
heterosexual, even in the face of admissions of same-sex desire. In
one case, a court reconciled an alleged harasser’s self-identification as
“heterosexual” with his statements that “he liked males, told [the
male] plaintiff he ‘wanted’ him, and once asked plaintiff if he ‘had a
big dick’ and said that he ‘liked that sort of thing,’” by reasoning that
87
there was no evidence the harasser “made such comments often.”
Courts will disregard even same-sex sexual contact when it conflicts
88
with heterosexual identification.
One assumption behind this reliance on self-identification is that
heterosexually identified individuals never desire same-sex sexual
conduct or engage in same-sex sexual behaviors. This is demonstrably
false. Indeed, the category of men who engage in same-sex sexual
activity but do not identify as gay or bisexual is significant enough

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Warner v. USF Holland Inc., No. 08 C 6823, 2012 WL 245190 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2012).
85. Id. at *6.
86. Id. But see Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that an
alleged harasser’s statement that she was “a lesbian” at a family gathering “so her mother would
stop trying to fix her up with people” was enough “to support an inference, however strained,
that [the alleged harasser] is a homosexual”).
87. Hubbard v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 06-43-JE, 2006 WL 2863222, at *12 (D. Or.
Oct. 4, 2006), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2008).
88. See Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *1, *4
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010) (disregarding the harassers’ “consensual same-sex sexual behavior,
including stroking one another’s penises and nipples, kissing, dancing, and humping each other”
because they “never actually exposed themselves to one another”); Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine,
No. Civ.A.03-3139, 2004 WL 2297459, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2004) (holding that harassment
was not “because of sex” even though the harasser grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals), aff’d, 150 F.
App’x 378 (5th Cir. 2005); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 (E.D.
Va. 2002) (holding that harassment was not “because of sex” even though the harasser placed
his genitals on the plaintiff’s shoulder).
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that public-health researchers denominate this group with the
89
acronym MSM: “men who have sex with men.” According to a 2011
national telephone survey, only 3 percent of men and 5 percent of
90
women self-identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, although 6 percent
of men and 13 percent of women reported experiencing same-sex
91
sexual contact, and 6 percent of men and 16 percent of women
92
reported feeling same-sex attraction. Of course, self-reporting is
notoriously suspect due to the continued stigma attached to
nonheterosexual identities—it is likely that same-sex contact and
93
attraction are underreported.
Another assumption underlying this reliance on selfidentification is that every individual is consciously aware of and
94
certain about his or her sexual orientation. In one case, a female
plaintiff argued that her alleged harasser was homosexual based on an
incident in which the harasser rubbed the plaintiff’s leg, another time
when she stared at the plaintiff’s breasts, and a conversation in which
she asked the plaintiff, “[H]ow do you know if you prefer men over
95
women sexually[?]” One interpretation of this conduct is that the
alleged harasser was questioning her own sexual orientation. This is
no idle possibility: research suggests that, for women in particular,
sexual desires may form that are inconsistent with prior sexual
orientations, and identification as lesbian or bisexual may be a
96
process. But the court refused to consider such an interpretation
89. See Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1465 n.3 (2009)
(“[MSM] was first adopted by public health scholars and workers who recognized the significant
community of men who had sex with men but do not identify as gay.”).
90. Chandra et al., supra note 68, at 29 tbl.12, 30 tbl.13. This study’s data came from an
automated telephone survey of a national sample of 55,556 males and 56,032 females aged
eighteen to forty-four in the United States. Id. at 31 tbl.14.
91. Id. at 31 tbl.14.
92. Id. at 12, 28 tbl.11.
93. LAUMANN, supra note 75, at 284; SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 37.
94. This presumption runs counter to long traditions in psychology and literature. See
SEDGWICK supra note 28, at 26 (“[W]here would the whole, astonishing and metamorphic
Western romance tradition (I include psychoanalysis) be if people’s sexual desire, of all things,
were even momentarily assumed to be transparent to themselves?”).
95. Reissner v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., No. 02-CV-6353-CJS, 2004 WL 941645, at
*1–2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2004).
96. See, e.g., Lisa M. Diamond, What Does Sexual Orientation Orient? A Biobehavioral
Model Distinguishing Romantic Love and Sexual Desire, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 173, 173 (2003)
(“[I]ndividuals can develop novel sexual desires—even desires that contradict their sexual
orientations—as a result of falling in love.”); id. at 183 (detailing case studies from a longitudinal
study). See generally KRISTIN G. ESTERBERG, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES:
CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITIES, CONSTRUCTING SELVES (1997) (providing narrative accounts
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because the alleged harasser had “unequivocally denied being
homosexual, denied ever having sexual relations with other women,
and affirmatively stated that her sexual orientation was
97
heterosexual.”
2. Reputation. Although the Oncale Court did not provide
instructions on how a plaintiff might prove a harasser’s
homosexuality, it did caution that the plaintiff’s evidence had to be
“credible,” perhaps to ward off arguments based on speculation or
98
stereotypes about gay men and lesbians. Accordingly, courts
routinely reject bald speculation or arguments explicitly based on
99
stereotypes about the demeanor and dress of gay men and lesbians.
100
101
Courts also hold that “rumor” and “gossip” are not credible
102
evidence of homosexuality.
However, courts frequently remark on the absence of reputation
evidence establishing the harasser to be homosexual as if it would be
103
expected that coworkers would know if a harasser really were gay.
For example, one court considered affidavits from twelve of the
alleged harasser’s coworkers that indicated that none “believed [the
harasser] was a homosexual or had reason to believe [the harasser]
104
was gay.” These courts may have taken Oncale’s instruction that
evidence of homosexuality be “credible” as a requirement that a

showing that although some women consider themselves “lesbians from birth,” others came to
see themselves as lesbian or bisexual as those terms became culturally and socially available).
97. Reissner, 2004 WL 941645, at *9.
98. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
99. See, e.g., Alleman v. La. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 698 F. Supp. 2d 644, 660 (M.D. La. 2010)
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that an alleged harasser “was homosexual based on her voice
and appearance”); Smith v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(rejecting “bald assertions” of homosexuality “supported by nothing more than [the plaintiff’s]
speculation about lesbian fashion”).
100. Aguilera-Corona v. Kefro LLC, No. Civ. 04-6283-AA, 2006 WL 696091, at *3 (D. Or.
Mar. 14, 2006).
101. Reissner, 2004 WL 941645, at *9.
102. Courts may exclude such statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence. E.g., Dick v.
Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1266 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2,
397 F.3d 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2005).
103. See, e.g., Warner v. USF Holland Inc., No. 08 C 6823, 2012 WL 245190, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 25, 2012) (“Plaintiff has no independent evidence (from, say, co-workers or [the alleged
harasser’s] friends) that he was gay or bisexual.”).
104. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also
Lavack v. Owen’s World Wide Enter. Network, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(“[The alleged harasser] lived with other male employees of Autofocus who have not
experienced anything that would indicate that [he] is homosexual.”).
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harasser be “openly” gay —meaning that he holds himself out as gay
to the community. These courts go beyond requiring evidence that a
harasser self-identifies as gay to require evidence that the harasser is
out of the closet at work.
Along these lines, some courts require that the plaintiff
subjectively believed the harasser to be homosexual. They impose this
requirement by refusing to find credible evidence of homosexuality if
the plaintiff is unable to testify to the harasser’s sexual orientation.
When deposed about their harassers’ motives, plaintiffs frequently
respond that they just “don’t know” why harassers behaved the way
106
they did. For example, one plaintiff lost his case because, although
an alleged harasser had thrust his hips into the plaintiff’s groin area,
when asked at his deposition, the plaintiff stated he did not believe
107
the harasser to be homosexual.
In Love v. Motiva Enterprises, the Fifth Circuit held the plaintiff
had failed to adduce evidence from which to infer her harasser’s
homosexuality, even though the plaintiff stated that she had seen the
alleged harasser kissing another woman for thirty seconds in a truck
outside the worksite, and that the harasser had tried to kiss the
108
plaintiff. The court refused to consider this evidence, because
during her deposition, the plaintiff had stated she did not “know
109
anything about [the harasser’s] sexual orientation.” The plaintiff

105. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc. 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872, 876 (M.D. Tenn.
2009).
106. See Pedroza, 397 F.3d at 1067 (when asked about her harasser’s orientation, plaintiff
stated “I don’t know which way she may go” (quotation mark omitted)); Noto v. Regions Bank,
84 F. App’x 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff “admit[ed] she [did] not know whether [the
alleged harasser was] a lesbian”); McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th
Cir. 2003) (plaintiff “did not understand what motivated [the alleged harasser’s] behavior”);
Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (plaintiff admitted “I don’t
know if [the alleged harassers] were asking me to have sexual relations with them. I don’t really
know what they were saying”).
107. Ballard v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 8:06CV718, 2008 WL 1990787, at *2 (D. Neb. May 5,
2008). But see Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding the
victim’s perception of the harasser’s sexual orientation to be largely “irrelevant”); Tepperwien
v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 427, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the
victim’s perception of the harasser’s orientation is not dispositive), aff’d, 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir.
2011).
108. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 903 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
109. See Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept.
17, 2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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argued that she interpreted the deposition question to be asking
110
whether the harasser had admitted to a lesbian identity.
The plaintiff’s explanation makes sense if sexual orientation is
defined by the specific act of coming out of the closet. Sedgwick tells
111
a story about two friends, a man and a woman. Although the
woman had long been aware that her male friend’s “eroticism
happen[ed] to focus exclusively on men,” she did not feel comfortable
referring to him as a “gay man” until ten years into their relationship,
when he stated to her, in casual conversation, that he had “com[e]
112
out” to another acquaintance. The plaintiff in Love may have had
this understanding of sexual orientation. Thus, her contention that
she did not “know anything” about her harasser’s “sexual
orientation” was not inconsistent with her claim that she had seen her
harasser kissing another woman.
The requirement that a harasser be known by the plaintiff and
other coworkers to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual is therefore even more
limiting than the requirement that the harasser self-identify as such.
113
Coming out can be a long process. And even those who have come
out in certain contexts may have incentives to remain in the closet at
114
work. This high bar for credible evidence of homosexuality may be
rooted in a negative view of gay identity: the idea that a court should
not deviate from the presumption of heterosexuality without
overwhelming evidence because homosexuality is thought to be
inferior, morally suspect, or stigmatized.
3. Sexual Behavior.
A few courts apply conduct-based
definitions of homosexuality. These courts look to past behavior or
115
sexual relationships as credible evidence of homosexuality. For
110. Id. On appeal, the dissent pointed out that the plaintiff likely thought she was being
asked for “a clinical opinion.” Love, 349 F. App’x at 908 n.5 (Dennis, J., dissenting). I note that
“homosexuality” has not been a diagnosis since 1973. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY
AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 40 (1987).
111. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 3–4.
112. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
113. See LAUMANN, supra note 75, at 291 (“Development of self-identification as
homosexual or gay is a psychologically and socially complex state, something which, in this
society, is achieved only over time, often with considerable personal struggle and self-doubt, not
to mention social discomfort.”).
114. See Pizer, supra note 27, at 735–37 (documenting “[n]umerous studies” that have found
“many LGBT people conceal their sexual orientation and/or gender identity in the workplace”).
115. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is
undisputed that [the alleged harasser] had five children by a former marriage and was in a longterm, live-in, heterosexual relationship with her boyfriend. There was no other evidence
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example, one court considered an admission that a harasser had
116
previously engaged in same-sex “affection[s]” while “intoxicated.”
Another considered “comments allegedly made by [the harasser to
the plaintiff] in reference to possible homosexual activity during [the
117
harasser’s] time in the Navy.” It is possible that these alleged
harassers would have fallen into the category of “situational
bisexuality,” engaging in sex with same-sex partners, but only in
certain contexts or institutions, like single-sex schools, prisons, or the
118
military.
Nonetheless, these courts were willing to allow
nonheterosexual identities to be ascribed to the harassers. The
reasoning here is akin to a “one-drop” rule for bisexuality: that any
same-sex sexual contact, regardless of how isolated or incidental,
gives rise to a bisexual identity from which a jury could infer same-sex
119
desire for the plaintiff.
But most courts have refused to adopt a one-drop rule, holding
that evidence of past same-sex sexual behavior alone is insufficient
evidence of homosexuality. In another case, the lawyers were left to
quibble over the following exchange at a deposition of an alleged
male harasser:
Q. Okay. When you say in response to the two questions that I
just gave you, you say you might have bumped into somebody, do
you understand that my question refers to intimate sexual contact
with a man prior to October 23, 2000?
A. Yes, I understand your question.
Q. Okay. And is that your answer, you may have bumped into
somebody?
regarding [the alleged harasser’s] sexual history or preferences.”); King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68
F. App’x. 659, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The record contains no evidence that any of [the plaintiff’s]
male coworkers had ever been involved in homosexual relationships or distinctly homosexual
conduct.”).
116. See Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 29, 2008) (finding a dispute as to the harasser’s sexual orientation in a case in which the
harasser allegedly admitted that “when he was intoxicated he had ‘the tendency to engage in
affection from members of the same sex’” although he “denie[d] being homosexual”).
117. See Thomas v. Willie G’s Post Oak Inc., No. H-04-4479, 2006 WL 1117959, at *7 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 25, 2006) (finding credible evidence of homosexuality).
118. See SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 171 tbl.8.3; see also MARJORIE GARBER, VICE
VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE 30 (1995) (noting scholarly
typologies of bisexuality); Amy Sohn, Bi for Now, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 10, 2003, at 118 (discussing
“hasbians,” women who used to date women but have switched to men).
119. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop
Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 600 n.29 (2007) (discussing this analogy).
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A. Yes, that is my answer.
Q. All right. That’s your same answer to the question [regarding]
having homosexual contact with men prior to October 23, 2000?
120

A. That is my same answer.

The court held that this answer could be construed as an admission
that the alleged harasser had “prior ‘intimate sexual contact’ with
men,” but noted the harasser had also “testified that he had a
girlfriend during 2000,” around the time of the alleged same-sex
121
harassment. The court concluded that this evidence alone “does not
definitely support the plaintiff’s conclusion that [the alleged harasser]
122
However, the court
is currently a practicing homosexual.”
concluded a jury could infer that this harasser was still “practicing”
homosexuality because there was also evidence he had “rubb[ed] his
123
penis against the plaintiff’s buttocks.”
It is unlikely the court would have inferred the harasser’s
homosexuality from this action alone had there been no evidence of
his history of same-sex intimate behavior to give the act a
“homosexual” context. Many courts have dismissed cases in which
124
male harassers exposed their genitalia or “rub[bed]” their genitalia
125
up against the plaintiff, concluding these actions are not motivated
126
by the desire for sexual gratification. The exception is when the
120. Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 2004).
121. Id. at 4 n.3.
122. Id. at 5 n.3 (emphasis added). The term “practicing homosexual” invokes a religious
discourse in which homosexual behavior (the sin) is distinguished from homosexual identity (the
sinner). The first Google result for a search for the words “practicing homosexual” is Larry
Tomczak, 6 Reasons Why Practicing Homosexuals Can’t Be Christians, CHARISMA NEWS (May
31, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.charismanews.com/opinion/39696-six-reasons-why-gays-can-tbe-christians.
123. Jones, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 4.
124. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 460, 463 (5th Cir. 2012); Warner v. USF
Holland Inc., No. 08 C 6823, 2012 WL 245190, at *5–6, *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2012); Sisco v.
Fabrication Techs., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936, 944 (D. Wyo. 2004).
125. Taylor v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. 06cv854, 2008 WL 4647690, at *1, 8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20,
2008); Sisco, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 936, 944; English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d
833, 837, 848 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 541,
544 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the harasser’s “grinding his genitals against [the plaintiff’s]
buttocks in simulated intercourse” was “inappropriate and vulgar” but “insufficient evidence to
demonstrate that [the harasser’s] conduct towards [the plaintiff] was based on sex”).
126. Compare Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *4
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010) (holding that harassment by same-sex coworkers, many of whom
were married, was motivated to entertain, not for “sexual desire or gratification”), with Smith v.
Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1325–26 & n.13 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (holding that a jury could
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plaintiff alleges that the harasser had an erection. For example, in
128
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., the Seventh Circuit confronted a
harasser who had “rubbed himself into an erection while [the
plaintiff] was laying on his stomach with cramps,” and then
threatened to “crawl on top of [the plaintiff] and fuck [him] in the
129
ass.” The court held that the “context” of this harassment left
130
“room for the inference that the sexual overlay was not incidental.”
Nor do courts dismiss harassing behavior as merely crude
entertainment in cases in which the alleged harasser engaged in
131
masturbatory activity in same-sex company.
In searching for evidence of sexual gratification, courts
132
distinguish “simulated” sex acts from the real thing. The distinctions
drawn by courts in these cases are reminiscent of the notoriously
difficult task of drawing lines between soft- and hard-core
133
pornography. In one case, a plaintiff alleged his harasser had

conclude that the defendant harassed men for sexual “gratification” when it was “undisputed
that [the defendant was] homosexual”).
127. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); see Thorne v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6, slip. op. at 11 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2008) (“It
would seem that the act of rubbing a man’s shoulder with an erect penis would be ‘credible
evidence’ that a man is homosexual.”); cf. Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp.
2d 745, 752, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that the trier of fact could find sexual desire in a case
in which “[the alleged harasser] forced [the plaintiff] to engage in oral sex”).
128. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
129. Id. at 1009 (quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 1011.
131. See, e.g., id. at 1009; cf. Gray v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 3:07-CV-00374, 2009 WL
305521, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2009) (holding that a jury could infer harassment was
“because of sex” in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the harasser “groped herself in [the
plaintiff’s] presence”).
132. Compare Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(dismissing a case in which the alleged female harasser “pushed [the plaintiff] up against a wall
for ten to fifteen seconds while rubbing her hands and body up against [her]”), and Miller v.
Kellogg USA, Inc., No. 8:04CV500, 2006 WL 1314330, at *6 (D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (“[The
harasser’s] alleged behavior in positioning himself behind [the plaintiff] and simulating a sexual
act . . . represent[s] boorish behavior that was tinged with offensive sexual connotations, which
is not sufficient to create a jury question under the based [on] sex requirement.”), with La Day
v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying summary judgment in a case in
which the alleged harasser “fondled [the plaintiff’s] anus,” in a way the plaintiff described “as
similar to ‘foreplay with a woman’”), and Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d
745, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“A reasonable trier of fact could find that Vijay’s alleged acts of
forcing Benitez to engage in oral sex, propositioning him for sex, and groping Reyes’s genital
parts were motivated by sexual desire.”).
133. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(concluding that hard-core pornography may be “indefinable” but asserting, “I know it when I
see it”); David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143
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touched his arm and commented on his muscle tone, poked him in the
stomach and on the rear end, and gave him an “unwanted neck
134
massage.” The plaintiff also alleged the harasser “‘fondled’ himself
135
in the plaintiff’s presence” by touching the crotch area of his shorts.
136
This harasser, however, self-identified as heterosexual. The court
expressly refused to accept the plaintiff’s characterization of the
behavior as “fondl[ing],” concluding that the plaintiff’s deposition
testimony only supported his claim that the harasser “‘play[ed] with
himself’ and/or engaged in the ‘continual readjustment of his privates’
137
by touching his shorts in the crotch area.” The court regarded this
latter characterization as nonmasturbatory behavior consistent with
138
heterosexuality. Clothing may make the difference. In dismissing a
claim, one court found it relevant that a harasser had been “clothed”
when he forced the plaintiff’s face to his groin “to give the impression
139
that [the plaintiff] was performing fellatio.”
As social science researchers have noted, defining sexual
orientation based on conduct is problematic. This is not only because
140
there is no agreed-upon standard for what conduct counts as sexual.
Additionally, conduct-based definitions exclude virgins and those
who experience same-sex attractions but have only engaged in crosssex sexual activity, and miscount individuals who are heterosexual by
all other definitions but have engaged in same-sex sexual behaviors
141
under coercion or for other reasons unrelated to their preferences.

U. PA. L. REV. 111, 168 (1994) (“Thus, soft-core pornography, of the sort that appears in
Playboy or Penthouse, obeys careful strictures . . . . Most pictorials depict women only, either
alone or in pairs. Where men enter the picture, their genitals are generally obscured; if a penis is
displayed, it is never erect. And actual penetration is virtually never depicted. Hard-core
pornography, by contrast, is full of erect penises and penetration.”).
134. Nguyen v. Buchart-Horn, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1998, 2003 WL 21674461, at *1 (E.D. La.
July 15, 2003).
135. Id. at *1 n.1.
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. (alteration in original).
138. This was because the plaintiff testified that he did not understand the behavior to be
“sexual harassment” until an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) officer
informed him of his potential claim. Id. at *2.
139. Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2005).
140. See SAVIN-WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 144 (noting that “which behaviors are deemed
‘sexual’” varies depending on age, sex, sexual orientation, and other circumstances); SEDGWICK,
supra note 28, at 25 (“Even identical genital acts mean very different things to different people.
To some people, the nimbus of ‘the sexual’ seems scarcely to extend beyond the boundaries of
discrete genital acts; to others, it enfolds them loosely or floats virtually free of them.”).
141. LAUMANN, supra note 75, at 291; Savin-Williams, supra note 70, at 40.
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In court, behavioral definitions require troubling evidentiary
excursions into an alleged harasser’s sexual history on the
questionable assumption that past conduct amounts to current
142
Such assumptions have been rejected in other
preferences.
143
contexts.
4. Desire. Other courts seem to regard the essence of sexual
orientation to be sexual desire. Desire is a difficult object for legal
determination because it refers to an internal state and a longing for
144
something absent, rather than something present. That something
absent might be sexual activity (lust), romantic intimacy (love), or
145
some combination of the two. Thus, courts must interpret a
harasser’s statements and conduct to determine whether a jury could
reasonably infer the harasser harbored same-sex preferences.
Some social science researchers consider measures of genital
146
arousal as markers of sexual desire and indicia of sexual orientation.
Thankfully, in deciding harassment cases, no U.S. court has followed
the Czech model of determining sexual orientation by requiring the
subject to submit to a medical procedure testing for physical signs of
147
genital arousal in response to same-sex stimuli. Physical signs of
142. See, e.g., Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 29, 2008) (refusing to consider hearsay evidence that two male employees had engaged in
consensual sexual relationships with an alleged male harasser).
143. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2) (providing a heightened standard for the relevance of
evidence of a victim’s sexual history in civil cases).
144. It is a cliché of postmodern literary theory that “the thing about desire is that there is
no there there.” JEFFREY EUGENIDES, THE MARRIAGE PLOT 48 (2011). Consider Tennessee
Williams’s metaphor for desire as streetcar. See generally Katheleen Hulley, The Fate of the
Symbolic in A Streetcar Named Desire, reprinted in TENNESSEE WILLIAMS’S A STREETCAR
NAMED DESIRE 111, 116 (Harold Bloom ed., 1988).
145. Social science researchers divide desire into two sorts: sexual and romantic. See, e.g.,
Stephanie Cacioppo, Francesco Bianchi-Demicheli, Chris Frum, James G. Pfaus & James W.
Lewis, The Common Neural Bases Between Sexual Desire and Love: A Multilevel Kernel Density
fMRI Analysis, 9 J. SEXUAL MED. 1048, 1049 (2012); Ritch Savin-Williams, How Many Gays
Are There (It Depends), in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL
IDENTITIES 5, 10 (Debra A. Hope ed., 2009); cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 25 (“For some
people, it is important that sex be embedded in contexts resonant with meaning, narrative, and
connectedness with other aspects of their lives; for other people, it is important that they not be;
to others it doesn’t occur that they might be.”).
146. See generally, e.g., Kurt Freund, Diagnosing Homo- or Heterosexuality and Erotic AgePreference by Means of a Psychophysiological Test, 5 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 209 (1967).
147. See generally ORG. FOR REFUGE, ASYLUM & MIGRATION, TESTING SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: A SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PLETHYSMOGRAPHY IN ASYLUM &
REFUGEE STATUS PROCEEDINGS (2011), available at http://www.oraminternational.org/images/
stories/PDFs/oram%20phallometry%20paper%202010-12-15%20--for%20download.pdf
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sexual arousal, such as erections, may occur without any triggering
event and be outside an individual’s control or contrary to her
148
desires. However, one court was persuaded that a harasser might be
gay by conduct including his request for gay pornography from the
plaintiff, who, so it happened, distributed pornography around the
149
office.
The assumption here—that the relationships between
fantasy, pornography, and sexual orientation are corresponding and
150
linear—is not necessarily true.
Some courts conclude that homosexuality can be inferred from
the harassing conduct itself when that conduct amounts to a genuine
151
“sexual advance,” that is, a proposition to engage in sexual activity.
Such propositions are evidence of desire. This appears to be a broad
definition that would allow a jury to infer homosexuality from even a
single same-sex sexual proposition, regardless of how the alleged
harasser identifies or whether she has ever engaged in same-sex
sexual behavior. For researchers, there is no agreement on “what
proportion of an individual’s attractions must be directed toward
same-sex others, or how strong the attractions must be to count as
152
homosexual.” Although this seems to be a broad definition, as
discussed in the next Section, courts narrowly construe sexual
advances.

(criticizing the Czech Republic’s use of phallometry to verify an asylum applicant’s claim of
persecution based on sexual orientation); U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNCHR’S
COMMENTS ON THE PRACTICE OF PHALLOMETRY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO DETERMINE
THE CREDIBILITY OF ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON PERSECUTION DUE TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4daed0389.pdf.
148. LEVAY & BALDWIN, supra note 69, at 232, 248.
149. Walton v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 10-344, 2011 WL 6016232, at *3, *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
2, 2011).
150. See DIAMOND, supra note 29, at 91 (describing a woman who “pursues casual sex with
men and sometimes watches gay male pornography, but . . . has only fallen in love and formed
meaningful relationships with women”); LEVAY & BALDWIN, supra note 69, at 233–34 (“Does
[fantasizing about the same sex] mean all these people were actually sexually attracted to samesex partners in real life? Not if we are to go by their self-identification as heterosexual, which by
definition means they are attracted only to the other sex.”); see also LAURA KIPNIS, BOUND
AND GAGGED: PORNOGRAPHY AND THE POLITICS OF FANTASY IN AMERICA x (1998) (arguing
against policies “enacted on the basis of the most simplistic assumptions about the role of
fantasy in the human psyche (that fantasy is synonymous with intent, for instance)”).
151. See, e.g., La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002).
152. Savin-Williams, supra note 70, at 40.
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In sum, although a minority of courts will conclude there is
credible evidence of homosexuality based on an alleged harasser’s
past or current behavior or indications of desires, the majority will not
conclude that an individual is “homosexual” unless that individual
identifies as such in the workplace.
C. Fictions Regarding Same-Sex Desire
How do courts determine if a harasser experienced sexual desire
for a plaintiff if that harasser does not identify as gay? As discussed, if
a court finds credible evidence that a harasser is homosexual, it may
153
automatically infer that the harassment was because of sex. But
courts rely on a narrow, self-identification-based definition of
homosexual identity. Thus, courts often find themselves deciding
whether a reasonable jury could infer that the ostensibly heterosexual
harasser harbored sexual desire for the plaintiff based only on that
harasser’s conduct toward the plaintiff. This may be part of the
circular inquiry into whether a harasser is gay, or it may be
154
considered a replacement for that inquiry. This Section will describe
how courts analyze desire in such cases.
Courts undertaking this inquiry have created an elaborate set of
fictions about what types of motives are consistent with same-sex
desire, comparing the conduct at issue to an idealized sort of romantic
courtship, which takes the form of earnest solicitations, in private
settings, without mixed emotion or hostility. These fictions mirror the
images of model gay couples portrayed by same-sex marriage
advocacy groups, in “long term, committed, marriage-like
relationships, whose personal narratives appeal[] to middle
155
America.” Such relationships are simple love stories. Thus, courts
hold that a harasser cannot both loathe and desire her object. They
read sexual propositions as insincere mockery, rather than
acknowledging the element of insincerity in many forms of flirtation.
153. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Part I.A.
155. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 21, 33 (2010); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage
Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (describing the public performance
required of “respectable” and “domesticated” same-sex couples: “lining up in pairs outside of
City Hall the moment the Mayor deems the marriage registry open to homo business; placing
your wedding announcement in the New York Times; posing model homo families—our perfect
plaintiffs—before the media”).
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They understand aggression, hostility, and threats as inimical to
desire. And they see public displays as devoid of sexuality.
It is tempting to understand this set of cases as a result of the fact
that federal judges have very limited imaginations when it comes to
156
sexuality, particularly of the same-sex variety. But a close reading
reveals an active judicial imagination infused with preconceptions,
myths, and stereotypes about sex (meaning both stereotypes about
men and women and stereotypes about what is erotic) and sexual
orientation. Courts imagine that only those who are truly gay might
harbor same-sex desire. Gay identity is determined based on whether
the individual performs a certain cultural script about what it means
157
to be gay. One such script is performed by coming out of the
158
closet,
being “openly” gay, and working to recruit straight
159
coworkers. But there is another, newly available cultural script
about gay identity as romantic: a search for same-sex relationships
160
that fulfill “yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection.” For
the most part, judicial decisions hold same-sex desire to one or the
other of these two standards. Same-sex desire is not understood as
161
complicated, paradoxical, humorous, or otherwise exhibiting the full
162
range of the human experience.
156. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992) (“[J]udges know next to nothing
about [sex] beyond their own personal experience, which is limited, perhaps more so than
average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty much . . . screened out of the
judiciary . . . .”).
157. A foundational text on the idea of scripts about sexual identity is JOHN H. GAGNON &
WILLIAM SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1973).
158. See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
159. See infra Part II.B.
160. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“Because it
fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity,
civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among
life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”); see also Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon,
54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1400 (2005) (describing “Goodridge’s constitution of lesbian and gay male
identities” as “immaculate[], cleansed identities, scrubbed clean not only of the homophobic lies
(the good news), but also of a certain truth (not so good): that sex, even, or especially, sex in
relationships, same-sex and cross-sex both, can—and, at times, does—cause harm”).
161. See ZYLAN, supra note 7, at 184–85 (“Indeed, one way to make sense of the odd and
conflictual behavior often observed in these cases is as a scene of gender and sexual confusion,
as desire in contestation with efforts to make sense of one’s own identifications.”).
162. Cf. Rubin, supra note 28, at 282 (“[H]eterosexual encounters may be sublime or
disgusting, free or forced, healing or destructive, romantic or mercenary. As long as it does not
violate other rules, heterosexuality is acknowledged to exhibit the full range of human
experience.”). Psychologists describe this phenomenon as the “out-group homogeneity effect.”
See Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects in Natural
and Minimal Groups, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 536, 536 (1992).
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My point in highlighting the complexities of same-sex desire is
not to argue that courts should allow cases to proceed to juries in all
163
of these circumstances. Deciding whether any of these plaintiffs
ought to have prevailed requires a first-order normative framework
for thinking about why harassment is sex discrimination and a secondorder set of legal rules that correspond with that framework. This
Article is agnostic on these questions, although possibilities are
explored in Part III. Additionally, it is impossible to reach a
conclusion on whether any of these cases should have survived
summary judgment given that the focus on desire by litigants and
courts obscured other ways of thinking about how harassment might
be “because of sex,” impoverishing the record. The purpose of this
Section is to expose the incoherence of the desire inquiry in the samesex harassment context by examining various fictions underlying that
inquiry. This in turn sets up the argument that desire should not be
164
the test of whether harassment is discriminatory.
1. Disgust Is Inconsistent with Desire. In determining whether
same-sex scenarios might be interpreted as sexual advances, courts
measure those scenarios against an idealized version of mutually
affirming romantic love. Thus, they hold that disgust, pity, revulsion,
shaming, humiliation, and insult all indicate the absence of desire. As
one court quite awkwardly put it, the essence of a claim is “proof of
165
non-humiliating sexual contact of some kind with the claimant.”
For example, in Love v. Motiva Enterprises, the plaintiff, Connie
Love, alleged that she had been harassed by her coworker, Jeanne
Sirey, while the two women worked together in the “coker unit” at
166
Motiva’s plant in Norco, Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit described the
record as follows:

163. Additionally, in describing the facts of the various cases discussed in this Article, I do
not represent that any events alleged are true. Rather, I describe the facts from the plaintiff’s
perspective. This is because the bulk of these cases resolve a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. At summary judgment, courts are required to consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
164. See infra Part III.
165. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 17,
2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc.,
668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that harassment must be “sexual rather than merely
humiliating in nature”).
166. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 902 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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Sirey derided Love, frequently calling her a “stupid bitch,” “fat
cow,” and “disgusting.” She allegedly told Love that she was a
“sorry excuse for a woman because she did not make the coker
conducive for women to work in;” that she was a “failure as a
woman;” and that “You think that’s a body you have? You should
be ashamed.” Sirey also allegedly touched Love with her hands on
two occasions. On the first, Sirey confronted Love in the changing
room and ran her finger under Love’s bra strap and her underwear
near her hip while at the same time calling Love “fat” and
“disgusting.” On another occasion, Sirey began rubbing Love’s
shoulders and back while Love was at the lunch table. When Love
protested, Sirey said she was “just being friendly.” Love testified
that Sirey also would seek her out at company functions, stand next
167
to her, and touch her arm to let her know Sirey was present.

The court concluded that Sirey’s behavior was inconsistent with
168
Rather, Sirey’s “consistent insults” and
sexual attraction.
expressions of “negative feelings about Love and her appearance”
169
were “more indicative of humiliating or bullying behavior.” In
response, Love argued that after she had gastric-bypass surgery and
returned to work, “she was obviously more attractive to Sirey, and
that Sirey’s inappropriate conduct was no longer accompanied by
170
negative remarks.” She alleged Sirey attempted to hug her, rubbed
her breasts against her when reaching for a log book in Love’s
workspace, and locked Love in the bathroom, telling Love that she
171
would not free her unless Love did “favors for her.” This was not
enough for the court, which held that “Sirey had a long history of
insulting Love, which cannot be ignored or explained away by the
overly simplistic view that Love’s surgery rendered her desirable to
172
Sirey.” As evidence of Sirey’s sexual interest, Love argued that
Sirey had licked her lips and made comments such as “‘[y]ou think
you’re a woman,’” and “‘[j]ust be aware. Always look over your
173
shoulder.’” The district court concluded: “[W]hile licking one’s lips

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 903.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, No. 07-5970, 2008 WL 4286662, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 17,
2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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may be sexually suggestive in some contexts, when combined with
174
this threatening language, the sexual connotation disappears.”
The dissent observed: “The majority ignores that love-hate
relationships, for example, are quite common and well
175
documented.” Indeed, American popular culture is saturated with
representations of the eroticization of relations of dominance and
176
submission, humiliation, and shame. The interrelationship between
sex and humiliation was well recognized by early sexual harassment
177
cases and is no barrier to the success of plaintiffs alleging cross-sex
178
harassment. One factor the Supreme Court has recognized for
determining whether harassment is severe or pervasive is whether the
179
conduct is “humiliating.” Part of the reason the majority in Love
could not see desire could be that it had difficulty imagining (or
taking seriously) a woman as a sexual aggressor and as an agent of an
180
undomesticated brand of sexual desire. This scenario does not
match a certain ideal of lesbian sexuality, which “tend[s] to cede raw
sexuality to men, equate femininity with intimacy rather than
sexuality, and argue for the purity of lesbian sex as a full expression of
feminism, egalitarianism, and the joys of mutual desire untainted by
181
the power dynamics inherent in patriarchal heterosexuality.”
Courts also draw an artificial line between “gay bashing” and
182
same-sex desire. Wheatfall v. Potter was a Texas case in which the
183
male plaintiff, a self-described “gay American,” alleged he had been
harassed when a male manager “would come into his office and
184
initiate conversations with sexual overtones.” For example, the

174. Id.
175. Love, 349 F. App’x at 907 n.3 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, 20 Million Shades of Green: Racy Book Hits
Milestone, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2012, at B1 (describing Fifty Shades of Grey, a book series about
a sadomasochistic relationship, as “this year’s pop-culture phenomenon”); RIHANNA, S&M, on
LOUD (Def Jam Recordings 2010) (radio hit about sadomasochism).
177. See Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same-Sex Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1999) (discussing cases).
178. E.g., Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 761 (8th Cir. 2003).
179. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
180. Cf. Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, Gender Trouble at Abu-Ghraib?, 1 POL. & GENDER
597, 616–17 (2005) (analyzing the domestic reaction to a female soldier photographed abusing
male Iraqi prisoners as deviating from norms regarding proper feminine and feminist conduct).
181. JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY 135 (1998).
182. Wheatfall v. Potter, No. H-07-1937, 2010 WL 2854284 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2010).
183. Id. at *4.
184. Id. at *1.

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

INFERRING DESIRE

561

manager invited the plaintiff “to his ranch ‘to ride [his] horse until
185
[the plaintiff] was sore.’” But the manager also allegedly called the
186
plaintiff a “motherfucking faggot.” The manager asserted he was
187
“exclusively heterosexual.” The court concluded that a jury could
not infer sexual desire from this interaction because the manager
188
“inten[ded] to humiliate” the plaintiff. The assumption, again, is
that humiliation and desire are incompatible. The particular
assumption here is that antigay attitudes are not compatible with
189
same-sex sexual desire. This assumption is false, of course: some of
the most outspoken opponents of gay rights have ended up embroiled
190
in same-sex scandals. A Freudian might argue that homophobia
191
results from the repression of same-sex desire. An individual
struggling to repress his own same-sex desires transfers his shame
onto others and acts out his guilt through gay bashing, thus publicly
reaffirming his heterosexuality. Some empirical research bears out
192
this theory. This is not to say that all homophobia is at base

185. Id. (first alteration in original).
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id. at *1.
188. Id. at *5 (citing La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002)). The
court also pointed out that the plaintiff did not provide “any evidence that [the manager]
propositioned other male employees” and thus failed to show the manager was motivated by a
“desire to have sex with [the plaintiff].” Id.
189. See Silva v. E.U.A. Nova, No. 97-117ML, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22977, at *2, *12
(D.R.I. Jan. 22, 1999) (holding, in a case in which the plaintiff endured many forms of antigay
harassment, including a request from his supervisor to “[g]et on your knees and suck my dick,”
that there was “no evidence that either [the harasser or the plaintiff] actually engages in
homosexual activities, and no evidence that the statement was made as a serious proposition”).
190. See Richard M. Ryan & William S. Ryan, Homophobic? Maybe You’re Gay, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012, at SR12 (discussing scandals involving evangelical leader Ted Haggard,
Senator Larry Craig, and Young Republican leader Glenn Murphy, Jr.). This is not to say that
the assumption was necessarily false with respect to the manager in Wheatfall; rather, it is to
point out the flaw in the court’s categorical reasoning.
191. See id. (discussing Freud’s theories).
192. See Henry E. Adams, Lester W. Wright, Jr. & Bethany A. Lohr, Is Homophobia
Associated with Homosexual Arousal?, 105 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 440, 441 (1996) (using
survey questions regarding homophobia and measuring sexual arousal in response to
pornographic videos with penile plethysmography); Netta Weinstein, William S. Ryan, Cody R.
DeHaan, Andrew K. Przybylski, Nicole Legate & Richard M. Ryan, Parental Autonomy
Support and Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Sexual Identities: Dynamics of SelfAcceptance and Defense, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 815, 828 (2012) (studying
reaction time tasks and concluding that “discrepancy between implicit and explicit sexual
orientation measures[] was . . . shown to relate to greater self-reported homophobia”). I do not
mean to imply that penile plethysmography, a technique for measuring erections, and implicit
attitudes are definitive indicators of sexual desire. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying
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homoerotic, but rather, that homophobic attitudes do not necessarily
undercut the inference of desire if, for example, the harasser made a
statement that could be construed as a sexual proposition.
The idea that disgust is opposed to desire is not one courts
193
indulge in cross-sex harassment cases. For example, in a 2010 First
Circuit case in which the male harasser engaged in a persistent
campaign of professional intimidation against the plaintiff, including
daily complaints that her attire was too revealing in violation of the
dress code, the court found a jury could infer that harassment was
194
based on the plaintiff’s sex. Although it held the plaintiff did not
have to prove she was the object of the harasser’s sexual interest, it
noted that the unusual fervor of the harasser’s frustration suggested
195
to another employee that he might have “a crush” on the plaintiff.
2. Humor Is Inconsistent with Desire. Many cases dismissing
same-sex harassment claims label the conduct at issue “‘male-on-male
horseplay,’” “‘simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the
196
197
same-sex,’”
“indiscriminate[] vulgar[ity],”
and “juvenile

text. But these studies at least call into question the assumption that homophobia and
homosexuality are inherently opposed.
193. See, e.g., EEOC v. Donohue, No. 2:09cv280, 2011 WL 4572020, at *7, *12 n.4 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that discriminatory intent was implicit, even though a male harasser had
told a female plaintiff he thought she was “fat”).
194. Rosario v. Dep’t of Army, 607 F.3d 241, 245, 248–49 (1st Cir. 2010).
195. Id. at 248.
196. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 844 (E.D. Va. 2002) (quoting
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)). I note that these
quotations come from Oncale’s discussion of whether harassment is “severe or pervasive,” not
whether it is “because of sex.” Nonetheless, many courts have conflated the two questions. See,
e.g., Peone v. Cnty. of Ontario, No. 12-CV-6012 CJS, 2013 WL 775358, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2013) (concluding that an incident in which a supervisor wrestled the plaintiff to the ground and
“‘grind[ed]’ his ‘pelvis’” against the plaintiff’s leg was not “because of sex” because it was
“‘male-on-male horseplay’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81)). But see Tepperwien v. Entergy
Nuclear Operations, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 427, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (refusing to decide, at
summary judgment, whether the harasser’s conduct in grabbing the plaintiff’s genitals was
“teasing or hazing” or “sexually threatening”), aff’d, 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011).
197. Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001); see also EEOC v. Boh
Bros. Const. Co., 689 F.3d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 2012) (dismissing the claim by characterizing the
harasser as “a world-class trash talker and the master of vulgarity in an environment where
these characteristics abound”); EEOC v. McPherson Cos., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1245
(N.D. Ala. 2012) (characterizing harassment as mere “[b]arracks humor”).
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198

These courts are looking for “earnest . . .
provocation.”
199
200
solicitation” in the form of sincere “proposal[s] for sex.”
However, even when they find proposals of sex, often, courts do
201
not take them seriously. In a 2012 Sixth Circuit case, the alleged
male harasser, Paul Ottobre, touched the male plaintiff “in a sexual
manner” by “grabbing his buttocks” and “poking him in the rear with
202
a hammer handle[] and . . . a long sucker rod.” When the plaintiff
protested, Ottobre “inflamed the situation with comments such as
‘you’ve got a pretty mouth,’ ‘boy you have pretty lips,’ and ‘you know
203
you like it sweetheart.’” After the plaintiff quit, Ottobre left him a
voicemail stating “‘I miss holding you. I miss spooning with you. I
204
love you. Please call me back.’” The plaintiff testified that he knew
Ottobre was married to a woman but thought Ottobre harassed him
205
because Ottobre was bisexual.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the employer. It held simply that the plaintiff failed to
offer “‘credible evidence’” of Ottobre’s “sexuality,” as required by
206
Oncale. It did not remark on why Ottobre’s sexually charged
conduct toward the male plaintiff could not be construed by a jury to
evince a bisexual orientation. Likely, the court of appeals found it
obvious that, as the district court held, Ottobre harassed the plaintiff
207
because he thought it “was funny, not sexually gratifying.” Perhaps
this is explained by the fact that Ottobre, a convicted felon standing

198. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
199. Lack, 240 F.3d at 261; see also Atkins v. Computer Scis. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410
(E.D. Va. 2003) (discussing “earnest sexual solicitation”); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., No. 6-013247-CV-S-RED, 2003 WL 828237, at *9 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2003), aff’d sub nom. Pedroza v.
Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005) (contrasting “teasing motivated by a mutual
dislike” with “earnest sexual solicitation”).
200. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845; see also Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900,
902 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that the harasser never made any “explicit proposals”
for sexual activity); EEOC v. Belle Glade Chevrolet-Cadillac-Buick-Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc.,
No. 07-80169-CIV, 2008 WL 62159, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2008) (holding that a jury could find
that sexually explicit propositions indicated the alleged harasser was “sincerely interested in
beginning a relationship”).
201. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
202. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 466.
205. Id. at 465, 468.
206. Id. at 468 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
207. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., No. 09-11350-BC, 2010 WL 3904697, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 29, 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012).

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

564

[Vol. 63:525

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

six foot five and weighing 330 pounds, did not match stereotypes of
208
bisexual men. The district court saw Ottobre as a “bully” who
enjoyed “mentally and physically tormenting weaker people around
209
him.” It read his come-ons as sarcastic rather than genuine,
exploiting the plaintiff’s sensitivity toward suggestions that he was
210
gay. No other interpretation would be reasonable.
211
In English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., the alleged harasser,
Joseph Dutchburn, engaged in a “daily, albeit brief, campaign of lewd
212
behavior directed at English [the male plaintiff].” For example,
Dutchburn told English that he “‘wanted to plant his salami between
213
[English’s] cheeks,’ while walking behind English.” On another
occasion, “Dutchburn walked up behind English, wrapped his arms
214
around English and said ‘I’m going [to lunch] with you.’” At lunch,
Dutchburn wanted to discuss the men’s sex lives, a topic that made
215
English “uncomfortable.” Later that day, Dutchburn told English
“‘they needed to bond,’” and then “approached English from behind
while English was seated at his desk and pressed his genitals against
216
English’s shoulders.” The next day, after English called Dutchburn
a “wacko,” “Dutchburn retorted ‘I love you,’ winked and then added
‘like a step son.’ Dutchburn then asked English ‘if he’d like to put his
217
meatballs on [English’s desk].’” Later that afternoon, “Dutchburn
approached English from behind, stuck his finger in English’s side

208. See id. at *1; see also Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the harasser, who was “six inches taller and at least 100 pounds heavier” than the
plaintiff, forced the plaintiff to perform simulated sex acts simply “to demonstrate physical
domination”); Farren v. Shaw Envtl., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 352, 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(concluding that repeated threats of sexual assault were motivated by “simple malice” rather
than desire when “both men were similarly described as ‘large’ and ‘imposing’” and the alleged
harasser was a “tough guy”), aff’d on other grounds, 510 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2013). In another
decision, a district court seemed to regard a plaintiff’s large stature as evidence of
impenetrability to harassment. See Beseau v. Fire Dist. No. 1, No. 05-2162, 2006 WL 2795716, at
*2 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2006) (noting that the harasser was much smaller than the plaintiff, who “is
6ʹ2ʹʹ tall and weighs approximately 315 pounds with a chest measurement of about 52ʹʹ”).
209. Wasek, 2010 WL 3904697, at *7.
210. Id.
211. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833 (E.D. Va. 2002).
212. Id. at 837.
213. Id. (alteration in original).
214. Id. (alteration in original).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 838 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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218

and said ‘next time it would be [my] 9MM.’” After noticing English
was unhappy with his behavior, “Dutchburn asked English to go for a
walk so they could ‘smoke the peace pipes,’ looked down at his lap
219
and said, ‘you know, the bones.’”
The court held no reasonable jury could read sexual innuendo
into these comments. For example, the court held that the “smoke the
peace pipes” comment “could mean anything from an invitation to
220
mend fences to smoking illicit drugs.” The court concluded this
221
Rather, it
conduct was not an “earnest sexual solicitation.”
amounted to “horseplay,” or “expressions of juvenile provocation
and offensive behavior driven by Dutchburn’s desire to tease or
humiliate English and others,” analogous to use of the phrase “kiss
222
my ass” among men. The court saw Dutchburn as “juvenile” and
hence asexual, not the sort of “grown man” who might experience
223
sexual desire. The court would not infer desire from the harassment
because it concluded that the acts were no more than “casual
224
obscenity,” akin to “‘a friendly slap on the buttocks.’”

218. Id. (alteration in original).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 845. Another judge refused to interpret the expression “ass breath” as having any
“homosexual connotation,” even though it was uttered in the context of a series of colorful
descriptions of sexual activities associated with gay men. EEOC v. McPherson Cos., 914 F.
Supp. 2d 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ala. 2012).
221. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
222. Id. at 848.
223. Id.; see also McPherson Cos., 914 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (describing a litany of antigay
insults by the harasser as “childish”).
224. English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (quoting Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998,
1010 (7th Cir. 1999)) (quotation mark omitted); see also McPherson Cos., 914 F. Supp. 2d at
1242 (analogizing the harassment at issue to the hazing the judge received from his “grizzled
veteran drill sergeant during basic training”).
The reference to a slap on the buttocks may be a misinterpretation of a passage from
Oncale in which Justice Scalia wrote: “A professional football player’s working environment is
not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he
heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by
the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the office.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). This passage does not speak to whether such conduct was
“because of sex”; it is about a different question, whether the harassment was “severe or
pervasive.” See supra note 196. Additionally, the passage suggests that sexual touching “back at
the office,” of exactly the sort that occurred in English, might give rise to a harassment claim.
One must wonder whether the Court would use the football example today, in the
wake of sexual abuse scandals involving football coaches and players. See Joe Drape, Sandusky
Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2012, at A1; Amos Kamil, Great
Is the Truth, and It Prevails, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 10, 2012, at 26.
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One interpretation of these decisions is that they reflect an
impoverished view of how sexual desires are expressed and how such
desires are formed in their expression, ignoring how humor is often a
mode of flirtation, a way to probe boundaries and express desire
without commitment. The very value of flirtation may lie in its
225
ambiguity, openness, and suspense. This does not mean it is
opposed to serious desire; rather, flirtation is a way of relating to
226
things serious. One might argue judicial modes of interpretation are
ill-equipped to integrate a liminal category like flirtation.
On the other hand, all schoolchildren know teasing often results
from crushes. You need not be a Freudian to recognize that desires
are not always fully conscious. Courts have no trouble understanding
male come-ons to women as sexual harassment, no matter how
absurd. For example, in a 2010 Fourth Circuit case, the court easily
concluded that a remark by a male harasser that he wanted to help
the nursing female plaintiff pump breast milk was a “proposal[] of
sexual activity,” notwithstanding the harasser’s reputation around the
office as a “shock jock” who “made offensive remarks in front of both
227
male and female audiences.” Courts, however, have difficulty
fathoming same-sex desire of this sort, expressed through humor
rather than earnest request. They view these jokesters as certain
archetypes: asexual juveniles and hypermasculine bullies. Neither is
consistent with the stereotype of the adult, effeminate gay man.
3. Aggression Is Inconsistent with Desire. In the same-sex
context, courts view sexualized threats, aggression, and hostility as
inconsistent with desire. This is evident in cases in which courts must
decide whether a man’s touching another man’s genitals could be
characterized as sexual. Courts look to the nature of the touch,
distinguishing the rough from the tender. The verbs courts use are
228
229
230
231
telling. “[S]triking,”
“slapping,”
“grabbing,”
“goosing,”
225. Cf. ADAM PHILIPS, ON FLIRTATION xvii–xix (1994) (“[F]lirtation . . . exploits the idea
of surprise. From a sadistic point of view it is as though the known and wished-for end is being
refused, deferred or even denied. But from a pragmatic point of view one could say that a space
is being created in which aims or ends can be worked out . . . .”).
226. See id. at xvii (“The fact that people tend to flirt only with serious things—madness,
disaster, other people—and the fact that flirting is a pleasure, makes it a relationship, a way of
doing things, worth considering.”).
227. EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, 609 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2010).
228. Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2003).
229. Lavack v. Owen’s World Wide Enter. Network, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (E.D.
Mich. 2005).
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232

“tap[ping] and swat[ting],” are considered nonsexual. Thus, the
following male-on-male harassment could not be interpreted as
motivated by sexual desire:
[G]rabbing [the plaintiff] by the waist, chest and buttocks; grinding
his genitals against [the plaintiff’s] buttocks in simulated intercourse;
telling [the plaintiff] to “squeal like a pig, or a woman,” and making
other lewd comments; attempting to stick the handle of a shovel and
a tape measure in [the plaintiff]’s anus; and kicking [the plaintiff] in
233
the buttocks.

The more threatening the behavior, the less likely courts are to
234
find sexual desire. For example, consider this scenario from Shafer
235
v. Kal Kan Foods, which the Seventh Circuit held evinced “physical
domination” rather than desire:

230. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 514 (6th Cir. 2001); Barrows v. Seneca
Foods Corp., No. 09-CV-6554, 2012 WL 268339, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012), vacated, 512 F.
App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013); Taylor v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. 06cv854, 2008 WL 4647690, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 20, 2008); Collins v. TRL, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
231. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d at 503.
232. See Barrows, 2012 WL 268339, at *2 (holding that conduct was not “because of sex” in
a case in which the supervisor would “frequently tap and swat [Plaintiff’s] penis,” and on one
occasion, “while Plaintiff was pushing a wheel barrow weighing approximately four hundred
pounds, his supervisor . . . grabbed his testicles by his hands in a vice like grip causing extreme
pain and embarrassment to Plaintiff”).
233. McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 541–42 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphases
added).
234. See Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that
conduct was not “because of sex” in a case in which harassers made crotch-grabbing gestures
and “used a phrase describing oral sex,” slashed plaintiff’s tires, and threatened plaintiff’s life);
Strishock v. Swift & Co., No. Civ.A.04CV2603PSFCBS, 2005 WL 1587300, at *1 (D. Colo. July
5, 2005) (holding that conduct was not “because of sex” in a case in which the plaintiff’s
supervisor “wrestled [the plaintiff] to the ground, bound his hands and feet, pulled his pants
down, spanked him with his bare hand 35 times, wrote ‘Happy Birthday’ in black magic marker
across his bare buttocks and smeared birthday cake on his face,” then took a photo, and “left
him lying bound for a period of time during which he told co-workers not to help him or cut him
loose or else that person would be next” (quotation marks omitted)). In two recent cases, courts
drew the line at conduct reported by the plaintiff as “assault.” Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits,
Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (denying a motion for summary judgment in a
case in which the harasser allegedly “forced [the plaintiff] to engage in oral sex” and three male
employees filed police reports); Reagan v. City of Knoxville, No. 3:07-cv-189, 2010 WL 2639933,
at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2010) (denying a motion for summary judgment in a case in which
the alleged harasser twice kneed the plaintiff in the groin and once pinned him against a truck
and “simulated sexual acts on him,” and the plaintiff informed his supervisor “that he had been
assaulted and required medical attention”). But see Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663,
666 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that state tort law claims for assault and battery alone were
insufficient to give rise to a sexual harassment claim).
235. Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2005).
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In June 2001 Dill, who earlier had remarked that Shafer has a
“cheerleader ass” that “would look real nice on my dick,” forced
Shafer’s face down to his crotch (while clothed), moving his groin to
give the impression that Shafer was performing fellatio. A few
weeks later, in the same company, Dill grabbed Shafer’s hand and
moved it to his crotch (again while clothed) while moaning as if
Shafer were masturbating him. The force was enough to put Shafer
in fear that Dill would break his arm. The next month Dill
approached Shafer in the locker room when Shafer was not wearing
a shirt and pulled a handful of hair from Shafer’s chest, causing
considerable pain. Finally, in August 2001 Dill bit Shafer in the neck
236
hard enough to raise welts, though not to penetrate the skin.

Even when a male coworker threatens to rape a male plaintiff,
courts may conclude the motive is “simple malice” rather than
237
desire. In one case, a court did not find desire even though the male
harassers repeatedly grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals and buttocks,
simulated sex acts with the plaintiff, and subjected the plaintiff to
repeated viewings of the “male-on-male rape scene from
238
Deliverance.”
Such holdings are not limited to cases involving male-on-male
harassment. In one case involving a female harasser and a female
plaintiff, the court held that sexual desire was lacking even though the
239
harasser stated she was attempting to simulate a “rape.” In another,
the female harasser “pressed her breasts against plaintiff,” and, on
several occasions, “grabbed plaintiff in a full body hug that plaintiff

236. Id. at 665.
237. See Farren v. Shaw Envtl., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356, 359 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2012)
(holding that there was no evidence the defendant, the plaintiff’s coworker, felt any sexual
desire toward the plaintiff, even though he repeatedly threatened sexual abuse by saying, for
example, “‘I’m going to fuck you, and tell everyone I fucked you,’” and “would grab himself in
front of [plaintiff] and say I have a big schwanz and it’ll go up in you; I’ll bend you over and fuck
you”), aff’d on other grounds, 510 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F.
App’x. 659, 661, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that conduct involving taunts about oral sex and
homosexuality, and “grabbing, punching, and kicking” by two self-identified heterosexual men,
was not motivated by desire because it was borne of “animus, power, or whatever it is that
drives bullies to single out others for taunting and ridicule”).
238. Taylor v. H.B. Fuller Co., No. 06cv854, 2008 WL 4647690, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20,
2008).
239. See Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). For further
discussion of Hy-Vee, see infra Part II.A.
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described as brutal and unwelcome,” but the court did not find desire,
240
since there were no “direct[] . . . proposition[s] for sexual favors.”
It need hardly be said that courts consider male-on-female
genital touching to be “because of sex,” especially when violent and
241
aggressive.
The first Supreme Court case recognizing sexual
harassment involved a female plaintiff’s allegations that her male
242
harasser had “forcibly raped her on several occasions.” That courts
do not see hostile forms of male-on-male genital touching as sexual is
perhaps not surprising considering the cultural invisibility of male
243
victims of sexual assault. As Professor Bennett Capers has written,
even some male victims of rape do not view their experiences in
sexual terms, assuming that “rape was something that only happens to
244
women.” The failure to see female-on-female forms of violence may
245
stem from a failure to understand women as serious threats.
4. Exhibitionism Is Inconsistent with Desire. One final fiction
courts use to screen out cases is that same-sex sexual desire is
240. Atkins v. Computer Scis. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (E.D. Va. 2003); see also Klen
v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., No. CIVA05CV02452EWNCBS, 2007 WL 2022061, at *2, *14 (D.
Colo. July 9, 2007) (holding that harassment was not “because of sex” in a case in which
coworkers pulled the plaintiff’s hair, “threw pens and paperclips at her,” “flicked their hands in
her face,” “bumped Plaintiff’s chair,” “‘snapped’ Plaintiff’s neck,” and “elbowed Plaintiff in the
head”). But see Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088, 1094, 1097 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a jury could find harassment was “because of sex” in a case in which the harasser
“reached over and pulled open Plaintiff’s shirt exposing her chest and bra to coworkers,” and
the harasser did not treat male employees similarly), overruled on other grounds as recognized
in Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2006).
241. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that a jury’s finding of a sexually hostile work environment was reasonable in a case
in which the male harasser “knocked [the female plaintiff] to the ground, undressed her and
digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and repeatedly threatened to kill her”); Lockard v.
Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming a jury verdict in favor of a female
sexual harassment plaintiff in a case in which male customers “grabbed [the plaintiff] by the
hair” and one customer “then grabbed her breast and placed his mouth on it”).
242. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
243. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2011).
244. Id. at 1268.
245. In various studies in which participants are given vignettes about domestic violence and
the researchers vary the sex of the victims and perpetrators, participants rate violence in the
context of same-sex relationships as less serious than male-on-female violence in heterosexual
relationships. See generally Michael J. Brown & Jennifer Groscup, Perceptions of Same-Sex
Domestic Violence Among Crisis Center Staff, 24 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 87 (2009); Sheila M.
Seelau & Eric P. Seelau, Gender-Role Stereotypes and Perceptions of Heterosexual, Gay and
Lesbian Domestic Violence, 20 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 363 (2005); Amy J. Wise & Sharon L.
Bowman, Comparison of Beginning Counselors’ Responses to Lesbian vs. Heterosexual Partner
Abuse, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 127 (1997).
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manifested only in private. For example, in Bradley v. Bates
246
Acquisition, LLC, the plaintiff alleged “he witnessed several of his
male co-workers engaging in consensual same-sex sexual behavior,
including stroking one another’s penises and nipples, kissing, dancing,
247
and humping each other.” The court concluded the plaintiff could
not demonstrate that these coworkers were homosexual, because
248
“they were just ‘putting on a show’” intended to entertain. “Thus,
the primary purpose of and motivation for the behavior in which
[they] engaged appears not to have been sexual desire or
249
gratification.” In English v. Pohanka, the court concluded that the
harasser’s act of “pressing his genitals against English’s shoulder” was
not an earnest sexual solicitation, because it “was done in view of
250
other coworkers and was not followed by a proposal for sex.” All of
the conduct complained of in that case “occurred on a showroom
floor” where sales consultants worked in “office cubes” and “had
251
little privacy.” The harasser even got a “few laughs” out of those
252
coworkers, to his “twisted delight.” Some of them “implicitly
253
encouraged” his behavior.
In these cases, the conduct is compared to the sort of private, athome vision of sexuality protected by the Supreme Court in Lawrence
254
v. Texas. Of course, sexual desire can be and often is displayed in
255
256
257
public settings, for entertainment, and in groups. And, like the

246. Bradley v. Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *1 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010).
247. Id. at *1.
248. Id. at *4. It was also relevant to the court that some of the alleged harassers were
married. Id.
249. Id.; see also Collins v. TRL, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (concluding
that a harasser who grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals was not motivated by sexual desire, in part
because “[i]t appears from the record that actions that [the harasser] took were performed in
the presence of others who would then laugh regarding what happened”).
250. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 845 (E.D. Va. 2002).
251. Id. at 847.
252. Id. at 846.
253. Id. at 847.
254. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that the Constitution protects
the “most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home”).
255. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 149–93 (1999).
256. See supra note 133.
257. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 301 (2004) (discussing “the scope, terms, and
structures of polyamory today” and “portray[ing] several polyamorous relationships”).
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other fictions described in this Section, the assumption that sexual
desire is only expressed in private is not generally made in cross-sex
258
cases.
***
Thus, courts have developed a set of rules about what constitutes
credible evidence of homosexuality that implicitly requires evidence
that the harasser held him or herself out as gay, lesbian, or bisexual in
the workplace. Absent that, courts may infer homosexuality from
desire for a same-sex plaintiff, but only when that desire manifests
itself in accord with a certain idealized picture of same-sex intimacy
259
that matches the image promoted by gay-marriage advocates.
Courts do not see desire in scenarios involving disgust, humor,
violence, or exhibitionism, because they understand the agents of
harassment in those cases as heterosexual or asexual archetypes:
bullies, clowns, and perpetual children. These holdings have now
taken on a life of their own as precedents about what constitutes
260
same-sex desire.
II. REINFORCING HETEROSEXISM
This Part will discuss how this notion of “homosexuality” as
being openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual at work, combined with the set
of fictions that flatten same-sex desire into a simple, earnest, gentle,
private emotion, work to privilege heterosexual identities and protect
heterosexual marriage. The cases act to preserve the reliance interests
of spouses and children in heterosexual marriage. They also protect
the interests of plaintiffs in defending their heterosexual identities
against threats by “openly” gay coworkers. These cases, in which
desire is inferred from gay identification, punish expressions of gay
identity at work. When alleged harassers self-identify as gay, courts
find it easy to see same-sex desire, even if it is not simple, earnest,

258. Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 567 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the
argument that indiscriminate harassment is not based on sex if it occurred in an “open forum
where men and women worked together”).
259. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069–70 (8th Cir. 2005)
(applying the fiction that humor and play are desexualized to a female harasser, and rejecting
the plaintiff’s argument that “because such bawdy, ‘locker room’ behavior is not as
commonplace among females, a reasonable jury could more readily infer actual sexual desire
based on similar statements or acts by females”).
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gentle, or private. The doctrine has spawned invasive litigation
practices in which workers must sit for depositions regarding their
sexual orientations, employers routinely ask for sworn affirmations of
261
heterosexuality, and plaintiffs’ lawyers appeal to homophobia. This
262
Part will explain how the doctrine serves to reinforce heterosexism.
A. Privileging Straight Marriages
In analyzing pre-Oncale decisions, Professor Kenji Yoshino
argued that the concept of bisexuality would undermine the doctrinal
263
focus on homosexual identities. Once courts recognized bisexuality,
they would no longer allow a harasser to negate the possibility that he
experienced same-sex desire by arguing that he experienced cross-sex
264
desire. Courts would then shift the focus of inquiry from status
265
(homosexual identity) to behavior (homosexual advances). But this
266
has not occurred. Today, bisexuality is ubiquitous. Yet courts
continue to indulge the argument that a harasser who has been
involved in a heterosexual marriage would not experience same-sex
267
desire.
A frequent refrain in cases dismissing sexual harassment claims is
that the alleged harasser, “who is married and has children, asserts
268
that he is heterosexual.” It should be well known by now to any
261. See infra note 428 and accompanying text.
262. One response might be that Title VII does not prohibit heterosexism, or any form of
discrimination based on sexual orientation, for that matter. This may not be true for long. See,
e.g., Pizer, supra note 27, at 719–20. In any event, my argument in this Part should appeal to
anyone who questions whether the state should endorse heterosexual over nonheterosexual
identities and unions.
263. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 450–51.
264. Id. at 454.
265. Id. at 452.
266. Glazer, supra note 2, at 1000.
267. Courts do not see a harasser’s marital status as relevant to a claim of cross-sex
harassment. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 993, 1000–01 (9th
Cir. 2010) (affirming a claim against a married harasser); Moser v. MCC Outdoor, LLC, 256 F.
App’x 634, 637, 645 (4th Cir. 2007) (same).
268. Hubbard v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. 06-43-JE, 2006 WL 2863222, at *3 (D. Or.
Oct. 4, 2006), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 607 (9th Cir. 2008); see Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., No. 08228-JJB, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2 (M.D. La. Aug. 3, 2010), vacated, 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012);
Sillars v. Nevada, No. 3:07-CV-00041-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 4540457, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 6,
2008), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2010); Cole v. Kone Elevators, Inc., No. CV-05-1969PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 3313707, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2006); Beseau v. Fire Dist. No. 1, No. 052162, 2006 WL 2795716, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2006); Lavack v. Owen’s World Wide Enter.
Network, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 230
F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1274, 1365–66 (D. Kan. 2002); cf. Ashmore v. J.P. Thayer Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d
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follower of American politics or celebrity gossip that a heterosexual
269
marriage is no barrier to same-sex desire. Some courts have rejected
270
the argument that straight marriage is a defense to same-sex desire,
while others recognize the fallacy of such reasoning, but partially rely
271
on it anyway. Perhaps these courts are assuming that most people,
especially those who are married to cross-sex partners, do not
experience same-sex desire. But even if this were a safe assumption,
why would it hold true for the subset of married people accused of
272
same-sex sexual harassment? This Section will suggest that one
possible explanation is a concern about how a finding of same-sex
desire might threaten a marriage and the interests of the harasser’s
273
spouse and children.
The claim that courts are protecting
heterosexual marriage is supported by cases in which courts seem to
draw implicit comparisons between cross-sex marriages and
propositions for same-sex trysts at the office. But regardless of
whether this holds true as a causal explanation, this Section argues
that the effect of these cases is to allow married heterosexuals to
engage in harassing conduct that would be illegal but for their marital
and sexual-orientation status, thus privileging heterosexual marriage.
274
For example, in Smith v. Hy-Vee, the plaintiff, Dru (Dani)
Smith, worked in a bakery with another woman, Sherri Lynch, who
275
“engaged in rude, vulgar, sexually charged behavior toward Smith.”
1359, 1365 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (finding no evidence the harasser was “actually homosexual” in a
case in which “Plaintiffs testified that [the harasser’s] obnoxious behavior included descriptions
of his sexual relationship with his wife”).
269. See, e.g., David Greenberg, Sex and the Married Politician, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 53,
53.
270. See Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 299–300 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Provensal v. Gaspard, No. 10-4276-SS, 2011 WL 2004416, at *3 & n.1 (E.D. La. May 23,
2011); Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572, at
*4–5 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010); Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752,
757 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
271. See Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005); Bradley v.
Bates Acquisition, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1153, 2010 WL 3220647, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2010).
272. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 449 (arguing that the judicial presumption of
heterosexuality may “be defended on the grounds that we believe the majority of the population
to be straight,” but that defense “may be insufficient, in that courts are not dealing with the
general population, but with the subset of that population whose same-sex conduct has given
rise to a claim of harassment”).
273. Cf. Wendy C. Ortiz, Newly Wed and Quickly Unraveling, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at
ST6 (discussing her experience as “part of that population of 30-something people who come
out, and, unintentionally, take down a couple of people (or more) in the process”).
274. Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
275. Id. at 905.
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The Eighth Circuit described an incident in which Lynch pretended to
rape Smith:
In May 2006, Smith observed Lynch “dry humping” a male Hy-Vee
manager. After the manager left, Smith said, “God, Sherri, it’s like
you practically raped him.” Lynch replied “[n]o Dani, if I were going
to rape someone, it would be like this.” Lynch then pushed Smith up
against a wall for ten to fifteen seconds while rubbing her hands and
276
body up against Smith.

On another occasion, Lynch “rubbed her fingers against Smith’s
277
fingers and told Smith ‘[t]hat’s what a penis feels like.’” Lynch also
278
“smacked [Smith] on the buttocks approximately six times.” The
court held that Lynch’s conduct was not “motivated by a particular
attraction to Smith because Lynch exposed both men and women to
279
the same behavior.” Lynch also “made sexually explicit cakes for
male-Hy-Vee employees,” “‘dry humped’ the same [male] manager
about once a week,” “put her hands in this manager’s pockets and
said ‘hey there big boy,’” and “hit several male employees on the
280
posterior on several occasions.”
Although it did not resolve the question, the court made
reference to a debate between the parties about Lynch’s sexual
orientation. Smith argued that Lynch was a lesbian or bisexual based
on her observations of Lynch’s conduct: kissing another female
employee, smacking that woman on the buttocks, and dry humping a
281
third female employee. Lynch denied that she was a lesbian or
282
bisexual. The court observed that Lynch had “been married to the
283
same man for sixteen years and [had] two daughters.” In affirming
the dismissal, the court did not conclude that Lynch was a bisexual
284
harasser, whose desires were strictly sex blind. It did not hold that
the case had to be dismissed because Lynch treated men and women
equally badly. Rather, it concluded that Lynch’s behavior was not a
serious sexual advance, citing a case holding that the use of crude

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
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humor in the presence of both men and women did not constitute sex
285
discrimination.
The Hy-Vee court seems to have drawn an implicit contrast
between Lynch’s nonserious workplace vulgarity and her serious
marriage, which it noted was to the “same man” for sixteen years, to
286
underscore the stability of the monogamous relationship. It did not
287
hold that a married woman could not experience same-sex desire,
but its interpretation of the facts seems to have been shaded by its
interest in protecting the stability of Lynch’s heterosexual identity
and marital status, as well as the interests of her husband and
288
children. The doctrine’s requirement that the court assign a sexualorientation status to the alleged harasser upped the ante. The court
was not willing to disrupt Lynch’s heterosexual identity based on
289
workplace indiscretions. But for Lynch’s marriage and claim to
290
heterosexual status, the outcome might have been different.
291
Another example is Sillars v. Nevada. In that case, the female
plaintiff and the alleged harasser, Patsy Cave, worked together for a
292
Nevada state agency. The plaintiff had been promoted and was

285. Hy-Vee, 622 F.3d at 908 (citing Barekman v. City of Republic, 232 S.W. 3d 675, 681
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007)).
286. See id. at 906.
287. The Eighth Circuit has stated that a cross-sex marriage does not preclude a jury from
finding that a harasser “was motivated by some degree of homosexual desire.” See Pedroza v.
Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005).
288. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1415–16 (2004) (“The landscape post-Lawrence is not one that makes formal legal
distinctions between heterosexual and homosexual practices, but rather one that likely renders
different legal treatment to those who express their sexuality in domesticated ways and those
who don’t—regardless of orientation.”).
289. The doctrine functions like the “queen-for-a-day” exemptions to the military’s former
ban on gay service members, protecting those who engage in “isolated” incidents of same-sex
eroticism based on “immaturity, curiosity or intoxication.” JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A
READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY 46–47 (1999) (quotation marks
omitted); see also id. (explaining the exemption “protect[ed] heterosexual persons from any
status-like consequences of their homosexual acts”).
290. Compare Hy-Vee, 622 F.3d at 906, 908, with Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930,
934 (7th Cir. 2007). For further discussion of Kampmier, see infra Part II.B. My argument is not
that the outcome should have been different. Whether one sees this case as troublesome
depends on one’s theory of what harm sexual harassment law should address. See infra Part III.
My argument is that the focus on sexual desire results in unequal outcomes insofar as liability
turns on whether harassers are married. See supra note 267.
291. Sillars v. Nevada, No. 3:07-CV-00041-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 4540457, at *1 (D. Nev.
Oct. 6, 2008), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2010).
292. Id.
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training Cave to take over her former job. Over the course of the
294
training, the two struck up a friendship. On one occasion, Cave
visited the plaintiff’s house, and
during the course of their conversation, they drank one or two
margaritas. Cave informed Plaintiff that she “had feelings for
someone in the office,” and Plaintiff began naming male employees
to determine who the person was. Cave said that it was no one that
Plaintiff had named. At some point during the conversation, Cave
295
began to cry.

A few nights later, “Cave called Plaintiff in tears stating, ‘I don’t want
you to think bad of me.’ She asked if she could come to Plaintiff’s
296
home and talk to her, but Plaintiff said, ‘No, it’s late at night.’” The
plaintiff contended that after this incident she noticed Cave would
297
stand too close to her and stare at her breasts. Cave denied having
298
feelings for the plaintiff. Although the court was evaluating a
299
summary judgment motion, it credited this denial, holding the
plaintiff had “no evidence demonstrating that Cave is homosexual.
Instead, Cave is married and has several children. There is no
evidence that she has ever been in, or intends to be in, a homosexual
relationship, and Cave denies having romantic feelings for
300
Plaintiff.” Why did the court conclude that no reasonable jury could
infer desire from Cave’s late-night visit to the plaintiff’s house and
odd confession? The incident described by the court is a scène à faire
301
of unrequited desire. The decision protects Cave’s marriage from a

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at *5.
299. Id. at *4.
300. Id. at *5. The court also may have been under the mistaken impression that Oncale
requires that harassment be in “‘sex-specific and derogatory terms.’” Id. (quoting Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1997)). This quotation comes from Oncale’s
description of how a plaintiff might prove harassment was motivated by “general hostility to the
presence of women in the workplace,” which was not at issue in Sillars. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at
80.
301. ROLAND BARTHES, A LOVER’S DISCOURSE: FRAGMENTS 44 (Richard Howard, trans.,
Hill and Wang 2001) (1977) (“[S]o that a long series of verbal contentions (my ‘politenesses’)
may suddenly explode into some generalized revulsion: a crying jag (for instance), before the
other’s flabbergasted eyes, will suddenly wipe out all the efforts (and the effects) of a carefully
controlled language.”).

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

INFERRING DESIRE

577

one-time lapse, a near confession of same-sex desire over too many
margaritas.
302
Myers v. Office Depot is a similar example, this one involving
303
men. The story began at an employer-sponsored “Kickoff event” in
Orlando, Florida, which was intended to motivate Office Depot’s
304
sales force. During the event, the male plaintiff, described by the
court as “openly homosexual,” became involved in an “intense
305
conversation” at the bar with a coworker, Ron Sorey. After the
conversation, the plaintiff went into the bathroom and entered a stall,
306
where Sorey grabbed him and tried to kiss him. The plaintiff
307
Later, Sorey became the plaintiff’s
rebuffed the advance.
308
supervisor. Sorey was confrontational with the plaintiff and tried to
309
pressure him to leave the company. The court dismissed the case,
holding that the “[p]laintiff [did] not offer any evidence that Ron
Sorey [was] a homosexual and thus allegedly attempted to kiss the
310
plaintiff because of sex.” The court also made a cryptic reference to
“calls to female co-workers,” which proved that “Sorey was an equal
311
opportunity harasser, which is not actionable.” The “calls” to which
the court referred were drunken calls from Sorey during another
312
corporate event to the hotel room of two female coworkers. During
those calls, Sorey informed the women that “his wife doesn’t like anal
313
sex,” and they all shared a laugh. Here, as in Sillars, the court
302. Myers v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 06-CV-11252, 2007 WL 2413087, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 21, 2007).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at *4. The court also dismissed the case because the single incident of the
“attempted kiss” did not meet the requirement that harassment be “severe or pervasive.” Id. at
*5. There was no quid pro quo claim because Sorey was not the plaintiff’s supervisor at the time
of the alleged harassment. Id.
311. Id. at *4.
312. Id.
313. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 9 & Ex. B,
Myers, 2007 WL 2413087 (No. 06-CV-11252). One of the coworkers, Mary Miller, testified that
when Sorey first called, she told him, “Ron, you need to go to sleep, you’re drunk.” Id. Ex. B.
Sorey hung up but called again, and “began to tell [her] how his wife doesn’t like anal sex.” Id.
Miller responded, “Ron, have you ever heard of lubricant,” and the two laughed. Id. Miller
testified “it wasn’t—there was no insinuation of him and I or anything like that.” Id. The next
day, Miller told Sorey, “We do stupid things when we’re drunk and, you know, you had one too
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refused to understand a one-time lapse as sexual desire that would
give rise to a bisexual or gay identity. The implicit comparison is
between sex in a public restroom and marriage.
The set of fictions narrowly construing evidence of same-sex
desire discussed in Part I.C apply with special force in cases in which
314
harassers are married. Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine is an example of
a case in which a court refused to read conduct as evincing sexual
desire when the alleged harasser was involved in a heterosexual
315
marriage. The plaintiff, Thomas Kreamer, worked as a deckhand on
316
a boat. He alleged he had been harassed by a coworker, Carroll
Carerre, a man whose “language was consistently profane
317
and . . . [who] had been known to engage in excessive horseplay.”
The plaintiff testified that on eight occasions, Carerre grabbed him in
the crotch, and “[o]n the third or fourth time, Carrere allegedly told
318
plaintiff that ‘he would like to compare packages.’” The plaintiff
319
told Carrere to stop. Carrere also attempted to annoy the plaintiff
by throwing the rope off the bit of his boat when the plaintiff was
320
attempting to tie two boats together. After the plaintiff complained,
321
Carrere blew him a kiss. On another occasion, “Carrere allegedly
burned plaintiff’s wrist with a hot Zippo lighter that Carrere was
322
allegedly trying to put between plaintiff’s legs.” The plaintiff also
related a strange story about an incident in his sleeping quarters:
[O]ne morning during the time in question, Carrere entered his
sleeping quarters on the Bacchus. Plaintiff stated that when he
awoke, Carrere was standing next to plaintiff’s bed, just looking at
plaintiff. Carrere did not say anything, did not touch plaintiff and
did not attempt to get into plaintiff’s bed. When plaintiff told
323
Carrere to “get the hell out,” Carrere left without saying anything.

many. Don’t worry about it.” Id. When asked if she ever made a formal complaint, Miller said,
“There was no reason to. It wasn’t offensive to me; it was funny.” Id.
314. Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine, No. Civ.A.03-3139, 2004 WL 2297459 (E.D. La. Oct. 7,
2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 378 (5th Cir. 2005).
315. Id. at *1.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at *1, *6.
319. Id. at *1.
320. Id. at *2.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
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When the plaintiff later came into contact with Carrere, Carrere
324
whistled at him and made “offensive gestures.” Near the end of his
time on this particular job, “Carrere approached plaintiff from behind
as he was bent over slightly over the engines, grabbed his sides and
325
said he ‘would like to f**k that piece of ass.’” The plaintiff pushed
326
him away and left the engine room.
The court concluded, as a matter of law, that this evidence, “as a
whole, reveals an intent of Carrere to humiliate plaintiff for reasons
unrelated to a sexual interest, rather than an actual intent to have
327
sexual contact.” The court refused to read Carrere’s statement that
328
he would like to “f**k that piece of ass” literally. Because Carrere
was leaving that day, the court reasoned, the incident must have been
“nothing more than a final parting shot directed at plaintiff” rather
than “a realistic sexual proposition of the type necessary to be
329
actionable under Title VII.”
This raises the question: How much time did the court think a
sexual encounter between the two men might take? Is the court
assuming that sexual propositions are only made in an effort to start
long-term relationships? One fact the court highlighted was that
“Carrere never asked [the plaintiff] out or expressed an interest in
330
him socially outside of work.” The court held that nothing salacious
could be inferred from the odd incident in which the plaintiff awoke
to find Carrere standing in his sleeping quarters, silently staring at
331
332
him. The court would not read desire into this pointed silence.
The explanation, most likely, is that the court considered this
evidence in light of the fact that “Carrere, who is married with

324. Id.
325. Id. (quotation mark omitted).
326. Id.
327. Id. at *6.
328. Id. at *3, *6 & n.14.
329. Id. at *6.
330. Id. at *7.
331. See id. (“When this one incident is considered in light of all the other summary
judgment evidence, plaintiff has simply failed to present any proof indicating that Carrere was
acting out of any bona fide homosexual interest.”).
332. Cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 3 (“‘Closetedness’ itself is a performance initiated as
such by the speech act of a silence—not a particular silence, but a silence that accrues
particularity by fits and starts, in relation to the discourse that surrounds and differentially
constitutes it.”).
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children, has denied that he is homosexual.” On comparison,
Carrere’s conduct toward Kreamer looks insignificant; at most it was
a brief flirtation with the idea of a same-sex tryst, not the sort of effort
to initiate a relationship that might lead to a same-sex marriage.
Thus, comparison between same-sex trysts and marriage is made
part of the doctrine by the set of fictions narrowly construing
evidence of same-sex desire. These fictions serve to protect straight
marriages from the disruption that ascription of gay, lesbian, or
bisexual identity to a spouse can effect.
B. Defending Straight Workers from Gay “Recruitment”
The doctrine not only protects heterosexual identities from
internal threats, it defends them against external threats as well, in
the form of “predatory homosexual conduct” that could convert the
334
straight victim to a gay or lesbian identity.
335
In Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., the female plaintiff, Shannon
Kampmier, alleged she had been harassed by another woman, Lena
336
Badell, when the two worked together as nurses. The Seventh
Circuit observed that Badell had “referred to herself as ‘queer little
337
old me,’” and described sexual activities with her “girlfriend.”
Notable here is the court’s choice of the term “girlfriend.” The briefs
described the woman as Badell’s “domestic partner of more than 20
338
years.” The plaintiff made much of the fact that, notwithstanding
this domestic partnership, Badell had previously carried on “a
homosexual affair with a female subordinate” and “kissed and
339
sexually touched said female employee while at work.”

333. Kreamer, 2004 WL 2297459, at *7. But see Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., No. 08-228JJB, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2–3 (M.D. La. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding that a married man did not
desire the male plaintiff), vacated, 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012).
334. See EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 519 (6th Cir. 2001). Courts and
parties frequently refer to “homosexual advances,” rather than simply “sexual advances,” as
though the “homosexual” nature of the advance rendered it more threatening. See, e.g., Redd v.
N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 179 (2d Cir. 2012).
335. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007).
336. Id. at 934.
337. Id.
338. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Kampmier, 472 F.3d 930 (No. 061788), 2006 WL
2024101, at *6; see also Brief for Appellant at 6, Kampmier, 472 F.3d 930 (No. 06-1788), 2006
WL 1497454, at *6 (using the term “live-in partner”).
339. Brief for Appellant, supra note 338, at 7. The defendant characterized it as “a
consensual romantic relationship.” Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 338, at 7.
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The plaintiff alleged that Badell continuously grabbed her
buttocks, hugged her, grabbed her around the arms, jumped in her
340
lap, kissed her on the cheek, and rubbed up against her. Badell also
told the plaintiff “that she could turn any woman gay ten to twelve
times,” described sex acts she had performed with her “girlfriend,”
341
and stated she could do the same with the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s
initial complaint about this conduct was, “‘What’s up with our
executive director? She is really touch-feely. She is always talking
about being gay,’” to which her supervisor responded, “‘I know. I
342
know. She’s like that with everybody.’”
The employer made the “equal opportunity harasser”
argument—introducing evidence that Badell had also “grabbed two
male employees’ buttocks” and sexually propositioned another man,
343
who agreed to go out on a date with Badell, but then stood her up.
The court rejected the employer’s argument that Badell was an
“equal opportunity harasser” because it concluded that the plaintiff
344
endured more “severe and prevalent” harassment than the men. It
reasoned that “Badell made constant references to female employees
at the Loyalton, made comments about their ‘boobs,’ and told the
women at the Loyalton that she could turn any woman
gay. . . . [A]nother Emeritus employee[] also testified that she heard
345
Badell claim to be able to turn any woman gay.” The court was
quite concerned with Badell’s statement that she could “turn any
346
woman gay,” a fact it repeats four times throughout the opinion.
The court’s fixation on Badell’s offer to turn any woman gay
resonates with the old stereotype of gays and lesbians as recruiters
and seems to imply that the threat of recruitment, in other words, the
threat to these women’s heterosexuality, is what makes this

340. Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 934.
341. Id. at 941–42.
342. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 338, at 10. The parties disputed the point at
which Kampmier complained about the conduct as sexual harassment. Brief for Appellant,
supra note 338, at 8.
343. Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 940. Badell told the man the next day, “‘I was waiting and ready
for you. If you did not want it and did not want to be bothered by me, then you should have said
something.’” Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 940–41.
346. Id. at 934, 940–41; see also Harris v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 2011-94, 2012 WL 5289392, at
*1, *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23, 2012) (concluding summarily that harassment was “because of sex” in a
case in which the male harasser told the male plaintiff that he was “homosexual” and stated that
he could make the plaintiff “go gay”).
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harassment “because of sex.” The plaintiff’s brief made this
argument expressly: “Badell was a homosexual, and her agenda was
to ‘recruit people,’ even though she had a live-in female partner, as is
evidenced by her affair with her female Marketing Director at the
348
Loyalton.”
Badell’s harassment discriminated against women because her
desire for them was of a same-sex nature, threatening to undo their
heterosexual identities. Badell expressed desire to date both men and
women at work, but only threatened the sexualities of women. By
contrast, when ostensibly straight men harass other straight men by
threatening their sexualities, courts conclude the harassment was
based on sexual orientation, not sex, and is therefore not actionable
349
350
under federal law. In Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, also a
Seventh Circuit case, the plaintiff, who identified as heterosexual,
alleged that his coworkers thought he was gay based on the fact that
351
he was single and had a close friendship with a male coworker. As a
result, they referred to him as a “‘faggot’” and threatened to “snap his
352
neck.” The court dismissed the claim, holding that this harassment
was because of Hamm’s perceived sexual orientation (gay), not his
353
sex (male).
The distinction is that in Hamm, the plaintiff’s coworkers did not
sexually desire him (they only threatened to kill him). Accordingly,
although courts do not understand aggressive male-on-male genital
touching as the type of “predatory homosexual conduct” that could
354
ground a Title VII claim, they will see desire in physical contacts
355
356
357
massages,
“fondl[ing],”
and
that include hand holding,
347. See RUBIN, supra note 28, at 271 (discussing moral panic in the 1970s over the threat of
gay recruitment of children).
348. Brief for Appellant, supra note 338, at 34 (citation omitted). It is not clear from the
brief whether the statement “‘recruit people’” was Kampmier’s characterization of Badell’s
behavior or a quotation attributed by Kampmier to Badell herself. Id.
349. See generally Kramer, supra note 39.
350. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003).
351. Id. at 1060.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 519 (6th Cir. 2001); see also supra Part
I.B.3.
355. Knobbe v. Artco Casket Co., Inc., No. 4:10CV322 CDP, 2010 WL 2947731, at *1–2
(E.D. Mo. July 22, 2010).
356. Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Thorne v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23,
2008); Tainsky v. Clarins USA, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Mann v. Lima,
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“caress[ing].” In Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc. the alleged male
harasser sent the male plaintiff text messages stating “‘I want cock’”
360
and “‘your missing the dipper,’” referring to his penis. The district
court held that these text messages, although “regarding sexual
361
362
matters, are not propositions.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed. It
emphasized that the harasser “repeatedly physically touched and
363
caressed Cherry’s body.” The harasser had placed his hand on the
plaintiff’s buttocks, knee, and thighs, and “rubbed [plaintiff’s]
364
shoulders and stroked his hair.”
In Cherry, a witness stated the harasser had touched Cherry
365
“‘like I do my wife.’” This echoes another Fifth Circuit decision, in
which the court held a jury could infer sexual intent when a male
harasser “approached [the plaintiff] from behind while he was
bending down and fondled his anus,” in a contact the plaintiff
366
described “as similar to ‘foreplay with a woman.’” These courts saw
the harasser’s conduct as sexual, and hence injurious, because the
harasser treated the plaintiff like a woman. As Yoshino has
explained, these types of interactions are injurious because they are
367
homoerotic, as opposed to homosocial. Homoerotic interactions are
ways of “unmaking men,” in which men are revealed to be
368
“‘inverts’—that is, as women trapped inside men’s bodies.” By
contrast, homosocial interactions are ways of “making men,” “insofar

290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 192 (D.R.I. 2003). But see Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 230 F. Supp. 2d
1261, 1274 (D. Kan. 2002) (“[C]ontinu[ing] to rub Plaintiff’s shoulders after Plaintiff asked him
to stop . . . [was not] ‘credible evidence’ that [the alleged harasser] is homosexual or his conduct
is motivated by sexual desire.”).
357. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2002).
358. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012); Cromer-Kendall v.
District of Columbia, 326 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (D.D.C. 2004).
359. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012).
360. Id. at 185. The harasser also offered the plaintiff the opportunity to spend the night at
his house and borrow his clothes and underwear. Id.
361. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., No. 08-228-JJB, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2 (M.D. La. Aug.
3, 2010), vacated, 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012).
362. Cherry, 668 F.3d at 188.
363. Id.
364. Cherry, 2010 WL 3035758, at *2.
365. Cherry, 668 F.3d at 189. The court pointed to this statement in explaining why the
harassment met the “severe or pervasive” requirement for a sexual harassment claim. Id.
366. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2002).
367. Yoshino, supra note 7, at 448.
368. Id.
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as the men who can take (and dish out) hazing, razzing, or horseplay
369
are constituted as ‘real’ men.”
But it is more than simply that the harassers are treating men
like women. Sexualized violence against women has often been
understood in terms of desire. And courts apply the same horseplay
370
exemption to cases involving women harassing women. In these
cases, harassers are not just treating men like women, they are
treating men tenderly and with affection, like women they might want
to marry. This threat to heterosexuality is one that courts recognize.
C. Punishing Self-Identification as Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual
When the alleged harassers are “openly homosexual,” some
courts hold there is an automatic “inference that their conduct was
371
based on sexual desire, and thus, sex.” I have found only one case in
which a court held there was credible evidence of homosexuality, but
372
nonetheless concluded the harassment was not “because of sex.”
That case involved a female harasser who did not specifically target
the plaintiff with her alleged harassment. In every other case in which
a court found credible evidence that the harasser was gay, it
373
concluded the harassment was because of sex. These courts did not
require that the alleged harasser express her desire in a way that was

369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir. 2005).
371. Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2009); see
also supra note 55.
372. Adeshile v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. H-06-3480, 2008 WL 112103, at *6 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 9, 2008). In a similar case, the alleged harassers were two female coworkers engaged in a
romantic relationship with each other. Baugham v. Battered Women, Inc., 211 F. App’x 432, 439
(6th Cir. 2006). The female plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to vulgar comments and
behavior related to this same-sex relationship. Id. Without specifically remarking on the alleged
harassers’ sexual orientations, the court held that the female plaintiffs did not present any
evidence to support the claim that they were subjected to harassment because of sex. Id. at 439;
see also Espinosa v. Burger King Corp., No. 11-62503-CIV, 2012 WL 4344323, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 21, 2012) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim because she alleged that her gay coworkers harassed
her because she was heterosexual, not because she was a woman, without reaching a conclusion
as to whether the jury could infer the harassers were in fact gay).
373. I have found twenty-two cases in which plaintiffs prevailed on the question of whether
harassment was “because of sex” with sufficient allegations or evidence of a harasser’s
homosexuality. They are noted with an asterisk in Appendix B. In three other cases finding
evidence of desire, the court noted that alleged harassers self-identified as nonheterosexual
without reaching any holding on the question. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 934
(7th Cir. 2007); Harris v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 2011-94, 2012 WL 5289392, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 23,
2012); Rogers v. Johnson, No. C08-4395 TEH, 2010 WL 1688564, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
2010).
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simple, sincere, gentle, and private. Because courts rely so heavily
on self-identification, together with reputation, as the marker of
homosexuality, the effect of this doctrine is to punish expressions of
gay identity, imposing an implicit “don’t tell” requirement in the
workplace. Theoretically, homosexual identification might be a shield
against liability in cross-sex harassment cases too, but this has not
375
been a significant phenomenon.
376
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.
illustrates how self-identification as gay can create a nearly automatic
inference that harassment was because of sex. There, the plaintiff,
Diane Dick, worked in a sales office consisting mostly of female
employees. She alleged she was sexually harassed by several of her
377
female coworkers. As the district court noted, “One central theme
animating Ms. Dick’s memorandum is her insistence that a strong
lesbian atmosphere prevailed in the office, and that the Vernal Office
378
was known as the ‘lesbian factory.’” As evidence that her harassers
were homosexual, Dick pointed out “that the office bulletin board
379
was decorated in rainbow colors—which symbolizes gay pride.” She
also alleged that two of her female coworkers would “lock themselves
380
into various rooms at the office for extended periods of time.” Dick
admitted to being “upset” that she was not informed that a coworker
was a lesbian, because Dick’s granddaughter had often babysat for
381
that coworker’s children.

374. See, e.g., Kampmier, 472 F.3d at 940.
375. I have found one decision, Lewis v. North General Hospital, 502 F. Supp. 2d 390
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), in which the male plaintiff (who, incidentally, self-identified as “gay”), alleged
that his female harasser, also “gay,” had “brushed up against him” and “rubbed her breast on
him.” Id. at 403. The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiff failed to argue he had been
harassed because he was a man. Id. at 404. However, another district court allowed a claim to
proceed in which the harasser was an “openly homosexual” man and the plaintiffs were female.
See Francois v. Washmonbo, Inc., No. 05-23368-CIV, 2007 WL 1362796, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 9,
2007) (“[The harasser] allegedly grabbed Plaintiffs from behind on many different occasions and
would tell them to ‘dame la lengua’ or ‘give me your tongue.’”).
376. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
377. Id. at 1260.
378. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278 n.4 (D. Utah 2003), rev’d,
397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
379. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1261. In noting this evidence, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court’s holding that the plaintiff’s assertion that the office used “‘rainbow colors . . . symbolizing
gay pride’” on a bulletin board did not raise a “disputed factual issue” as to the “lesbian
atmosphere” in the office. Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 n.4 (alteration in original).
380. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1261.
381. Id.
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Dick described the alleged harassment in terms of “‘a working
environment permeated by sexually explicit banter, insults, lewd
382
jokes, gestures, games, and devices.’” The only physical conduct
directed at Dick, however, involved two incidents in which Camie
Hinkle, a female coworker, attempted to pinch her breasts, but was
rebuffed, and one incident “at a novelty shop over the lunch hour [in
which] Ms. Hinkle shoved a sex toy in the shape of a penis toward Ms.
383
Dick.” Dick alleged that she was referred to as “‘Ivanna Dick’” and
“‘Granny Dick,’” and that another female coworker “often would
point to Ms. Dick’s collection of stuffed cats on her desk and say that
384
Ms. Dick had a ‘pussy.’” Her coworkers made crude jokes about
oral sex, simulated sex with a stuffed bear, and played vulgar rap
385
music in front of her. The district court noted that Dick admitted
that this was the “office environment” and that the vulgarity also
386
seemed to offend a male coworker, a returned missionary. The
record also included evidence that Dick was harassed out of dislike,
due to jealousy over her professional success, as a result of her
comment expressing concern that the coworker who hired her
granddaughter as a babysitter was a lesbian, and because she had a
387
reputation as a “busybody.”
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit found enough evidence of sexual
388
desire to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
The court did not understand the coworkers’ insults (“‘Granny
Dick’”) as evidence of disgust that would cancel out any desire. It did
not conclude that the evidence suggesting the harassers disliked Dick
389
proved that they did not desire her. It did not characterize the
390
humor in the office as “horseplay.” And it was not concerned that

382. Id. at 1260 (quoting Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1275).
383. Id. at 1261.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Dick, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (quotation mark omitted).
387. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1265–66.
388. Id. at 1270.
389. Id. at 1261, 1266. This stands in contrast with cases involving ostensibly straight
harassers in which courts viewed disgust and dislike as inconsistent with desire. See supra Part
I.C.1.
390. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
81 (1998)). This stands in contrast with cases involving ostensibly straight harassers in which
courts viewed humor as inconsistent with desire. See supra Part I.C.2.
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the harassment was put on for show. Referring to Hinkle’s two
rebuffed efforts at touching Dick’s breasts, the Tenth Circuit held
that “Ms. Hinkle touched, on more than one occasion, one of the
most intimate parts of Ms. Dick’s body—an act seldom carried out
392
without some sort of sexual motivation.” The fact that differentiates
Dick from the many cases in which courts have not interpreted sexual
touching as evidence of desire is that in Dick, the alleged harassers
had previously engaged in consensual same-sex relationships in the
393
workplace. Contrast this with a case such as Kreamer, in which the
court held that no inference of desire was reasonable when a married
man grabbed the plaintiff’s crotch eight times and later stood over
394
him, watching him as he slept. The Dick court concluded that
evidence that two other female coworkers had locked themselves in
various rooms suggested tolerance for “sexually motivated conduct in
the workplace,” supporting an inference that the harassment of the
395
plaintiff resulted from sexual desire. The court implied that the
problem was tolerance of same-sex workplace sexuality, even of the
consensual variety, rather than discriminatory harassment. Thus,
expressions of lesbian identity and relationships exposed the
396
employer to liability for harassment.
Courts will not understand male-on-male conduct as humorous
“horseplay” when the harassers are gay, even when the plaintiff
understood that conduct as “horseplay” rather than a manifestation
397
of desire. In Johnson v. Dollar General Corp., the harassing conduct
consisted of an incident in which three alleged male harassers held

391. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1265–66. This stands in contrast with cases involving ostensibly
straight harassers in which courts viewed exhibitionism as inconsistent with desire. See supra
Part I.C.4.
392. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266. In discussing the evidence of desire, the court also referred to
evidence that the same harasser had “shoved a sex toy in the shape of a penis toward Ms. Dick”
“at a novelty shop over the lunch hour.” See id. at 1266, 1261.
393. See id. at 1266 (“[The harassers] engaged in same-sex sexual conduct with other people
in the workplace.”). By contrast, other courts have viewed aggressive sexual touching as
inconsistent with desire. See supra Part I.C.3.
394. Kreamer v. Henry’s Marine, No. Civ.A.03-3139, 2004 WL 2297459, at *6–7 (E.D. La.
Oct. 7, 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 378 (5th Cir. 2005).
395. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266.
396. See Brower, supra note 6, at 32–33 (“The specter of a hardworking Utah grandmother
employed in a ‘lesbian factory’ is a fairly vivid image. Accordingly, the schema of lesbian
sexuality interposed itself and led the court to find a same-sex desire-based harassment case
where it did not exist.”).
397. Johnson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-173, 2008 WL 2781660 (E.D. Tenn. July 14,
2008).
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398

the plaintiff down while they attempted to pull off his pants. Earlier,
399
the harassers had admitted to the plaintiff that they were gay and
had made comments to the plaintiff such as “‘if you’ve got big feet,
400
you’ve got to have a bigger penis.’” According to a witness,
precipitating the “pantsing” incident was a conversation about body
piercing, in which the plaintiff said he would never allow his penis to
401
be pierced unless “someone caught him and held him down.”
Thereafter, one of the harassers began “chasing Plaintiff around the
402
store,” and eventually caught him and pulled him into an office.
Once there, two of the harassers held the plaintiff’s arms back while
the third pulled his pants down but was unable to pull down his
403
boxers. The plaintiff had testified that he had no reason to think
that the harassers were sexually aroused during the alleged incident,
404
but rather, that they ‘“just thought it was something funny to do.’”
Nonetheless, the court did not address the defendants’ argument that
the case was simply “crude male horseplay” of the sort routinely
405
dismissed when the alleged harassers do not self-identify as gay.
Thus, liability turns on status, defined as being out of the closet.
The not-so-implicit message of these cases is that it is not acceptable
to be out at work. The cases use the term “openly homosexual”
almost as an epithet; indeed, the plaintiff’s brief in Kampmier went so
406
far as to describe the harasser’s homosexuality as “blatant.” In
penalizing nonheterosexual identities, the doctrine creates incentives
for employees to cover or downplay nonheterosexual identities at
407
work. Workers might be cautious to display symbols of gay pride or
engage in consensual same-sex relationships in the view of coworkers,

398. Id. at *1.
399. Memorandum in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment with
Imbedded Motion To Amend Complaint Caption at 4, Johnson, 2008 WL 2781660 (No. 2:06CV-173), 2008 WL 3853708 (summarizing the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that two harassers
admitted they were gay and that the plaintiff had seen one of them kissing a man he referred to
as his husband).
400. Johnson, 2008 WL 2781660, at *1.
401. Id. at *1 n.2.
402. Id. at *1 & n.2.
403. Id. at *1.
404. Reply Brief in Further Support of Defendant Dollar Gen. Corp.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, Johnson, 2008 WL 2781660 (No. 2:06-CV-173), 2008 WL 3853709.
405. Id. For a discussion of other “horseplay” cases, see supra Part I.C.2.
406. Brief for Appellant, supra note 338, at 34.
407. See Yoshino, supra note 29, at 772, 836–65 (describing the harms of “covering”).
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lest they be hauled into court as alleged harassers, as in Dick. On
the flip side, workers have added incentive to talk up their cross-sex
marriages, which detract from the inference of desire, and to
emphasize heterosexual longings, which suggest the harasser is not
“openly gay.” Some courts understand heterosexual banter as
negating the possibility of same-sex desire, for example, by dismissing
a same-sex harassment claim in which the alleged male harasser
“would often grace those in his company with his opinions regarding
the sexual desirability of various women who worked” alongside
409
them.
D. Forcing the Closet Door Open
Shortly after Oncale was decided, Professor Janet Halley argued
that the case had the potential to turn Title VII into a tool of
“homosexual panic,” used by purported “victims” of benign, but
unwanted, same-sex sexual overtures in the workplace to label gay
410
men or lesbians harassers. Professor Marc Spindelman, defending
Oncale, argued that Halley’s claim lacked empirical support, insofar
as she could not point to any cases in which homophobic plaintiffs
411
“were permitted to sue.” The issue, however, is not that plaintiffs
are winning these cases, or even that they are getting to trial,
412
considering the high rate of settlement. Civil litigation today is

408. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005).
409. King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F. App’x. 659, 663 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Armintrout v.
Bloomingdale’s Pizza, Inc., No. 04 C 313, 2007 WL 837279, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2007)
(observing, with respect to an alleged male harasser’s sexuality, “it is uncontroverted that Luis
would pinch and grab female employees on the buttocks, that other employees did not perceive
Luis as a homosexual, and that Luis openly talked with other employees ‘about girls’ and asked
one of the female waitresses out on a date”); English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp.
2d 833, 845 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2002) (concluding the alleged male harasser’s “frequent comments
about his girlfriends and [the male plaintiff’s] relations with his wife further undercut any
reasonable inference that [the harasser] sought to initiate an affair with [the plaintiff]”).
410. Halley, supra note 7, at 195.
411. See Spindelman, supra note 7, at 204 (“It would, of course, be worrisome if
homophobic plaintiffs, wrongly claiming sexual harassment that never occurred, were permitted
to sue. [Halley] predicts just such an ‘alarming class of cases’ will arise under Oncale, but cites
not one example.” (quoting Halley, supra note 7, at 192)).
412. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 123–24 (2009)
(discussing the “dominance of settlement” in all types of cases, including employment
discrimination); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663,
693–95 (discussing the high rates of dismissal due to settlement in employment discrimination
cases).
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dominated by discovery, which occurs prior to summary judgment.
The problem is that plaintiffs, some with questionable motives, are
now able to subject alleged harassers to inquisition about their sexual
histories and desires through discovery. Moreover, because
employers, not individuals, are the defendants in Title VII cases,
accused harassers now find themselves asked by their employers to
testify to their heterosexuality. Discovery gives plaintiffs tools to
harass coworkers with the threat of outing. In addition to discovery
abuses, in constructing their summary judgment arguments to courts,
some plaintiffs’ lawyers expressly draw on antigay biases and
413
stereotypes.
Many same-sex harassment cases seem to have been filed due to
the plaintiffs’ discomfort with homosexuality, if not outright
homophobia. In some cases, courts quote statements from plaintiffs
suggesting the plaintiff brought the case because he or she was
“uncomfortable” with the alleged harasser’s homosexuality, rather
414
than because he or she thought sex discrimination was afoot. In one
case, the plaintiff had referred to her alleged harasser as a “‘fat
415
lesbian.’” In another, the harassment complained of was that a
customer’s employee had made “‘unmanly gestures’” by wiggling his
fingers and had given the plaintiff a “‘gay look’” with “‘googling
416
eyes.’” In response, the plaintiff “asked a non-receptive, married,
female employee for a dinner date” just to demonstrate he was “not
417
‘gay.’”

413. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 37 S. TEX. L.
REV. 699, 705 n.26 (1996) (“At least one practitioner has admitted to me that she exploits antigay prejudice in her efforts to induce the court to recognize same-sex harassment in the context
of unwelcome sexual advances.”). For examples of antigay rhetoric from the plaintiffs’ briefs in
Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp. and Dick v. Phone Directories Co., see supra notes 338–39, 348,
378, and 406.
414. See Sillars v. Nevada, No. 3:07-CV-00041-LRH-RAM, 2008 WL 4540457, at *2 (D. Nev.
Oct. 6, 2008) (noting that the plaintiff informed her supervisor that it “‘just really made [her]
uncomfortable, to have a female that [she] considered a friend have romantic feelings toward
[her]. [She] didn’t know what to do about it. [She] was looking for guidance’” (alterations in
original)), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 669 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.
2004) (“Plaintiff testified that he is a Christian man and therefore, in his view homosexuality is a
sin, and it makes him ‘[r]eal uncomfortable.’” (alteration in original)).
415. Reissner v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., No. 02-CV-6353-CJS, 2004 WL 941645, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2004).
416. Higgins v. Vitran Express, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-228, 2011 WL 3652253, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio
June 6, 2011).
417. Id. at *1.
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In other cases, the alleged “harassment” is so insignificant as to
418
suggest that the plaintiff was motivated by homophobic panic. For
419
example, in Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., the plaintiff’s “primary
complaint” of harassment was that his male colleague repeatedly gave
him shoulder massages, lasting from one to five seconds, while he was
420
working at his computer in his cubicle. Shoulder massages may be
unwelcome, but they certainly do not rise to the level of severe or
421
pervasive harassment. The plaintiff thought the massage constituted
sexual harassment because it was not “normal for a guy to massage
422
another guy’s back.” The plaintiff’s problem was his fear that the
harasser was gay (not “normal”). He pointed to the fact that his
423
harasser had friends with “‘alternative lifestyles.’” In another case,
the Eleventh Circuit observed that a male plaintiff “found certain
behavior sexual that no reasonable person would, perhaps because it
424
was coming from a gay man.” These cases are consistent with
research that suggests same-sex sexual overtures toward men are
more likely to be perceived as harassment than opposite-sex
425
overtures toward men.
Before these cases are weeded out at summary judgment,
homophobic accusations become occasions for employers and their

418. See, e.g., Thomas v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., Inc., No. CIV-07-1378-D, 2010 WL 565272, at
*5 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2010) (asking the plaintiff about her marital status and inviting her out
for a drink); Berkeley v. Potter, No. CIV A 06-4490(NLH), 2008 WL 746602, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar.
18, 2008) (invading the plaintiff’s “personal space,” brushing against his chest, and giving the
plaintiff a “‘strange and unusual, queer gaze,’” all on a single occasion); Landrau Romero v.
Caribbean Rests., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D.P.R. 1998) (winking and smiling on several
occasions).
419. Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Kan. 2002).
420. Id. at 1266.
421. Sometimes even heads of state give unwelcome shoulder massages. See Warren St.
John, The Politics of Good Touch, Bad Touch, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at H1 (discussing a
“diplomatic goof” in which President George W. Bush gave German Chancellor Angela Merkel
a shoulder massage at the 2006 G8 summit).
422. Budenz, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (quotation mark omitted).
423. Id.
424. Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 589 F.3d 1136, 1154 n.11 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated
and reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 611 F.3d 1379 (11th
Cir. 2010). In that case, the issue was not whether the harassment was “because of sex,” but
whether it met the “severe or pervasive” requirement. The court rejected the suggestion that
“the fact that the touchings were same-sex somehow makes them more severe.” Id. at 1155.
However, the opinion was vacated by an order granting rehearing en banc, and the parties
agreed to dismiss the case before it could be reheard.
425. See generally Margaret S. Stockdale, Perceptions of the Sexual Harassment of Men, 5
PSYCH. MEN & MASCULINITY 158, 165 (2004).
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lawyers to investigate the sexuality of alleged harassers. For example,
as a result of the shoulder massages in Budenz, the alleged harasser
found himself having to “den[y] that he is [a] homosexual or that he
426
Employers, not
has ever desired a homosexual experience.”
427
individuals, are liable under Title VII. Employers may not have any
reason to protect the interests of accused harassers in discovery. It is
common practice for employers to seek declarations of
heterosexuality from accused harassers, whether in the form of
428
written affidavits or deposition testimony. An employer may even
ask an alleged harasser to testify about her sexual orientation at
429
trial.
430
Citing Oncale, courts hold such discovery is plainly relevant. It
is true that courts are increasingly requiring a plaintiff to show only
that her harasser sexually desired her, rather than “credible evidence
431
of homosexuality.” One reason for this trend is that courts are
concerned that “credible evidence of homosexuality” will be too hard
432
for the plaintiff to come by. But the trend toward requiring only

426. Budenz, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
427. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2006).
428. See, e.g., Noto v. Regions Bank, 84 F. App’x. 399, 402 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003); Hinton v.
Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 3:11-0158, 2012 WL 3626773, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 21,
2012); Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572, at
*4 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010); Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008); Reissner v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., No. 02-CV-6353-CJS, 2004 WL
941645, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2004); Nguyen v. Buchart-Horn, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-1998, 2003
WL 21674461, at *1 (E.D. La. July 15, 2003); Smith v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1109,
1117 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., No. 6-01-3247-CV-S-RED, 2003 WL 828237, at
*9 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2003), aff’d, 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005); Budenz v. Sprint Spectrum,
L.P., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (D. Kan. 2002); Pavao v. Ocean Ships, Inc., No. C-97-4059VRW, 1998 WL 917528, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 1998). In one case, an employer collected
affidavits from twelve of an alleged harasser’s coworkers stating that none had any reason to
believe the alleged harasser was homosexual. English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp.
2d 833, 846 (E.D. Va. 2002).
429. See Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 923 F. Supp. 2d 393, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (ruling on a
motion in limine).
430. Smith v. Café Asia, 256 F.R.D. 247, 252 (D.D.C. 2009); Sorrell v. District of Columbia,
252 F.R.D. 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2008); see Herron v. Chisolm, No. CV412-041, 2012 WL 4753394, at
*2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2012) (dictum) (“The discoverability [o]f sexual orientation has long been
relevant in Title VII cases. Such information can be used to prove, for example, the invidious
discriminatory intent of same-sex defendants in sexual-harassment based, Title VII cases.”).
431. For opinions demonstrative of this trend, see supra note 54.
432. See Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e find it
would often be extremely difficult to obtain evidence tending to show a person’s sexual
orientation.”); Thorne v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6, slip op. at 10 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 23, 2008) (“[E]vidence that a sexual harasser is gay may be hard to come by.
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evidence of desire has not made the issue of sexual orientation
irrelevant; indeed, as discussed, assumptions about sexual orientation
determine the result in cases in which courts must decide whether the
433
harasser desired the plaintiff.
In cases in which the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is the plaintiff, it may be the government,
rather than the employer, asking for discovery on an employee’s
434
sexual orientation. In EEOC v. Glenview Car Wash, the EEOC
issued an interrogatory asking an employer to identify the alleged
435
harasser’s “‘sexual orientation.’” The court had rejected the parties’
attempts to enter a protective order limiting public access to the court
436
files in that case. The EEOC argued that Oncale requires inquiry
into the “harasser’s gender preference,” because “[i]t would seem an
odd situation where the fact to be proven is that the harasser is
homosexual, but it may not be proven by an admission from the
437
harasser.” The EEOC clarified that it did “not believe that the
sexual orientation of harassers ought to be a matter of concern in
Title VII sexual harassment litigation,” but stated it was “concerned,
however, that if it [did] not inquire as to the sexual orientation of the
harasser it [would] be foregoing the most efficient and effective
method of providing ‘credible evidence’ that the harasser is a
438
homosexual to the fact finder.” The court deferred decision on this
439
motion several times until the case was settled.
In one particularly egregious case, Vaughn v. St. Tammany
440
Parish School Board, the plaintiff accused his former supervisor, a

Unfortunately, many homosexuals take great care to hide their sexual orientation from those
with whom they work for fear that disclosure may lead to humiliation or even physical harm.”).
433. See supra Parts I.C & II.C.
434. EEOC v. Glenview Car Wash, Inc., No. 05 C 5568 (N.D. Ill. consent decree entered
July 5, 2006).
435. Defendant’s Sur-Reply to EEOC’s Motion To Compel at 1–3, Glenview Car Wash, Inc.
(No. 05 C 5568) (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2006), 2006 WL 1773265.
436. Id. at 3.
437. EEOC’s Brief on Discovery Disputes at 3, Glenview Car Wash, Inc. (No. 05 C 5568)
(N.D. Ill. May 2, 2006), 2006 WL 1773264.
438. Id. at 6.
439. See Consent Decree, Glenview Car Wash, Inc. (No. 05 C 5568) (July 5, 2006); see also
Docket Nos. 44, 64, 66, 68, Glenview Car Wash, Inc., No. 05 C 5568 (N.D. Ill.) (deferring
decision on the motion).
440. Vaughn v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., No. 04-1633, 2006 WL 950109 (E.D. La. July
5, 2006).

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

594

[Vol. 63:525

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

male, of sexual harassment. Citing Oncale, the plaintiff submitted the
following two requests for admission to his alleged harasser:
No. 2: Admit or Deny that you ever desired to have sex or sexual
relations with Plaintiff.
No. 3: Admit or Deny that you have had sex or sexual relations with
another man at any time during the period of your employment by
441
the St. Tammany Parish School Board.

The plaintiff went so far as to oppose the defendant’s request that any
response be submitted under seal, a fact that made clear to the court
that the requests were “intended to humiliate, oppress and harass the
442
defendant.” Although the court did not allow the discovery requests
to proceed, the questions themselves stand as accusations.
Thus, civil discovery has become a tool for plaintiffs to accuse
alleged harassers of homosexuality in contexts, such as education, in
which the stigma of that label might carry extreme professional
consequences. Even if a plaintiff does not intend to intimidate her
alleged harasser, she has every incentive to seek discovery on her
harasser’s sexual orientation to bolster her case. Thus, those accused
of same-sex harassment are subjected to questioning about their
sexual histories and desires, by strange lawyers, in the formal, stifling,
and intimidating context of a deposition. They are asked to sign
sworn statements, most likely drafted by their employers’ lawyers,
attesting to their heterosexual identities, desires, and relationships.
It might be objected that sexual harassment law has privacy
implications in cross-sex cases as well, for example, by allowing
female plaintiffs to publicly impugn the professionalism and marital
fidelity of alleged male harassers with frivolous charges. Although
this may be true, the privacy implications noted here are of a different
nature because these cases not only accuse harassers of a lack of
professionalism or possible infidelity, but also of possessing a
stigmatized gay identity. The law reaffirms that stigma by placing a
harasser’s sexual orientation at the fulcrum of a same-sex harassment
claim and immunizing harassment by ostensible heterosexuals, while
punishing the same conduct if perpetrated by “open” homosexuals.
The harm is not merely that the law requires exposure of matters
considered by most people to be deeply personal and private. In this
441. Id. at *1 (denying a motion to compel due to constitutional concerns regarding the
second request and overbreadth concerns regarding the third request).
442. Id. at *2.
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context, the doctrine and discovery procedures act to reinforce the
normative value and privilege of heterosexual identification, while
underscoring the danger and stigma for anyone who might
acknowledge experiencing same-sex desire.
III. DISTRACTING FROM DISCRIMINATION
In effect, in same-sex harassment cases, liability turns on whether
a harasser identifies as gay. This doctrine protects the stability of
heterosexual marital unions while punishing expressions of
nonheterosexual identity or desires that may threaten a plaintiff’s
heterosexuality. This is not simply because the doctrine requires
443
“credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.” It results
even in cases in which courts refuse to determine the harasser’s
sexual-orientation status, and ask instead whether the harasser
444
desired the plaintiff. These disparate results are part and parcel of
the doctrine’s focus on desire. This should be troubling for anyone
concerned about gay rights or queer theories. But what about those
whose concern is sex discrimination? Some may argue that the
presumption that desire fulfills the “because of sex” requirement for a
sexual harassment claim is necessary to accomplish the aims of sex
discrimination law. Analyzing this argument requires a closer look at
the harms that sexual harassment law is intended to address. This Part
examines theories of the harm of sexual harassment, and argues
courts and lawyers should abandon the presumption that desire is a
445
proxy for sex discrimination.
443. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
444. See, e.g., Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005). For discussion
of Dick, see supra Part II.C.
445. Many people consider the harm of sexual harassment to be something other than
discrimination against men or women. Because sexual harassment law is generally grounded in
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, I do not discuss these theories at length. I am
skeptical of these views and the legal rules they would require for reasons beyond the scope of
this Article. But due to the fact that these alternative accounts of the harm of harassment may
ground state laws and employer policies and may lurk behind the outcomes in federal cases, it is
worth sketching out my bases for skepticism here.
Some consider sexual harassment harmful based on generalized disapproval of sexual
desire, particularly when expressed outside of traditional marriage and the home. See Rubin,
supra note 28, at 278. I am skeptical of these theories because, as Professor Martha Nussbaum
has described, projective disgust at sexual desire has operated in the service of group
subordination in many eras and contexts. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW 107–14 (2006).
Others consider the harm of sexual harassment to be the threat that sexuality in the
workplace poses to productivity. Professor Vicki Schultz has demonstrated how corporate
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This Part will not offer a singular normative theory of the harm
446
of harassment. It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend a
position on what theory or combination of theories, and what
corresponding set of legal rules and presumptions, would best
accomplish the statutory purpose. Rather, I argue that under any
defensible theory, the focus on sexual orientation and desire distracts
from sex discrimination, and precludes alternative legal presumptions
that might expose whether harassment is sex discrimination. This
results from what anthropologist Gayle Rubin has described as the
“fallacy of misplaced scale” in which “[s]exual acts are burdened with
447
an excess of significance.” When desire is treated as a proxy for
discrimination, same-sex desire and its threat to the plaintiff’s
heterosexuality become seen as the principal harms, thereby
displacing discrimination. This Article’s claim is that sexual
orientation and desire are not adequate proxies for discrimination in
sexual harassment law. Although this Article criticizes cases for how
they analyze evidence of sexual desire, it does not take a position on
how any particular sexual harassment case should be resolved,
because that question ultimately depends on one’s normative theory
of harassment.
For purposes of this discussion, I group views on why sexual
harassment is sex discrimination into three perspectives: (1) sexual
domination, (2) gender disadvantage, and (3) sex differentiation. This
taxonomy of theories is a stylized one, intended for purposes of
analysis of whether the presumption that desire is discriminatory is
necessary to target the harm of sexual harassment. It is not intended
for all purposes. It glosses over overlaps among, internal divisions
within, and complications related to these three theories that may be
managers have enlisted this view of harassment in deeply troubling ways: to fashion the
workplace into a sterile site of production rather than a potential site of citizenship and
community, to enforce sexual conformity, and to undercut gender equality. See Vicki Schultz,
The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2067–72 (2003).
Some regard the fundamental harm of sexual harassment not to be discrimination
against men or women, but rather, disrespect of any worker. See Anita Bernstein, Treating
Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 452 (1997) (“Hostile environment
sexual harassment . . . is a type of incivility . . . or disrespect.”). My view is that, in the U.S.
context, a legal rule based on this perspective is likely to occlude sex discrimination and strain
the political will for any antiharassment projects. See Clarke, supra note 28, at 1252–65.
446. Cf. Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Professors Bernstein and
Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1258, 1267 (1998) (arguing for “a theory that directs
attention specifically to the multiplicity and variability of the dynamics that characterize sexual
harassment”).
447. Rubin, supra note 28, at 278–79.

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

INFERRING DESIRE

597

important in other contexts. Additionally, legal rules and
presumptions that flow from one theory may be consistent with or
find support in the other theories.
The following sections will describe each theory of the harm of
harassment and will argue that the preoccupation with desire is a
distraction from that harm in each case. Each section will then turn to
what sexual harassment doctrine would look like, from each
normative perspective, if courts were to stop searching for sexual
orientation and sexual desire, and instead adopt other presumptions
related to what types of harassment are discriminatory. Figure 2 lays
out the various theoretical perspectives on why sexual harassment is
discrimination because of sex, the paradigmatic story of sexual
harassment in each case, and a nonexhaustive list of ways in which
plaintiffs might establish causation without recourse to evidence
regarding a harasser’s desires or orientation.
Figure 2. Proving Causation in Sexual Harassment Cases Without
Desire or Sexual Orientation
Theory of Sexual
Harassment

Evidentiary Routes for

Paradigm Case

Proving Causation
1.

Sexual abuse in the
Sexual Domination

workplace (Meritor v.
Vinson)

Unwanted sexual
touching

2.

Quid pro quo sexual
extortion

3.

Threats of sexual

1.

Admissions of sex

violence

Exclusion based on
Gender Disadvantage

gendered stereotypes and
structures (Harris v. Forklift
Systems)

stereotyping
2.

Sex segregation or
stratification

3.

Harassment patently
degrading to women or
men

Sex Differentiation

1.

Comparator evidence

2.

Counterfactual

Differential treatment of

admissions (for

men and women (Oncale v.

example, that plaintiff

Sundowner)

would not have been
hazed had he been a
woman)

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

598

[Vol. 63:525

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

A. Sexual Domination
The sexual-domination theory regards sexual harassment as
discriminatory because it is a mode of male domination, like other
448
forms of sexual abuse. The key here is that sexuality, in the sense of
the erotic, is the mode of domination. The paradigm case for this
449
theory is the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor v. Vinson, in
which the female plaintiff was coerced into having sex with her male
450
supervisor forty or fifty times and “even forcibly raped.” The sexual
domination theory might best be exemplified by the work of
451
Professor Catherine MacKinnon. MacKinnon argued that gender
roles are not natural but rather part of a socially constructed
hierarchy of men over women “in which women are defined as
452
gender female by sexual accessibility to men.” Sexual harassment is
the convergence of “men’s control over women’s sexuality and
453
capital’s control over employees’ work lives.” Hence, “[s]exual
harassment is discrimination ‘based on sex’ within the social meaning
454
of sex, as the concept is socially incarnated in sex roles.” Although
there are many grounds for criticism of this argument, its influence
455
cannot be denied.
The sexual-domination perspective does not support the
inference of discrimination from desire. The problem, from the
sexual-domination perspective, is domination, not desire per se. Thus,
courts err by dismissing cases in which desire seems to be lacking but
sexual domination is present. MacKinnon filed a brief in Oncale
arguing not for any desire-based rule, but rather, to establish the rule
that “if acts are sexual and hurt one sex, they are sex-based,
456
regardless of the gender and sexual orientation of the parties.”
448. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 156–58, 174 (1979).
449. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
450. Id. at 60.
451. See generally, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
452. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 107 (1987).
453. MACKINNON, supra note 448, at 174.
454. Id. at 178.
455. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the
California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 404 (2012).
456. Brief for Nat’l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No.
96-568), 1997 WL 471814. The brief expressly argued that “[s]exual orientation on its face
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This raises a number of questions, including, what if acts are
sexual and they hurt both sexes? Or, to rephrase, what does
MacKinnon’s theory have to say about the bisexual and equalopportunity harassers? The response is that these “loopholes” are
generated by a sort of legal formalism that fails to comprehend how
unwanted sexual aggression is a form of masculine dominance.
Harassment is about power, not desire. The law “typically conceives
that something happens because of sex when it happens to one sex
457
but not the other.” This leads to “head counting” in which courts
ask whether a particular harasser victimized only members of one sex,
and it is what gives rise to the theoretical possibility of the “bisexual
458
defense.” But as courts have recognized in other contexts, “both
sexes can be discriminated against based on sex at the same time from
459
a single practice.” Imagine, for example, a racist supervisor who
harasses both black and white employees using the same racial
460
epithet. Should only the black employees have a claim? MacKinnon
concluded that although “head counting can provide a quick
topography of the terrain, it has proved too blunt to distinguish
treatment whose meaning is based on gender from treatment that has
other social hermeneutics, especially when only two individuals are
461
involved.”
Gender here is about masculinity and femininity, not men and
women. Women can wield masculine power just as men can be
feminized. Thus, in her Oncale brief, MacKinnon also made an
argument about the gendered power dynamics at play: that “[m]ale
rape—whether the victim is male or female—is an act of male
disposes of nothing” while acknowledging that the sexual orientations of the perpetrator and
victim “both can be relevant (if sometimes only minimally).” Id. at 24. For another
interpretation of MacKinnon’s argument, see JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND
WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 293–94 (2006).
457. MACKINNON, supra note 452, at 107.
458. Id. at 107–08.
459. Brief for Nat’l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., supra note 456, at 22 n.6.
The Supreme Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, a law that required a widower
seeking to collect benefits from his wife’s work-related death to prove he was dependent on his
deceased wife, but presumed that widows were dependent on their deceased husbands. Id.
(citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980)). Such a law discriminates
against both widowers who may be denied benefits and working women who cannot be sure
their husbands will be able to collect benefits upon their deaths. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 146.
460. See Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual Response, 30 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1269, 1279 (1999) (“Arguably, a perpetrator who calls all workers, regardless of race,
‘niggers’ discriminates, and is liable to any person so called.”).
461. MACKINNON, supra note 448, at 108.
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dominance, marking such acts as obviously gender-based and making
462
access to sex equality rights for Joseph Oncale indisputable.” Male
here means masculine, not by men. This is the crux of the argument—
that sexual harassment is male dominance, not necessarily dominance
by men. The key is the act, not the actor. The argument parallels that
made by feminists in the 1970s about rape: that it should not be
understood as a psychological phenomenon, that is, a deviant desire
for sexual gratification, but rather, as a social phenomenon, that is, a
463
way for the rapist to express masculine dominance and aggression.
Whatever the motive, the effect of rape is to maintain male
464
supremacy, just as lynching maintained white supremacy. Sexual
harassment is not stripped of its meaning as an act of male supremacy
when the harassers are of the same sex, just as lynching would not
escape its historical connotation as a technology of racial supremacy if
it were done by and to people of the same race. Rather than
examining the harasser’s motivations, from this perspective, courts
ought to be focusing on the harm to the victim.
This theory raises other questions: What does it mean for an act
to be “sexual”? Do the “simulated” sexual acts referred to so often in
465
the case law qualify? What about humor and “horseplay”? Asking a
coworker out on a date? More importantly, is sexuality always
domination? Should the law treat all sexual expression in the
466
workplace as harassment, even if welcomed? Professor Katherine
467
Franke has referred to the sexual domination theory as “anti-sex.”
468
She argues that it “conflates sex and sexism.” The antisex position
resonates with cultural conservatives and those who view all sex in
469
the workplace as a threat to efficiency. However, very few legal
theorists argue that all sexual expression or conduct in the workplace
470
is because of sex. Indeed, adherents of the sexual domination theory
462. Brief for Nat’l Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., supra note 456, at 4.
463. E.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 15, 105
(1975).
464. Id. at 254–55.
465. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
466. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 860 (1991) (arguing for a rule
prohibiting even consensual relationships).
467. Franke, supra note 22, at 704.
468. Id. at 705; see also ZYLAN, supra note 7, at 176–79.
469. See Schultz, supra note 445, at 2063–64.
470. But see Estrich, supra note 466, at 820 (arguing that the problem with sexual
harassment is that it is “sexual,” and so “[n]ot only are men exercising power over women, but
they are operating in a realm which is still judged according to a gender double standard, itself a
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of harassment argue that their brand of feminism is not a blanket
471
condemnation of workplace sexuality. Their arguments respond to
the charge that radical feminism is antisex or eliminates the possibility
of women’s sexual agency, attributing a false consciousness to any
472
woman who chooses sex. The appropriate question, then, is how to
473
judge whether sexual expression in the workplace is unwelcome.
From this perspective, the judicial focus on desire has obscured
how sexual harassment is a mode of male domination in same-sex
cases. For example, in Smith v. Hy-Vee, the court was so preoccupied
with the search for desire and its defense of the alleged harasser’s
heterosexual status that it failed to consider the social meaning of her
simulated rape of the plaintiff—an imitation of the paradigmatic act
474
of male dominance. That the act was done by a woman to a woman,
or that she had done the same thing to a man, does not change the
social meaning of rape as male dominance. From the sexualdomination perspective, the fixation with desire has led courts to
dismiss cases in which a harasser was motivated by disgust or
aggression, allowing sexual abuse in the workplace to proceed
unchecked.
What would sexual harassment doctrine look like, from this
perspective, if the desire-based presumption were abandoned? Some
might argue that the best solution would be to move to a “sex per se”
rule that counts any unwanted sexual conduct or expression as
475
“because of sex.” “Sex” here means erotic. Ten states have enacted

reflection of the extent to which sexuality is used to penalize women”); David S. Schwartz,
When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1728 (2002) (arguing for a revival of the “sex per se” rule, primarily for practical,
rule-of-law reasons). Although MacKinnon has criticized hierarchical forms of sexual
expression in the pornography context, she has not argued that sexual harassment law should
prohibit all hierarchical sexual expression at work. See Robin West, Law’s Nobility, 17 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 437–38 & n.173 (2005) (“MacKinnon has never argued (that I can find,
and I have looked) that sexual harassment law should target hierarchic sex.”).
471. Spindelman, supra note 7, at 212.
472. This charge resonates with the claim that MacKinnon has said all sex is rape. See
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143, 143
(1995) (book review) (denying the claim).
473. See Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says? Legal and Psychological Constructions of Women’s
Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 7,
at 94, 94; West, supra note 470, at 388–89.
474. See supra notes 274–90 and accompanying text.
475. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 470, at 1702; see also Meredith Render, Misogyny,
Androgyny, and Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a Gender-Deconstructed World, 29
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 148 (2006).
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statutes defining sexual harassment to include conduct of a “sexual
476
nature.”
Although a sex per se rule would be less problematic than rules
that turn on desire or orientation explicitly, it is not without
disadvantages. A sex per se rule still requires courts to determine
whether conduct is erotic or merely social, a question they are likely
to answer by reference to normative notions of sexual orientation and
477
desire, with the same disparate results they are reaching now. Even
in states that define sexual harassment to mean conduct of a “sexual
nature,” some courts have muddled the inquiry with the question of
478
whether the harassment is motivated by desire.
Another problem with these state laws is that nonsexual
(meaning not erotic) harassment directed at one sex may not be
cognizable as sex discrimination. For example, imagine a woman is
constantly undermined and excluded from important meetings,
trainings, and mentoring opportunities because she is a woman.
Courts may not see nonsexual bullying of women thought to have
479
“taken men’s jobs” as discrimination. Even if state courts are willing
to consider nonsexual forms of harassment, they may regard them as
480
not severe or pervasive, as compared to sexual conduct. From the
476. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46A-60(8) (West 2009); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-101(E) (West 2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 151B, § 1(18) (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 37.2103(i) (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(43) (West 2012); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-02(6) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(V) (LexisNexis
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-51-1(B) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495D(13) (2009); WISC.
STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13) (West 2002); see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155B (2009); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 64a(b)(4) (Supp. 2013). Some of these statutes may be interpreted to also require
a plaintiff to show the harassment was “because of sex” as per Oncale. See Robinson v. Ford
Motor Co., 744 N.W.2d 363, 367–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (“[P]laintiff must nonetheless show
that he was subjected to a sexually hostile workplace ‘because of sex.’”). But see Cummings v.
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. 1997) (“[I]t is not necessary for a sexual harassment
plaintiff to prove that the harassment occurred ‘because of sex,’ in addition to proving the
elements of sexual harassment . . . .”).
477. Cf. Schultz, supra note 22, at 1744–47 (describing courts’ difficulty in determining
whether particular actions or words constituted conduct of a sexual nature).
478. See Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, 679 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing Barbour v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 497 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam)).
479. See Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 2003) (holding that, under Michigan
law, “gender-based harassment” is not “sexual harassment” unless it took the form of
“‘unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
or communication of a sexual nature’” (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2103(i)). But see
LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W. 2d 14, 19–21 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting the
argument that Minnesota’s statute limits sexual harassment claims to those alleging “conduct or
communication of a sexual nature”).
480. See LaMont, 814 N.W. 2d at 22.
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sexual-domination perspective, this is deeply troubling, as it
481
contributes to women’s subordination to men.
Apart from these concerns, the primary problem with a broad
sex per se rule that would cover verbal and physical harassment is
that the Supreme Court has rejected it. As Justice Scalia wrote in
Oncale, “We have never held that workplace harassment, even
harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination
because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
482
connotations.”
The Supreme Court has not, however, ruled out a presumption
that physical conduct of a sexual nature is “because of sex.” The
Department of Education has interpreted Title IX, an analogue to
Title VII in the education context, to forbid “acts of sexual violence”
483
as “a form of sex discrimination” by definition. In the Title VII
context, some courts already recognize unwelcome sexual touching as
per se discrimination, regardless of whether it is part of a sexual
484
advance. Courts might also recognize sexual extortion in the form of
quid pro quo harassment as per se discrimination, regardless of the
485
desires or ostensible orientations of harassers. Threats of sexual
assault might qualify as well. Courts might reason that these are
paradigmatic forms of masculine domination—even when wielded by
women, or against men. There may be room for interpretation when
it comes to the meaning of “sexual touching,” but doctrines that
specify what types of touching are sexual (for example, intentional
481. This is even more troubling from the gender-disadvantage perspective. See Schultz,
supra note 22, at 1687. Another problem is that a sex per se rule would create additional
incentives for employers to ban welcome and consensual relationships on the job, creating a
desexualized, sanitized, and ultimately dehumanized workplace in the service of an alienating
form of managerial efficiency. Schultz, supra note 445, at 2087. Most sexual-domination
theorists do not go so far as to take issue with welcome and consensual sex. See supra note 473.
482. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (emphasis added).
483. Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1 (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (defining “sexual violence” as “physical sexual acts
perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent”). Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1972)
(current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012)), provides that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”
484. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
485. See, e.g., Dear Colleague Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 483, at 1–2 (defining
discrimination “on the basis of sex” under Title IX to include “rape, sexual assault, sexual
battery, and sexual coercion”).
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touching of genitals or breasts) are preferable to those in which the
486
sexual nature of a touch is determined by the harasser’s orientation.
There is also room for homophobic interpretation when it comes to
whether a harasser is engaged in quid pro quo harassment: explicitly
or implicitly conditioning a professional opportunity on sex. But
making the harasser’s purported sexual orientation irrelevant to this
inquiry would be an improvement over the status quo.
B. Gender Disadvantage
The gender-disadvantage school regards sexual harassment as
discriminatory because it is a tool for enforcing sexist stereotypes and
prejudices against men and women, just as gender stereotypes and
prejudices have historically been used to exclude women from highly
487
valued forms of work. The key here is that gender, in the sense of a
set of expectations regarding masculinity and femininity, is the mode
488
of subordination. The paradigm case for this school is the Supreme
489
Court’s decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., in which the
female plaintiff was subjected not only to sexual innuendo but also to
harassing comments designed to undermine her competence as the
office’s only female manager. For example, she was asked, “‘You’re a
woman, what do you know’”; she was told that “‘[w]e need a man as
490
the rental manager’”; and she was called “‘a dumb ass woman.’”
491
The analogy here is to harassment based on race.
From the gender-disadvantage perspective, the judicial focus on
sexuality and desire misses the point entirely, as the problem is not
sexuality or desire per se, but harassment designed to preserve
486. This is not to say all sexual touching is unlawful discrimination. A plaintiff must also
demonstrate that the conduct was unwelcome. See Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09
Cv. 7821(RPP), 2012 WL 3631276, at *4, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) (distinguishing unwanted
anal and oral intercourse from a “game” involving touching of genitals “over the clothes” in
which participants adhered to certain “parameters”).
487. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 22, at 771 (describing sexual harassment “as regulatory
practice,” that “inscribes, enforces, and polices a particular view of who women and men should
be”); Schultz, supra note 22, at 1755 (describing a “‘competence-centered’ paradigm” that
“understands harassment as a means to reclaim favored lines of work and work competence as
masculine-identified turf—in the face of a threat posed by the presence of women (or lesser
men) who seek to claim these prerogatives as their own”).
488. For elucidation of the distinction between sex and gender and its implications for Title
VII doctrine, see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995).
489. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
490. Id. at 19; see Schultz, supra note 22, at 1710–12 (discussing Harris).
491. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

INFERRING DESIRE

605

492

workplaces as masculine or feminine spaces. Professor Vicki Schultz
has illustrated how the focus on desire has caused courts to
disaggregate “sexual” forms of harassment from “nonsexual” forms
of sex discrimination, and to disregard the latter or to fail to see the
493
connections between the two. Nonsexual forms of “sex harassment”
might include sabotaging women’s work; characterizing more
desirable jobs as too physically challenging, dirty, or competitive for
women; isolating women from networks of social support; or
494
withholding opportunities for training from women. The focus on
sexual desire renders irrelevant evidence about “the larger structural
context of the workplace, including the company’s record on job
495
segregation by sex.”
The focus on desire is distracting to courts and litigants. It
“creates a negative dynamic that encourages women (and sometimes
men) to frame their complaints in terms of sexual offense, even when
496
much more—or much less—may be at stake.” Take, for example,
Love v. Motiva Enterprises, a case previously discussed for finding
497
that sexual desire is inconsistent with disgust. The case also provides
a useful example of how desire may have distracted from
discrimination. Connie Love, the plaintiff, worked with Jeanne Sirey
at Motiva’s oil refinery in Norco, Louisiana. Love, who had a degree
498
in nuclear engineering, worked in the coker unit, monitoring
499
production processes via computer screens. At the time Love began
500
working with Sirey, she weighed 338 pounds. Sirey called Love a
501
“stupid bitch,” a “fat cow,” and a “failure as a woman.” Sirey
502
criticized Love for being “incapable of speaking up for herself.” She

492. See Schultz, supra note 445, at 2172–73 (arguing that the “proper goal is not to
eliminate sexual conduct, but rather to dismantle sex discrimination”).
493. Schultz, supra note 22, at 1689–90.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 1797.
496. Schultz, supra note 445, at 2152.
497. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900, 902–03 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see
supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text.
498. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Love v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 2008
WL 4286662 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008), aff’d, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (No.
07-5970).
499. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–3, Love, 2008 WL
4286662 (No. 07-5970).
500. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 2.
501. Love, 349 F. App’x at 902.
502. Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *1 n.2.
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called Love a “sorry excuse for a woman” because Love did not make
503
it “conducive for all women to come to the coker unit.” She said,
“You do not deserve my respect because of the kind of woman you
are” and asked, “How can you do the work you do as a woman and
504
expect to get respect?”
After analyzing Love’s sexual-desire theory at great length, the
district court addressed her sex-stereotyping theory almost as an
505
afterthought. The court rejected the stereotyping argument on the
506
procedural ground that it had not appeared in Love’s complaint.
Love’s attorneys, apparently, had drafted their complaint with sexual
desire, not stereotyping, in mind. The court also rejected the
argument on substantive grounds. In their summary judgment brief,
Love’s attorneys argued that Sirey was engaged in sex stereotyping on
account of Love’s failure to “conform to Sirey’s idea of a liberated,
507
physically fit woman.” But in Sirey’s comments, the court saw just
Sirey’s own “individual ideas” about “women’s liberation and
508
physical appearance.”
The court refused to connect Sirey’s
criticisms of Love’s weight to larger cultural expectations about
women’s bodies, although Sirey had made clear that her weight-based
criticisms were connected to Love’s gender, that is, her “‘failure as a
509
woman.’” Nor did the court see Sirey’s statements regarding Love’s
failure to make the coker unit conducive for other women as sex
510
discrimination. Here, Sirey faulted Love for failing to serve as a role
model, representative, or pathbreaker—special requirements placed
on Love because she was female. Sirey’s criticism may suggest that
not very many women had advanced to desirable positions in the
503. Id.
504. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 6.
505. See Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *9–10.
506. Id. at *9. This is despite the rule that “a complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for
relief to a precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally
requires only a plausible ‘short and plain’ statement of the plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of
his legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
507. Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 5.
508. Love, 2008 WL 4286662, at *10.
509. Id. at *1 n.2; see Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 643
(2001) (“[T]he question of how entrenched the stereotype is should not be relevant, so long as it
inheres in the decision-maker’s mind.”).
510. The court distinguished sex-stereotyping precedents on the ground that Love
“stereotyped [Sirey] for not acting like a woman” rather than for acting “like a man.” Love,
2008 WL 4286662, at *10. This distinction does not hold water. The sex stereotyping in Price
Waterhouse included the criticism that the plaintiff was not meeting certain expectations for
feminine behavior in her dress and demeanor. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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511

Norco plant. If the court were to take a structural account of the
harm of discriminatory harassment, sex stratification of this sort could
create a presumption that harassment was discrimination “because of
512
sex.” However, Love did not argue, and it is not clear from the
record, whether employment in the coker unit, or the refinery in
general, was characterized by sex segregation or stratification.
Preoccupation with sexual desire and sexual orientation can also
prevent consideration of sex stereotyping against men. In Kalich v.
513
AT&T Mobility, LLC, for example, a case decided by a federal
court applying Michigan state law, a male supervisor mocked the
male plaintiff in front of staff members by referring to him as
514
“‘Virginia, Margaret, and Peggy.’” He also ridiculed the plaintiff’s
515
Yorkshire terrier, calling the dog “Fluffy or Princess.” He made
comments to the plaintiff like, “‘You should sew Kristine a quilt.
Come on, Virginia. You know you can sew. Dear, you know you can
516
do it.’” He stared at the plaintiff’s rear end and said, “‘What? Do
you not eat? You are wasting away. Your pants don’t even fit you
517
right anymore. You look like a girl.’” The harasser’s comments
smack of gender stereotyping—that the plaintiff looked like a girl,
that he should sew a quilt (traditionally women’s work), and even that
he had a feminine dog. This harassment communicated to the plaintiff
that he had failed to live up to masculine norms while reaffirming the
harasser’s masculinity, a classic example of the sort of harm that
sexual harassment law should address from the gender-disadvantage
518
perspective.
Despite the sex-specific nature of these comments, the Sixth
Circuit saw no evidence the plaintiff was singled out “‘because of’ his

511. It appears from the record that most of Love’s supervisors and colleagues were males.
See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 498, at 4.
512. See infra note 526 and accompanying text; cf. Hall v. City of Chicago, 713 F.3d 325, 332,
333 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing a cross-sex hostile-environment claim because the female
plaintiff worked in a “traditionally male role[]” and her supervisor commented, “‘I could slap
that woman’”).
513. Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012).
514. Id. at 468.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. See Franke, supra note 22, at 769–71 (describing same-sex harassment cases in which
conduct “authenticates the harassers’ status as ‘real men’ and exiles [the victim] from the
domain of men”).
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gender.” The court rejected each of the three Oncale theories
520
seriatim in a conclusory paragraph. Further, Michigan law, unlike
federal law, has a separate element requiring that sexual harassment
521
be erotic in form, which this was not. The court parsed each of the
522
harasser’s statements and found no suggestions of sexual attraction.
From the gender-disadvantage perspective, it is impossible to read
this discussion without thinking the court and the Michigan statute
were entirely missing the point.
What would sexual harassment doctrine look like from the
gender-disadvantage perspective without the inference of
discrimination from desire? First, the gender-disadvantage paradigm
would support a broadened understanding of Oncale’s holding that
harassment may be because of sex “if a female victim is harassed in
such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make
it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the
523
presence of women in the workplace.” This reasoning would also
apply to men who are victims of harassment for doing “women’s
work” in female-dominated professions such as nursing or
kindergarten teaching. Second, the gender-disadvantage perspective
supports the recent trend toward increased reliance on sex524
stereotyping theories. Under these theories, harassment designed to
ensure conformity with norms for male and female comportment is
discriminatory, even if the motive is not “general hostility” toward
525
one sex. Third, the gender-disadvantage perspective supports legal
rules that focus on workplace structures rather than individuals, for
example, by supporting a presumption that harassment in a
workplace that is segregated or stratified along the lines of sex is
526
discriminatory.

519. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 471.
520. Id. The court also noted that the harasser “knew or suspected that [plaintiff] was gay,”
and that “sexual orientation” discrimination was not prohibited by Michigan law. Id.
521. See id. at 471–73 (discussing Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Mich. 2003)).
522. Id. at 473.
523. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
524. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
525. Additionally, hazing may aim to inculcate norms about jobs as properly masculine and
to ensure group cohesion in those jobs. See McGinley, supra note 7, at 1229.
526. See Schultz, supra note 445, at 2172–83 (discussing social science evidence supporting
the presumption that workers are more likely to experience sexual behaviors as discrimination
in sex segregated or stratified work environments). This would remedy the difficulty many
plaintiffs face in bringing suits in single-sex workplaces. See supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
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These legal rules are not mutually exclusive with those founded
on the sexual-domination theory—they might be employed in the
alternative or in combination. The Sixth Circuit has developed a sort
of hybrid rule that combines concerns about gender disadvantage
with concerns about sexual domination. Under this rule, harassment
is “based on sex” if it is “explicitly sexual and patently degrading to
women,” meaning “that a reasonable person, regardless of gender,
would consider the sexually offensive conduct and comments more
527
offensive to women than men.”
C. Sex Differentiation
Finally, the sex-differentiation school regards sexual harassment
as discriminatory because the harasser has taken the victim’s sex into
528
account, deviating from a norm of sex blindness. The key here is
that sex, in the sense of biological maleness or femaleness, is the
mode of differentiation. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Oncale may best
529
represent this paradigm.
At first glance, it seems this perspective most strongly supports
the presumption that desire is discrimination. A harasser
discriminates against men if (1) he only desires men and (2) he
harasses the male plaintiff out of desire. However, the post-Oncale
530
cases demonstrate this theory is not workable. To determine
whether a harasser desires only one sex, courts look to whether the
531
harasser is “openly” homosexual. Yet the group of people who are
out at work does not represent the group of people with exclusively

527. Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032, at *9
(E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2012) (citing Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 567 F.3d 263, 271–
72 (6th Cir. 2009)). In Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., the male harassers subjected
all employees, men and women, to a sexualized environment, referring to “female customers,
associates and even friends as ‘bitches,’ ‘whores,’ ‘sluts,’ ‘dykes,’ and ‘cunts’”; ogling
pornography; and discussing their strip-club exploits. Gallagher, 567 F.3d at 271. The court
concluded that even though the plaintiff was not targeted because she was a woman, a
reasonable person could have considered the harassment more offensive to women than to men.
Id.
528. See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing sex-blind norms in other
antidiscrimination contexts).
529. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); supra note 34
and accompanying text.
530. Katherine Franke has pointed out that “this reasoning works only in a world populated
exclusively by Kinsey [Zeros] and Kinsey Sixes, that is, people who are exclusively heterosexual
or exclusively homosexual.” Franke, supra note 22, at 737.
531. See supra Part I.B.
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same-sex desires. Other courts, recognizing the difficulties of
determining sexual orientation, require only evidence of sexual desire
533
for the same-sex plaintiff. But a single instance of sexual desire does
not support the inference of same-sex desires generally, let alone
534
exclusively.
Legal scholars have suggested two alternative versions of this
argument. The first is the inseparability theory: that sexual desire is
always discriminatory, because it is inextricably bound up with the sex
of the target, even for bisexual individuals. The second is the
preference theory: that courts may presume sexual desire is
discriminatory because only a small percentage of people are
indifferent to the sex of their object of attraction (in other words,
535
“perfectly” bisexual). But on closer examination, neither of these
premises supports the blanket presumption that desire is
discriminatory.
The inseparability theory posits that the law should presume that
all sexual desire—all sexualized conduct in fact—is inextricably
bound up with the sex of the target. Thus, even if we assume a
perfectly bisexual individual, whose general preferences are sex
neutral, that person’s selection of any particular target will be
informed by whether the target is a man or a woman, and how that
536
target performs gender roles. But this begs an unanswerable
theoretical question about whether there can be sexuality outside of
537
sex (meaning maleness and femaleness). It also raises questions

532. See supra notes 89–93, 96, 113–114 and accompanying text.
533. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. As discussed, however, courts are unlikely to
see same-sex sexual desire unless the alleged harasser self-identifies as gay. See supra Part I.C.
534. See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text.
535. By using the term “preference” here I do not mean to imply sexual orientation or
desires are voluntarily chosen. I mean simply a preponderance of desires for members of one
sex or the other.
536. See Schwartz, supra note 470, at 1783–84 (“To begin with, sexual conduct, whatever its
motivation (desire or something else), occurs not between theoretical constructs—biological
males and females lacking gender identity, or free-floating gender-role spirits—but between real
people who display a complex mixture of biological sex and gender and who perceive and make
assumptions about these same traits in the other. Such acts may be purged of much of their
meaning if biological sex is removed from view.”).
537. Cf. SEDGWICK, supra note 28, at 26 (“Some people, homo-, hetero-, and bisexual,
experience their sexuality as deeply embedded in a matrix of gender meanings and gender
differentials. Others of each sexuality do not.”); Yvonne Zylan, Finding the Sex in Sexual
Harassment: How Title VII and Tort Schemes Miss the Point of Same-Sex Hostile Environment
Harassment, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 420 (2006) (arguing for a distinction between
sexuality and gender).
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about what level of causal force a discriminatory motive must have:
Could it be just one motivating factor or must it be a necessary
538
condition? And whatever the quantum of causation required, it is
not clear why a plaintiff should be able to rest on evidence of desire,
rather than being required to point to evidence, such as statements by
the harasser, indicating that the plaintiff’s sex played a role in the
harasser’s selection of him as a target. Courts require this sort of
539
evidence to support sex-stereotyping claims.
A second argument is the preference theory: that monosexuality,
meaning a sexual orientation toward only one sex (heterosexuality or
homosexuality), supports the inference that the harasser took the
victim’s sex into account. This contrasts with bisexuality, in which sex
is irrelevant to desire. To refine this argument, although some
individuals might be bisexual, most nonetheless act in accord with
540
preferences, however slight, for one or the other sex. This logic
assumes a Kinseyian model of sexual orientation, in which all
individuals can be arrayed on a spectrum from 0 to 6, with 0 being
perfectly heterosexual, 6 being perfectly homosexual, and 3 being
541
perfectly bisexual. Assuming only a small percentage of the
population are Kinsey 3s, a theory of causation based on the
presumption that desire is monosexual appears attractive for a legal

538. The Supreme Court has suggested it would hold that the term “because of” in Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006), means but-for causation, in other words, that sex was a
determinative factor. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013)
(holding, in the context of Title VII’s retaliation provision, that “the plain textual
meaning[] . . . of the word ‘because’” is but-for causation and that any contrary reasoning from
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), was displaced by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)
(interpreting the term “because of” in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (2006), to require but-for causation). But even if a Title VII plaintiff does not have
proof sex was a but-for cause of discrimination, she can still prevail by demonstrating that
“sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). However, if she does so, a defendant may limit
her remedies to certain forms of declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and
costs by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that it “would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Thus, even under the
“motivating factor” standard, a plaintiff’s remedies are severely limited if a court concludes her
sex was not a but-for cause of the harassment. Oncale’s desire analysis did not rest on a
motivating-factor theory; rather, it rested on a notion of but-for causation: that in the typical
case of male-female harassment, the “proposals of sexual activity would not have been made to
someone of the same sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
539. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
540. Katz, supra note 24, at 133–35.
541. See id. at 138–39.
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doctrine seeking a shorthand for determining when conduct was
542
because of sex. Because most people have preferences for one sex
or the other and act in accord with those preferences, desire should
be presumed discriminatory.
But there are problems with importing the continuum model of
sexual orientation into the law for this purpose. First, this model is a
spatial metaphor that reduces the multiplicity of definitions of sexual
543
orientation to a single, flat dimension. Recognizing this, Kinsey
himself argued that “the world is not to be divided into sheep and
544
goats.” Second, the original Kinsey studies were based on self545
reports (now over sixty years old). We ought to be skeptical of self546
reporting in the area of sexuality, even today. The continuum model
is premised on the notion that research could identify the valence of
an individual’s sexual desires—whether monosexual or bisexual—
when people themselves struggle to identify their own sexual
547
desires. The stigma associated with bisexuality is likely to lead to
underreporting of such feelings and experiences, even to the subject
548
herself. Third, the original Kinsey study did not purport to identify
static preferences. It based its 0 to 6 designations on self-reports of
whether individuals had ever experienced “psychosexual responses”
549
or had “overt sexual experiences” with men and women. An
individual’s past sexual experiences may not have been determined
solely by internal preferences, but rather, in interaction with external
542. See id. (arguing for a rebuttable presumption of monosexuality).
543. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. Additionally, the continuum model
assumes that an increase in same-sex attractions corresponds with a decrease in cross-sex
attractions, and vice versa. More recent research suggests a spatial model with two independent
dimensions, one for same-sex attractions and one for cross-sex attractions. See, e.g., Vrangalova
& Savin-Williams, supra note 72, at 99.
544. ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 639 (1948).
545. Id. at 647; ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE E. MARTIN & PAUL
GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 471 (1953).
546. See, e.g., Timothy L. McAuliffe, Wayne DiFranceisco & Barbara R. Reed, Effects of
Question Format and Collection Mode on the Accuracy of Retrospective Surveys of Health Risk
Behavior: A Comparison with Daily Sexual Activity Diaries, 26 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 60, 65–66
(2007) (discussing discrepancies between diary and retrospective self-reports of sexual activity).
547. See supra notes 94, 96, 113 and accompanying text.
548. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
549. KINSEY, ET AL., supra note 544, at 647; KINSEY, ET AL., supra note 545, at 471. The
Kinsey scale is not widely used by researchers today because “it suggests finer gradations of
sexual orientation than are usually supported by the underlying data.” LEVAY & BALDWIN,
supra note 69, at 454. Instead, researchers use a five-point scale that includes homosexual,
mostly homosexual, bisexual, mostly heterosexual, and heterosexual. Id.
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550

opportunities and social contexts. Subsequent research calls into
question the assumption that sexual preferences remain constant over
551
time for every individual.
Another flaw in the preference theory is the presumption that
harassers experience desire in accord with their general preferences.
But what about those who experience desires contra their sexual
preferences, for example, the Kinsey 1 (almost entirely heterosexual)
who desires another man not “because of” that man’s sex, but in spite
552
of it, perhaps eroticizing the taboo? In such a case, causation would
553
be lacking for Title VII purposes. Thus, the preference theory
would seem to lend support to those court decisions dismissing samesex claims in which harassers were involved in heterosexual
554
marriages. One of the tasks of this Article has been to reveal this
significant loophole by cataloguing the many cases raising the issue.
Some research suggests that the number of people who fall into the
category of “mostly heterosexual” may be larger than those who fall
555
under any other nonheterosexual label. Moreover, this loophole
exposes the normative void beneath the preference theory. Why
should liability turn on orientation?

550. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
551. See, e.g., Savin-Williams & Ream, supra note 73, at 386–87 (“Evidence to support
sexual orientation stability among nonheterosexuals is surprisingly meager.”).
552. The preference theory may also presume that for the majority of people, a target’s sex
is a necessary precondition for desire; that is, if a person were of the other sex, he or she would
never have been desired. This claim is belied by the experiences of many individuals, selfidentified as both hetero- and homosexual, who remain with their partners through changes in
that partner’s sexual or gender identity. See, e.g., Sara Corbett, When Debbie Met Christina,
Who Then Became Chris, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 14, 2001, at 84 (describing a partnership
between two lesbians that continued following one partner’s transition from a female to a male
gender identity). See generally HELEN BOYD, SHE’S NOT THE MAN I MARRIED: MY LIFE WITH
A TRANSGENDER HUSBAND (2007); VIRGINIA ERHARDT, HEAD OVER HEELS: WIVES WHO
STAY WITH CROSS-DRESSERS AND TRANSSEXUALS (2007). The argument raises a dilemma
about whether desire is about bodies or souls. Cf. CRAIG LUCAS, PRELUDE TO A KISS
(Dramatists Play Serv. Inc. 2010) (1990) (telling the story of a young, newlywed woman whose
soul switches bodies with an elderly dying man, and looking at whether her husband’s desire
could survive her change in sex and age).
553. See Katz, supra note 24, at 136–37 (“This is analogous to a white job applicant who fails
to obtain a job at an employer that discriminates against minority applicants in favor of
whites.”).
554. See supra Part II.A.
555. See, e.g., Vrangalova & Savin-Williams, supra note 72, at 96 (“[The mostly heterosexual
identity group] was the most frequently chosen nonheterosexual identity label among both men
and women. More women selected mostly heterosexual than all other nonheterosexual
identities combined.”).
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Those in favor of the presumption that sexual desire or sexual
conduct is discriminatory often cast their arguments as a sort of
realpolitik response to a judicial need for bright-line rules to redress
556
harms to women. But the desire-based rule is not a bright line.
Rather, it is a murky space within which judges allow ostensible
heterosexuals to harass same-sex coworkers without risking their
heterosexual identities. The bright-line rule applied by courts is that
those who identify as gay must be harassing all same-sex coworkers
out of sexual desire.
A move away from the desire-based rule is not likely to leave
cross-sex harassment plaintiffs out in the cold. Other theories of
557
causation are just as likely to cover the classic scenarios. In the
typical case of, for example, quid pro quo harassment, a man or
woman should be able to demonstrate that he or she was subjected to
sexual demands at work while members of the other sex were not,
558
giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Whether the motive
was desire, hatred, power, or something else should not matter and is
not a problem courts trouble themselves with in cross-sex cases.
The fixation with desire distracts courts from straightforward
applications of the sex-differentiation principle. The logic of the sexdifferentiation principle, as articulated by Justice Scalia, is that “but
for” his sex, the plaintiff would not have been harassed. But in cases
involving masculine horseplay or hazing, courts do not consider
whether the male plaintiff would have been treated the same had he
been a woman. In EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, the male plaintiffs
556. See Estrich supra note 466, at 860; Katz, supra note 24, at 103-04; Schwartz, supra note
470, at 1702.
557. See Figure 2.
558. For discussion of Oncale’s third evidentiary route, see supra note 37 and accompanying
text. Prior to Oncale, some courts denied summary judgment based simply on evidence that a
harasser had “single[d] out one sex” alone. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288
(D.D.C. 1995); see also Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that there was “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged harassment
was gender based” because male, but not female, employees were exposed to harassment in the
form of “bagging,” which “typically involved an action aimed at a man’s groin area”). For a
recent decision adopting Oncale’s third route in a case alleging male-on-male sexual assault, see
Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2013). Although this rule does
not provide for liability when an employer can show men and women encountered identical
courses of harassment, such cases are exceedingly rare. See supra notes 57, 61 and
accompanying text. In all-male or all-female workplaces, a plaintiff may need to rely on other
presumptions or legal rules. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For example, courts
might allow such claims to proceed on the theory that harassment in all-male or all-female
workplaces should be presumed discriminatory, based on research suggesting sex-segregated
environments are prone to harassment designed to enforce gender norms. See supra note 526.
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worked at a construction site where all but three of the 292 employees
559
were men. The plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to “unwanted
touching, poking, and prodding in their genital areas” by other men, a
560
practice known as “goos[ing]” and thought to be male “horseplay.”
After one plaintiff complained, he was taunted and told that if he
were a “‘real man,’ he would address the matter in a manner other
561
than by filing a sexual harassment complaint.” The three women
testified that although they had daily contact with the construction
562
workers, they were never touched inappropriately. Both harassers
563
stated that they would never have goosed the women. One of the
harassers testified to the effect of, “Of course I didn’t do that to
564
women. What kind of a guy do you think I am?”
The court disregarded this statement as self-serving chivalry in
565
holding the harassment was not “because of sex.” It compared the
conduct to Oncale, in which it was “easy to conclude the harasser
would not have been predatory toward females” because “[t]he
566
harasser was a homosexual.” This was a mistake—there was no
finding in Oncale that any harasser was homosexual. The mistake
illustrates the grip that sexual desire has on judicial imaginations.
Looking at this case in terms of the sex-differentiation paradigm, the
court should have found sufficient evidence that the harassment was
because of sex—the harassers’ statements amount to direct
admissions that they would not have subjected the plaintiffs to the
same sort of hazing had they been women. But for their sex, the male
plaintiffs would not have been harassed. Chivalry is no less disparate
treatment because it favors women. This case reveals that the court
conceived the real harm of harassment to be unwanted same-sex
desire, not disparate treatment based on sex.
The sex-differentiation paradigm would support many of the
same evidentiary presumptions as the sexual-domination and genderdisadvantage theories. It would also support finding causation when,
for example, there is evidence showing no one of the opposite sex was
559. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2001).
560. Id. at 501–02.
561. Id. at 502.
562. Id. at 503.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 520.
565. Id. This is despite the rule that credibility determinations are the province of the
factfinder. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594, n.* (2009).
566. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d at 522.
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harassed in the same manner as the plaintiff, or a counterfactual
admission by a male harasser that he would not have subjected the
568
male plaintiff to the same sort of hazing had he been a woman.
A pessimist might argue that it seems unlikely, at this point, that
sexual desire will lose its grip on sexual harassment law. Oncale
recognized the theory and courts continue to recite it. However,
judicial opinions on this issue reflect growing concern about the
difficulties inherent in determining sexual orientations. If the
desire/orientation inquiry will not be abandoned, as a second-best
solution, then, courts ought to abandon efforts to determine the
harasser’s sexual orientation for all purposes and in all contexts, and
instead look for evidence of what I term the harasser’s “workplaceharassment orientation.” This inquiry would find that harassment was
based on sex if a harasser engaged in quantitatively or qualitatively
worse treatment of men or women in the workplace. The Seventh
Circuit described an inquiry akin to this approach in Shepherd v.
569
Slater Steels Corp., a case in which the plaintiff stated at his
570
deposition that he believed the harasser to be bisexual. The court
reasoned: “Whatever beliefs [the plaintiff] may have as to [the
harasser’s] sexual orientation and his propensity to harass women as
well as men are to a large extent irrelevant; what matters is whether
571
[the harasser] in fact did sexually harass members of both genders.”
The court refused to dismiss the case on the ground that the harasser
did not discriminate between men and women, holding that the
evidence did not show that he “harassed women at the Slater plant in
the same way and to the same degree that he allegedly harassed [the
572
male plaintiff] . . . .” Such an approach would better reflect the
social science on sexual orientation, which recognizes that there is no
single test of sexual orientation, only various definitions that may be
573
appropriate for various purposes.

567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.

See supra note 558 and accompanying text.
But see supra notes 564–66 and accompanying text.
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1011.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER CONTEXTS
This Part will draw out some lessons from the same-sex
harassment cases for determinations of sexual orientation and desire
in other contexts, and ask some preliminary questions about how the
law ought to engage with sexual orientation and desire in those areas.
Although this study concludes that determinations of sexual
desires and orientations should not function as proxies for
discrimination in sexual harassment law, it does not suggest that
ignoring sexual orientation is a possible or desirable goal for the law.
Rather, sexual-orientation categories should be foregrounded and
interrogated. In many of the cases discussed in this Article, courts
purported to set aside Oncale’s requirement of “credible evidence of
homosexuality” and look instead for evidence that the harasser
574
desired the same-sex plaintiff. But in doing so, these courts did not
set aside misconceptions about sexual orientation. Rather, they
presumed harassers were heterosexual, unless the harasser selfidentified otherwise, and further assumed that this negated any
575
possibility of same-sex desire. On the other hand, if confronted with
evidence that a harasser self-identified as gay, courts found the
576
inference of desire nearly automatic. The problem is not mere
recognition of sexual-orientation categories; it is the assumption that
specific desires necessarily follow or do not follow from orientations.
In other areas of the law that turn on findings of sexual desire, for
example, in family and criminal-law contexts, scholars, courts, and
advocates might critically consider whether similar assumptions about
577
sexual orientation are driving results.
The same-sex harassment cases show that there are still dangers
in legal doctrines that navigate sexuality categories, even though legal
and cultural norms are shifting toward a vision of variation in

574. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.
575. See supra Part I.C.
576. This was the case in, for example, Dick v. Phone Directories Co. See supra notes 376–95
and accompanying text.
577. Recent work has critically examined how race and gender norms influence
determinations of sexuality in the context of child-molestation law. See Camille Gear Rich,
Innocence Interrupted: Reconstructing Fatherhood in the Shadow of Child Molestation Law, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 609, 613–14 (2013). In light of the same-sex harassment cases, we might also ask
whether sexuality determinations in child-abuse cases are influenced by views about sexual
orientation.
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sexuality as benign or even productive. The danger may not take
the form of overzealous labeling of individuals as lesbian, gay, or
bisexual, but rather, of undercounting those who do not fit neatly into
these categories. Courts are likely to refuse to acknowledge forms of
sexuality that do not fit predefined molds, particularly the farther
they stray from the conventional model of sex within heterosexual
marriage. Although courts may be less inclined to indulge outright
homophobia, they may continue to impose normative visions of
579
appropriate sexuality that protect traditional marriages.
This study shows that definitions of sexual orientation based on
580
self-identification may not work in all contexts. When negative
consequences attach to a determination of sexuality, as in sexual
harassment law, definitions based on self-identification are likely to
have unequal results. Those who are “openly” gay, lesbian, or
bisexual will face adverse consequences, while ostensible
heterosexuals who engage in the same behaviors will not. But selfidentification may also be problematic when positive consequences
attach to a determination that a person is gay, lesbian, or bisexual.
For example, many state and local laws protect against
581
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In this context,
there is a temptation to require a plaintiff to prove she is a member of
a protected class (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender) as
582
part of her prima facie case of discrimination. The problem is that
just like in the same-sex harassment context, courts rely on narrow,
self-identification and reputation-based definitions, which distract
from the purpose of remedying discrimination and require a plaintiff
who desires the law’s protection to “out” herself. New York law, for
example, bars discrimination based on sexual orientation, including
583
“perceived” sexual orientation. In one harassment case under the
New York antidiscrimination statute, coworkers insinuated that the

578. William Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From
Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1334–35 (2010).
579. See supra Part II.A.
580. This is not to say that self-identification is always inappropriate. For example, selfidentification may work in identifying participants for employer-sponsored diversity programs
which have the goal of ensuring a critical mass of minority employees.
581. See supra note 27. Proposed federal legislation would do the same.
582. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (describing the prima facie
case of discrimination).
583. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 2010); see id. § 292(27) (defining “sexual
orientation” as “actual or perceived”).
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plaintiff was gay, taunting him for listening to “gay boy music,” and
584
calling him a “‘dick smoker.’” But the court dismissed the claim,
because the plaintiff testified “that he is a heterosexual male, was
married, fathered a child, is masculine, and has no feminine
585
characteristics, traits, tastes or habits.” The harassers testified that
586
they did not think the plaintiff was gay. This case raises the
question: Why are a harasser’s beliefs about the plaintiff’s “real”
sexual orientation controlling? The law protects on the basis of
“sexual orientation,” not “homosexuality.” The coworkers’ taunts
were indisputably pointed at the plaintiff’s sexual orientation,
whatever that orientation might have been. Moreover, their bullying
promoted the stigmatization of gay identities and superiority of
straight identities, with the potential to discourage the plaintiff or
others from coming out at work. These forms of discrimination seem
587
to be exactly what this type of statute was intended to address.
Likewise troubling are definitions based on the idea that samesex desire is always manifested in sincere, unambiguous, caring,
private, committed relationships. These sorts of relationship-based
588
definitions can undercount the population that needs protection.
For example, one basis for asylum is a likelihood of future
persecution based on “membership in a particular social group,”

584. Glinski v. Radioshack, No. 03-CV-930S, 2006 WL 2827870, at *2–3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2006).
585. Id. at *11 n.12.
586. Id.; see also Akoidu v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. B147046, 2002 WL 399476, at *5–7
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2002) (holding that a plaintiff who testified that “he was not
homosexual” and that his “coworkers knew he had been married and had a child” had failed to
establish he “was in the protected class of homosexuals or persons perceived as homosexual”);
cf. 1212 Rest. Grp., LLC v. Alexander, 959 N.E.2d 155, 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding a
finding that harassers perceived a plaintiff to be gay based on their antigay insults and
statements to coworkers that they thought the plaintiff was gay). Although I agree with the
court’s conclusion in Glinksi that the harassment was not severe or pervasive, I question its
conclusion that the harassment was not motivated by the plaintiff’s perceived sexuality.
587. For analogous arguments in the race context, see generally D. Wendy Greene,
Categorically Black, White or Wrong: The Emergence of an “Actuality Requirement” and Identity
Adjudication in Title VII Litigation, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148754 (discussing claims in which an
identity characteristic has been misperceived); Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1497 (2010) (discussing interracial solidarity claims).
588. This is not to say relationship-based definitions are irrelevant in every context. Such
definitions have obvious application in equal protection arguments for same-sex marriage.
Many scholars have described how definitions of sexual orientation status that emphasize the
importance of relationships to identities can support arguments for same-sex marriage. See
supra note 2.
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including sexual identity. In these cases, immigrants often have
590
incentives to hide their sexual identities, for fear of persecution.
Nonetheless, some tribunals have applied restrictive definitions of gay
identity requiring a consistent record of self-identification and samesex relationships. In one asylum case, although the petitioner stated
he would probably engage in a same-sex relationship if returned to
Morocco, the immigration judge (IJ) noted the petitioner had not had
“any boyfriends or other gay encounters in Morocco,” and that
although he had engaged in homosexual conduct in the United States,
“he has had no boyfriends” and did not “appear to be committed to
591
any particular homosexual relationship.” Here the IJ evaluated the
petitioner’s sexual orientation by reference to an inapplicable,
culturally specific model of gay identity as living openly in a
592
committed relationship.
The same-sex harassment cases demonstrate that if not provided
with a specific definition of the aspect of sexual orientation relevant
for the particular legal inquiry, courts will apply idiosyncratic, faulty,
or one-size-fits-all definitions. Legal actors assume that knowing
someone’s sexual orientation is a matter of common sense. But the
experience of social science researchers suggests no general definition
593
is possible—sexual orientation is a multidimensional phenomenon.
It may be consistent or inconsistent, static or dynamic, acknowledged
or unacknowledged, visible or invisible, a source of pride or shame, or
all these things at once. Any purportedly comprehensive definition of
sexual orientation will inevitably fail to match the lived experiences of
many people and is unlikely to meet the purposes of the law. Rather
than applying an all-purpose definition, courts ought to follow the
589. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I.
& N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990).
590. See, e.g., Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[The petitioner] was
not open with his friends, family members, or community about his sexuality because
homosexuality is perceived as deviant behavior in Morocco. He avoided dating and kept his
contacts with gay men to a minimum.”); Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Boer-Sedano testified that he has known he was gay since the age of seven and that he
could not live ‘a gay life openly in Mexico’ because of how he would be treated if his sexuality
were known.”).
591. See Razkane, 562 F.3d at 1286 (reversing a Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion);
see also Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 491 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing a Board of Immigration
Appeals’ opinion in which the IJ stated that “no one would perceive [the petitioner] as a
homosexual unless he had ‘a partner or cooperating person’”).
592. Razkane, 562 F.3d at 1286.
593. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
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model of social scientists in disentangling the component of sexual
594
orientation that is relevant to the legal inquiry.
CONCLUSION
If the sexual harassment cases are any indication, courts are
likely to presume that assignment of sexual orientations or sexual
desires is a facile enterprise, without recognizing that sexual
orientation might be defined along different axes for different
purposes, and that such inquiries are likely to be intrusive and entail
heterosexism. Courts, advocates, and legal scholars ought to abandon
the search for a unitary theory of sexual orientation. They should
scrutinize laws that turn on sexual desire to guard against the dangers
that the resulting determinations will be descriptively inaccurate,
normatively troubling, and legally irrelevant. There may be legal
justifications for relying on sexual-orientation categories or inferences
of desire in certain contexts. But we should not assume such
determinations are simple or necessary.

594. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A

Federal Cases on Whether Workplace Same-Sex Harassment was
595
“Because of Sex”
1. Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013)*
2. McBride v. Peak Wellness Ctr., Inc., 688 F.3d 698 (10th Cir. 2012)*
3. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2012)
4. Rayford v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 489 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2012)*
5. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012)*
6. Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, 679 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2012)*
7. Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012)*
8. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012)*
9. Brown-Baumbach v. B&B Auto., Inc., 437 F. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2011)
10. Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)*
11. Love v. Motiva Enters. LLC, 349 F. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)*
12. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009)
13. Baugham v. Battered Women, Inc., 211 F. App’x 432 (6th Cir. 2006)
14. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006)*
15. Russell v. Univ. of Tex. of Permian Basin, 234 F. App’x 195 (5th Cir. 2007)*
16. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007)*
17. Venezia v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 421 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2005)
18. Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2005)
19. Kay v. Indep. Blue Cross, 142 F. App’x 48 (3d Cir. 2005)
20. Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005)*
21. Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005)*
22. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005)*
23. Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other
grounds as recognized in Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164
(10th Cir. 2006)
24. James v. Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App’x. 864 (10th Cir. 2004)*
25. Noto v. Regions Bank, 84 F. App’x 399 (5th Cir. 2003)*
26. McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 2003)*
27. Linville v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 335 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2003)
28. King v. Super Serv., Inc., 68 F. App’x. 659 (6th Cir. 2003)*
29. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003)

595. Those cases which address an alleged harasser’s sexual orientation or sexual desire for
the plaintiff or analyze whether a plaintiff’s evidence or allegations suffice under Oncale’s
sexual desire or sexual orientation inquiry are noted with an asterisk.
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30. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
31. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002)*
32. Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)*
33. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001)
34. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001)*
35. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)
36. Leake v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouse, 5 F. App’x 228 (4th Cir. 2001)
37. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)
38. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000)
39. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000)
40. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000)*
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225. Cox v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B, 1999 WL 1317785 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22,
1999)
226. Pirolli v. World Flavors, Inc., No. CIV.A.98-3596, 1999 WL 1065214 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
23, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 263 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2001)*
227. Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1999)*
228. Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Minn. 1999)
229. Merritt v. Del. River Port Auth., No. CIV.A.98-3313, 1999 WL 285900 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
20, 1999)*
230. Lee v. Gecewicz, No. CIV.A.99-158, 1999 WL 320918 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1999)
231. EEOC v. Trugreen Ltd. P’ship, 122 F. Supp. 2d 986 (W.D. Wis. 1999)
232. Carney v. City of Shawnee, 38 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D. Kan. 1999)
233. Silva v. E.U.A. Nova, No. 97-117ML, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22977 (D.R.I. Jan. 22,
1999)*
234. Pavao v. Ocean Ships, Inc., No. C-97-4059-VRW, 1998 WL 917528 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
30, 1998)*
235. Landrau Romero v. Caribbean Rests., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D.P.R. 1998)*
236. Bacon v. Art Inst. of Chi., 6 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Ill. 1998)

CLARKE IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/13/2013 6:29 PM

632

[Vol. 63:525

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX B

Federal Cases on Workplace Same-Sex Harassment:
Plaintiff Prevailing on “Because of Sex” Element
Oncale Theory 1: Sexual Desire

596

1. Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2012)
2. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2012)*
3. Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032 (E.D.
Ky. Feb. 2, 2012)
4. Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
aff’d, 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011)*
5. Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007)
6. Russell v. Univ. of Tex. of Permian Basin, 234 F. App’x 195 (5th Cir. 2007)*
7. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002)*
8. Shepherd v. Slater Steels Co., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999)*
9. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998)*
10. Morris v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., No. 09-cv-5692 (SLT)(RML), 2012 WL 5932784
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012)*
11. Caravantes v. 53rd St. Partners, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 7821(RPP), 2012 WL 3631276
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012)*
12. Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
13. Owens v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00699-TWT-RGV, 2012 WL 1454082
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2012), adopted by No. 1:11-cv-00699-TWT-RGV, 2012 WL
1432389 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2012)*
14. Walton v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 10-344, 2011 WL 6016232 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2011)
15. Robinson v. Carefocus, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-208, 2011 WL 2672037 (E.D. Tenn. July 8,
2011)
16. Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)*
17. Provensal v. Gaspard, No. 10-4276-SS, 2011 WL 2004416 (E.D. La. May 23, 2011)
18. Knobbe v. Artco Casket Co., No. 4:10CV322 CDP, 2010 WL 2947731 (E.D. Mo. July
22, 2010)
19. Reagan v. City of Knoxville, No. 3:07-cv-189, 2010 WL 2639933 (E.D. Tenn. June 28,
2010)
20. Rogers v. Johnson, No. C08-4395 TEH, 2010 WL 1688564 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010)

596. An asterisk indicates the court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficient allegations or
evidence that the alleged harasser was homosexual.
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21. Davidson-Nadwodny v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. CCB-07-2595, 2010 WL 1328572
(D. Md. Mar. 26, 2010)
22. Cragle v. Werner Enters., Inc., Nos. 3:07cv2132, 3:07cv2133, 2010 WL 936774 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 11, 2010)
23. Benitez v. Am. Standard Circuits, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
24. Smith v. Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2009)*
25. Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 2d 868 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)*
26. Gray v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 3:07-CV-00374, 2009 WL 305521 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7,
2009)
27. Thorne v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 00-0913-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2008)*
28. Ogilvie v. N. Valley EMS, Inc., No. 07-485, 2008 WL 4761717 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2008)*
29. Johnson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 2:06-CV-173, 2008 WL 2781660 (E.D. Tenn. July 14,
2008)*
30. EEOC v. Belle Glade Chevrolet-Cadillac-Buick-Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc., No. 0780169-CIV, 2008 WL 62159 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2008)
31. EEOC v. Turkey Hill Dairy, Inc., No. 06-CV-04332, 2007 WL 2407095 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
8, 2007)
32. Thomas v. Willie G’s Post Oak Inc., No. H-04-4479, 2006 WL 1117959 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
25, 2006)*
33. Peraita v. Don Hattan Chevrolet, Inc., No. 04-1197-WEB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38565
(D. Kan. Dec. 20, 2005)
34. Warmkessel v. E. Penn Mfg. Co., No. Civ.A.03-CV-02941, 2005 WL 1869458 (E.D. Pa.
July 28, 2005)*
35. Tainsky v. Clarins USA, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
36. Cromer-Kendall v. District of Columbia, 326 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2004)*
37. Jones v. Potter, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004)*
38. Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.R.I. 2003)*
39. Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1999)*
40. Merritt v. Del. River Port Auth., No. CIV.A.98-3313, 1999 WL 285900 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
20, 1999)*
41. Bacon v. Art Inst. of Chi., 6 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Ill. 1998)

Oncale Theory 2: Hostility Toward One Sex
1. Piston v. Cnty. of Monroe, No. 08-CV-6435P, 2012 WL 4490652 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2012)
2. Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032 (E.D.
Ky. Feb. 2, 2012)
3. Amezaga v. Potter, No. 04-1944 (RLA), 2007 WL 1387287 (D.P.R. May 8, 2007)
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4. Bailey v. Henderson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2000)

5. Lee v. Gecewicz, No. CIV.A.99-158, 1999 WL 320918 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1999)

Oncale Theory 3: Different Treatment of Sexes
1. Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013)
2. Brown-Baumbach v. B&B Auto., Inc., 437 F. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2011)
3. Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other
grounds as recognized in Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164
(10th Cir. 2006)
4. Leake v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouse, 5 F. App’x 228 (4th Cir. 2001)
5. Piston v. Cnty. of Monroe, No. 08-CV-6435P, 2012 WL 4490652 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2012)
6. McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 923 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2011)
7. Strom v. Holiday Cos., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Iowa 2011)
8. Durkin v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
9. Stevens v. Water Dist. One, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Kan. 2008)
10. Amezaga v. Potter, No. 04-1944 (RLA), 2007 WL 1387287 (D.P.R. May 8, 2007)
11. Ashmore v. J.P. Thayer Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (M.D. Ga. 2004)
12. Bray v. City of Chi., No. 01C7770, 2002 WL 31427026 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2002)
13. EEOC v. Pentman, LLC, No. 1:01CV0043, 2002 WL 548858 (W.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2002)
14. Winters v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2001)
15. Merritt v. Del. River Port Auth., No. CIV.A.98-3313, 1999 WL 285900 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
20, 1999)
16. Carney v. City of Shawnee, 38 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D. Kan. 1999)

Price Waterhouse: Sex Stereotyping
1. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009)
2. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)
3. Davis v. Vt. Dep’t of Corr., 868 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D. Vt. 2012)
4. EEOC v. Turkey Hill Dairy, Inc., No. 06-CV-04332, 2007 WL 2407095 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
8, 2007)
5. Warmkessel v. E. Penn Mfg. Co., No. CIV.A.03-CV-02941, 2005 WL 1869458 (E.D. Pa.
July 28, 2005)
6. EEOC v. Grief Bros., No. 02-CV-468S, 2004 WL 2202641 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004)
7. Fischer v. City of Portland, No. CV02-1728, 2004 WL 2203276 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2004)
8. Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Or. 2002)
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Other Theories
1. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
2. Watts v. Lyon Cnty. Ambulance Serv., No. 5:12-CV-00060-TBR, 2013 WL 557274
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2013)
3. Bligh-Glover v. Rizzo, No. 1:08CV2788, 2012 WL 4506029 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2012)
4. Bradford v. Dep’t of Cmty. Based Servs., No. 09-206-DLB-CJS, 2012 WL 360032 (E.D.
Ky. Feb. 2, 2012)
5. Aguilera-Corona v. Kefro LLC, No. Civ. 04-6283-AA, 2006 WL 696091 (D. Or. Mar.
14, 2006)
6. Vargas-Cabán v. Caribbean Transp. Servs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.P.R. 2003)
7. Burley-Sullivan v. City of Phila., No. Civ.A. 00-2413, 2001 WL 1175127 (E.D. Penn.
Sept. 17, 2001)
8. Preston v. City of Danville, No. 99-461, 2000 WL 33117411 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 22, 2000)
9. Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Minn. 1999)

